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I. INTRODUCTION
This survey covers the decisions of the Florida courts and Florida
legislation produced during the period from July 1, 1995 through June 30,
1996, especially selected for this article as being of potential interest to the real
estate practitioner.
II. ATTORNEYS' FEES
Jakobi v. Kings Creek Village Townhouse Ass'n.1 The Third District
Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of Jakobi's motion for
attorneys' fees as prevailing party in a suit against his townhouse association
under section 57.105(2) of the Florida Statutes.2 The dispute arose from the
Association's Architectural Control Committee's denial of Jakobi's request for
permission to install screening on the front of his unit. Jakobi filed suit for an
injunction against the Association and the parties stipulated to an agreement
allowing Jakobi to build the enclosure. Jakobi then moved for attorney's fees,
noting that the Association's bylaws contained a provision allowing attorneys'
fees to the Association in any litigation with an owner, and arguing that the
reciprocity mandated by section 57.105(2) entitled him to fees as the prevailing
party.
1. 665 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
2. 1L at 328. The court also held that the 1992 townhouse deed, through which Jakobi had
received title to the townhouse, constituted a novation of the bylaws and declaration of covenants
and restriction as between the Kings Creek Village Association, Inc. ("Master Association"), the
Kings Creek Village Townhouse Association, Inc. ("Association"), and the owner. Such a
finding was crucial to Jakobi's case for fees because of the provision in the section declaring that
"[tlhis act shall take effect October 1, 1988, and shall apply to contracts entered into on said date
or thereafter," while the bylaws and original declaration of restrictions and covenants came into
existence prior to 1988. Id. at 327.
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The appellate court determined "[t]his was an action 'with respect to the
contract' as contemplated by Section 57.105(2),' 3 and cited Ryan v. Town of
Manalapan4 for the proposition that the declaration and bylaws are contrac-
tual. In holding that the 1992 townhouse deed, through which Jakobi was
conveyed title, constituted a novation, 5 the appellate court noted that the
essential elements were present,6 since this requirement may be implied from
the circumstances of the transaction and conduct of the parties.7 Based on the
finding of a novation, the appellate court determined Jakobi was entitled to
claim the reciprocity benefits of section 57.105(2).s Thus, Jakobi was entitled
to the fee award. 9
Seminole County v. Clayton.10 The Fifth District Court of Appeal
reversed and remanded an attorneys' fee award in this eminent domain action.
Seminole County took a 2.8 acre tract of land owned by Pauline Amdt, which,
at the inception of the action, had no direct access to a public road. Resolution
of the case depended on the availability of feasible access. The County
obtained three appraisals and based its first offer on the lowest. Arndt's
appraiser assumed availability of access to a highway interchange and, as
might be expected, arrived at a higher appraisal. The parties settled without a
trial, leaving the attorneys' fees to Arndt's attorneys to be decided by the court,
which applied section 73.092 of the Florida Statutes and found a reasonable
fee based on hourly rates to be $25,425." In addition, in what the Fifth
District Court of Appeal labeled a "double decker" application of the statute,
the trial court added a twenty percent "benefit" fee for the difference between
the County's initial offer and the eventual settlement yield which amounted to
$133,836, bringing the total fee to $159,261, or $1,276.64 an hour.12
3. Id.
4. 414 So. 2d 193, 196 (Fla. 1982).
5. Jakobi, 665 So. 2d at 327.
6. Id. It decided so, in part because "[w]hen the current owner took title with record notice
of [the provisions of the bylaws and declaration] he assumed a new personal contractual
obligation with the master and townhouse associations and his seller was discharged of his
personal contractual obligations," thus meeting the requirements of mutual consent to the
novation. Id. at 328 (citing Prucha v.,Guarantee Reserve Life Ins. Co. of Hammond, 358 So. 2d
1155, 1157 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1979)).
7. Id. (citing Sans Souci v. Division of Fla. Land Sales and Condominiums, 448 So. 2d
1116,1121 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
8. Id. at 327.
9. Jakobi, 665 So. 2d at 327.
10. 665 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
11. Id at 364.
12. Id.
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In rejecting the trial court's fee computation, the appellate court opined
that "[w]hatever section 73.092 may mean, and it admittedly is lacking in
specificity, it cannot reasonably have been intended by the Florida Legislature
to produce this result."' 3 The appellate court, in assessing attorneys' fees, is
not required to abandon its own expertise or common sense, and it should
closely scrutinize awards to ensure reasonableness.' 4 Here it appeared that the
fee had been intended as punishment for perceived low-balling by the County
in its initial offer which, even if true, would not warrant "the imposition of
exorbitant attorney fees.'
II. BouNDARIEs
Jones v. Rives.16 For lack of competent substantial evidence, the First
District Court of Appeal reversed the jury finding of a boundary agreement
between adjacent property owners.' 7 Appellees purchased land adjacent to
appellant's and had timber cut from a section south of an old fence on the land.
The survey performed by both parties showed that appellant's property ran
nearly 100 feet south of the old fence. Appellant filed suit for cutting the
timber, alleging damages and trespass. Appellees counterclaimed, asserting
several claims of title to the relevant land. Appellant prevailed on a motion for
summary judgment on the issue of ownership and right to possession.' 8 As to
the purported boundary agreement, the jury accepted appellee's claim that the
old fence marked the true boundary between the properties.' 9
The appellate court reiterated the essential elements of a boundary by
agreement:
(1) an uncertainty or dispute as to the true boundary; (2) an agree-
ment, either oral or implied, between the adjacent landowners that
a certain line will be treated by them as the true line; and (3) subse-
quent occupation by the parties in accordance with that agreement
13. Id. at 364.
14. Id.
15. Clayton, 665 So. 2d at 365. The court also rejected County arguments that section
73.092 of the Florida Statutes is an unconstitutional "offensive encroachment" upon the judicial
function of regulating attorneys' fees. Id.
16. 21 Fla. L. Weekly D236 (1st Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 1996).
17. Id. at D237.
18. Id. at D236.
19. Id
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for a period of time sufficient to show a settled recognition of the
line as a permanent boundary."
20
The court found the first element lacking because no testimony had been given
that there was uncertainty or a dispute between the parties as to the true
boundary until the appellant had the property surveyed.2' In addition, the
evidence of there being three conversations, only one of which involved the
record landowners, regarding an agreement was legally insufficient.22 As to
the third element, although there is no set amount of time to show settled
recognition of the agreed boundary,2 evidence here was legally insufficient.24
IV. BROKERS
Schwey v. Vara.2 A piece of land was subject to a right of first refusal
when the broker contacted the owners with a possible buyer. The owners
accepted an offer and signed a contract of sale that provided for a cash sale and
the payment of a commission to the broker. However, the contract also
provided that it would be void and that the broker would not receive a commis-
sion if the right of first refusal was exercised. The right of first refusal was
exercised by submitting a contract for exactly the same cash price, but it did
not contain a provision for a broker's commission. The broker's potential
buyer did not question the validity of the right of first refusal or that it had
been validly exercised, but the broker did. She sued for a commission. The
trial court ruled in favor of the seller and the district court agreed.26
Apparently, there was no listing agreement with this broker. The only
brokerage agreement was the provision for the payment of a commission in the
first contract of sale. The district court stated that "[t]he broker has cited no
authority to support its argument that it is entitled to complain about the terms
or that it is entitled to a commission under these circumstances."27 What is
meant by "under these circumstances" is not completely clear. Perhaps it
20. Id. at D237 (citations omitted).
21. Jones, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D237.
22. Id-
23. Id. (citing Campbell v. Noel, 490 So. 2d 1014, 1016 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986)).
24. Id. In making this determination, the appellate court noted the appellees had purchased
the land in 1988, appellant had a survey made in June 1989, and appellant filed suit in January of
1990. Id
25. 674 So. 2d 935 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judge Klein wrote the opinion in which
Judges Dell and Stevenson concurred.
26. Md. at 936.
27. It
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means that if neither the seller nor the broker's possible buyer challenged the
exercise of the right of first refusal, then the broker had no standing to do so
either. This seems unlikely. Certainly the broker was either a party to the
contract of sale or an intended third party beneficiary of that contract and, as
such, had enforceable rights. On the other hand, perhaps the court meant that
the broker was in no position to claim that the right of first refusal had not been
validly exercised when it obviously had been. This seems more likely since
the court pointed out that "[a] right of first refusal exercise need only be
identical to the offer terms which are essential. 28 Under this interpretation it
is apparent that the court thought that the brokerage term was not "essential."
Neither interpretation feels entirely satisfying to this author.29
A better justification for the decision would be that this broker produced
an unsolicited offer to buy the property. The broker's commission term in that
offer was drafted by the broker. Under the general rules of contract interpreta-
tion, any ambiguity in a contract should be interpreted against the one who
drafted it and in favor of the other party. Applying that rule, a reasonable
person would interpret the provision to require the seller to pay a commission
only if the broker's prospect purchased the property or was prevented from
doing so by the breaching seller, not if the right of first refusal was exercised.
If the broker wanted a commission regardless of who was the ultimate pur-
chaser, she should have unambiguously provided for that in the contract.30 The
seller might not have accepted an offer with that unambiguous provision.
South Pacific Enterprises, L.P. v. Cornerstone Realty, Inc.31 A hospital
enlisted a real estate broker to help it look for a site on which to develop a
medical facility. The broker showed the hospital's agent the land in question.
At the request of the hospital, the broker even submitted a development plan
for that land, and they entered into a client registration letter that provided the
broker would get a commission if any of certain entities bought or leased the
land. However, another developer heard about the hospital's interest in this
land and submitted its own development to the hospital. They excluded the
broker from the negotiations that followed. After reaching agreement, the
28. Id.
29. Professor Brown.
30. See City Nat'l Bank of Miami Beach v. Lundgren, 307 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 316 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 1975) (explaining in dicta that a landowner could be
required to pay a commission to a broker who had found a prospective purchaser who was ready,
willing, and able even though another exercised a right of first refusal because that was what the
brokerage agreement provided).
31. 672 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judge Shahood wrote the opinion. Judge
Warner and Associate Judge Speiser concurred.
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hospital and the developer created a limited partnership that acquired and
developed the land. The broker sued for its commission, but the hospital
defended on the grounds that the broker had neither introduced the eventual
buyer to the seller nor participated in the negotiations that led to the sale. The
broker prevailed in the trial court and the district court affirmed on this issue.32
The district court agreed that the broker was not entitled to recover its
commission based upon the client registration letter.33 Construing the letter
against its drafter, the broker, the letter did not provide for a commission upon
the sale to this buyer. The court, however, recognized that this was not the
only theory under which this broker could recover. A broker who shows
properties to a prospective buyer is entitled to a commission when the broker is
the procuring cause of the sale. 4
The term "procuring cause" has been defined as "one who initiates
negotiations by doing any affirmative act to bring buyer and seller together
such as placing signs on the property, promoting calls from prospective buyers,
or showing the property to prospective purchasers. 35 No one specific act is
essential. So, this broker's failure to introduce the buyer to the seller or
participate in the negotiations did not preclude the court from finding that it
was the procuring cause. Moreover, the seller could not rely on the broker's
failure to participate in the sales negotiations because the buyer and seller had
prevented the broker from participating. The court found ample evidence in
the record to support the conclusion that the broker had played a significant
role in bringing the parties together.
36
The contract of sale had also contained certification by both parties that
they had not employed or dealt with a real estate broker. It also provided an
indemnity provision regarding any brokerage commission that might arise.
The trial court had denied all cross claims for indemnification. On this issue,
the district court reversed.37 Under this contract provision, the developer and
the buyer were entitled to indemnification from the hospital that had dealt with
the broker.
38
32. Id. at 571. However, the case was reversed and remanded for the proper calculation of
damages and on the issue of indemnification.
33. IdM at 570.
34. Id.
35. Id. (quoting Ehringer v. Brookfield & Assocs., 415 So. 2d 774, 775-76 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1982)).
36. South Pacific, 672 So. 2d at 570.
37. 1&.
38. Id.
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V. BUILDING CODE
Martin County v. Indiantown Enterprises, Inc. The Fourth District
Court of Appeal reversed a judgment against Martin County.4° Martin County
inspectors found the building in this case to be out of compliance with the
building code, and it gave notice to the owner that the building would be
demolished by the County if the owner failed to bring the premises into
compliance with the provisions of the code. Then, the owner sold the building
to a buyer who knew he had only thirty days to obtain a permit and keep the
County from demolishing the building.
4
'
Rather than complying with the County regulations providing for an
extension of the time,42 the owner had his architect contact County officials by
telephone. The County's Building Administrator told the architect that an
extension could be obtained by contacting the department and satisfying it
"that the renovations would be accomplished within a short period. 43 The
owner's architect showed a set of renovation plans to a technician at the
Building Department, and, later, the owner's attorney was told by a code
enforcement officer that "'the status on this file is it's on hold." '44 However,
after placing a temporary hold on demolition, the County Administrator told
the code enforcement officer to proceed with the demolition since the owner
made no progress on the property's renovations and "[t]he buyer made no
attempt to appeal to the Board for an extension of the demolition order."45 For
the County's demolishing the building, the buyer recovered $32,000 in
damages on theories of negligence and promissory estoppel. Although the jury
found the buyer thirty-five percent comparatively negligent, the trial court
judge refused to reduce the award proportionately.46
The appellate court reversed, holding that Martin County was entitled to a
directed verdict on both the negligence and promissory estoppel theories. 41
The court first noted that the buyer's negligence theory was based on his
39. 658 So. 2d 1144 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
40. Id. at 1146.
41. Id. at 1145.
42. The court noted that § 6-54 of the County regulations provides for such an extension
only 'for cause by appeal to the board of building adjustments and appeals."' Id. at 1145
(quoting MARTIN COUNTY, FLA., REGULATIONS § 6-54 (1995)).
43. Id.
44. Indiantown, 658 So. 2d at 1145.
45. Id. at 1145.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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contention that the County's employees supplied him with incorrect informa-
tion regarding the extension of the demolition deadline.48 The court apparently
felt that the County was immune from liability for this conduct because the
employees' acts were "'discretionary functions peculiar to government and
there can be no liability imposed upon ... [the County] because of the manner
of performance of those functions.' 49 Furthermore, the buyer's reliance on
the oral communications with the County employees was misplaced because
"[t]he code of regulations plainly set out the exclusive method for seeking such
extensions."50
The court also rejected the promissory estoppel theory, relying on
Alachua County v. Cheshire,5 1 stating that such a theory "requires 'affirmative
conduct' by the governmental entity, not merely negligence. ' 2  Apparently,
the County's employees' conduct failed to rise to that level, but the opinion
failed to offer any explanation why. The appellate court also determined that
the buyer's promissory estoppel theory was untenable because he could not
reasonably rely on the actions of the County officials.5 3  In light of the
County's regulations regarding extensions, the court concluded that "[c]ourts
usually shrink from finding an estoppel against a government entity where the
actions of the official are unauthorized or unlawful.
5 4
VI. BUTLER ACT
Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Key West
Conch Harbor, Inc.55 Beginning in 1942, Key West Conch Harbor's ("Key
West") predecessor in title obtained several permits from the Army Corps of
48. Id.
49. Indiantown, 658 So. 2d at 1145 (quoting City of Tarpon Springs v. Garrigan, 510 So. 2d
1198, 1199-200 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987)).
50. Id. The court went on to declare that the failure of the "informal remedy" which the
buyer had sought could not "create any enforceable duties to make out a cause of action in
negligence." Id. No legal authority was cited by the court for this proposition of law, and it was
not clear whether the court was fashioning its own proposition or basing this conclusion as an
implication of the proposition quoted earlier in the City of Tarpon Springs opinion. See City of
Tarpon Springs, 510 So. 2d at 1200.
51. 603 So. 2d 1334 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
52. Indiantown, 658 So. 2d at 1145 (quoting Cheshire, 603 So. 2d at 1334).
53. Id. at 1145-46.
54. Id. at 1146. See, e.g., Corona Properties of Fla. v. Monroe County, 485 So. 2d 1314
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Enderby v. City of Sunrise, 376 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1979)).
55. 21 Fla. L. Weekly D1430 (3d Dist. Ct. App. June 28, 1996).
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Engineers for dredging and improving offshore submerged lands in Garrison
Bight. The predecessor bulkheaded and filled a parcel ("Parcel B" of the
exhibits), later receiving a 1951 Butler Act56 deed. The Act allowed upland
riparian owners to obtain title land "'bulkheaded or filled in or permanently
improved."' 57 The question before the third district was whether the predeces-
sor sufficiently improved another parcel ("Parcel A") contiguous and seaward
of Parcel B "and should therefore have obtained title to that land as well.
58
The predecessor had constructed a 373 foot pier on Parcel A prior to the
effective date of the repeal of the Butler Act, May 29, 1951. A 138 foot
extension was also added to the pier prior to that critical date. The Trustees
produced no evidence to substantiate their claim that the improvements
occurred after the date. The trial court held that the dredging of the entire dock
was completed before May 29, 1951 .59 The trial court concluded fee simple
title to Parcel A vested in Key West by virtue of those improvements. 60 The
court entered judgment that Key West held fee simple title in the submerged
lands within 500 feet of its concrete bulkhead.6'
Affirming, the appellate court noted that "the dredged area is adjacent to
the parcel of land that was filled. 62 The Butler Act would not have transferred
title had the landowner dredged submerged lands out of the bight for the sole
purpose of filling another parcel of land.63 Noting that what constitutes an
improvement under the Butler Act must be determined on a case-by-case basis,
the court added that Key West's title was subject to a public navigational
easement. 64
Judge Gersten wrote a lengthy, provocative dissent highly critical of the
majority, noting at the outset that he did not feel that the Butler Act confers
65Florida coastline to a private party. Gersten eventually characterized the
majority's holding as "this Great Land Giveaway. 66
56. 1921 Fla. Laws ch. 8537.
57. Key West Conch Harbor, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D1430 (citations omitted).
58. Id.
59. IU.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Key West Conch Harbor, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D1430.
63. Id.
64. d. at D1431.
65. Id. (Gersten, J., dissenting).
66. Ma. at D1432.
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VII. CONDOMINIUMS
Oakland East Manors Condominium Ass'n v. La Roza.67 The Fourth
District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of a condominium
association's claim for foreclosure.68 In doing so, the appellate court relied on
the acceptance of benefits doctrine because, since entry of final judgment, the
appellee paid the amount.69 However, the court reversed the circuit court's
refusal to award prejudgment interest of eighteen percent and attorneys' fees
since the bylaws provided for unpaid assessments to bear interest at the highest
rate permitted under Florida's usury laws, as well as for attorneys' fees.70 The
trial court simply lacked discretion to refuse these awards.
71
Scudder v. Greenbrier C Condominium Ass'n.72 In this case, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal took a more current look at condominium associa-
tions' assessments for off-site transportation costs.73 The Associations in these
consolidated cases began assessing the unit owners for these services on
January 1, 1988. The owners objected, claiming the assessment was improper
under the court's decision in Rothenberg v. Plymouth A Condominium Ass'n 74
and a 1988 amendment to section 718.115(1) of the Florida Statutes, which
provided that reasonable transportation services could be billed as a common
expense if the services had been provided from the date control of the board of
association was transferred from the developer to the unit owners or if the
condominium documents or bylaws contained provisions stating as much.75
Another point of dispute was the "one-rider rule" under which only one pass
67. 669 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
68. Id. at 1139.
69. Id.
70. Il at 1139-40 (citing FLA. STAT. § 718.303 (1993); Sybert v. Combs, 555 So. 2d 1313,
1314 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Brickell v. Bay Club Condominium Ass'n v. Forte, 397 So.
2d 959, 960 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 408 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 1981)).
71. Id.
72. 663 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). In this case, the court withdrew its prior
opinion at 20 Fla. L. Weekly D2278 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 11, 1995) in order to correct a
misstatement made at page 19 of the earlier slip opinion. This case consisted of two consolidated
appeals from the Circuit Court for Palm Beach County. Scudder, 663 So. 2d at 1634. The two
appellee condominium associations are situated in Century Village in West Palm Beach. Id at
1364. The appellants are unit owners in the communities who objected to the disputed off-site
transportation assessments. Id.
73. Scudder, 663 So. 2d at 1364.
74. 511 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App.), review denied, 518 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 1987).
75. Scudder, 663 So. 2d at 1365. This amendment became effective July 1, 1988. Id at
1364.
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for use of the transportation was issued to unit owners so that only one resident
per unit could use the system.76
From an earlier decision, the court remanded the case for the trial court
77
to determine:
(1) whether the transportation services had been continuously pro-
vided by the Associations from the date control was turned over to
the Unit Owners; (2) whether the transportation service had to have
been continuously paid for as a common expense; (3) whether the
Associations [sic] "one-rider rule" was valid; and (4) whether
Florida Statutes Chapter 88-148 was constitutional.78
On remand, the trial court found that the services had been continuously
provided by the Associations; that the Associations were not required to prove
that the system was specifically paid for as a common expense continuously
during the relevant period; that limited seating provided a reasonable basis for
the "one-rider rule;" and that chapter 88-148 was not constitutionally vague.
79
The Fourth District Court of Appeal first addressed the issue of whether,
as the unit owners contended, the services must have been provided "by the
Associations" during the relevant period, and if so, whether the trial court's
determination was supported by competent substantial evidence.80 After
conceding that, on its face, section 718.115(1) contained no identification of a
required provider of services, the court suggested that such an interpretation of
the statute would produce an unreasonable or absurd result.81 The court felt
that if services were assessed by associations but provided by an independent
entity, condominium associations would somehow receive a windfall.8 2 The
court's interpretation was consistent in light of the 1988 amendment which
was passed "in response to this court's opinion in Rothenberg."83 The court
submitted that the amendment was intended "to benefit those associations that
76. Id. at 1368.
77. Id. at 1364 (citing Scudder v. Greenbrier C Condominium Ass'n, 566 So. 2d 359, 361
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990)).
78. Id.
79. Scudder, 663 So. 2d at 1364.
80. Id. at 1365.
81. Id. See State v. Egan, 287 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973); City of St. Petersburg v. Seibold, 48 So.
2d 291 (Fla. 1950).
82. Id.
83. Id. In Rothenberg, the court held that transportation services were not assessable be-
cause they did not directly relate to operation, maintenance, repair or replacement of condomin-
ium property. 511 So. 2d at 652.
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may have provided transportation services to their unit owners in the good
faith belief that they were authorized to do so." 84 Therefore, it is reasonable to
require the Association to be the provider of services.85 The appellate court
ultimately concluded that the trial court's finding that the services had been
continuously provided by the Associations during the relevant period was
supported by substantial competent evidence, and affirmed its decision on this
86issue.
Next, it declared that section 718.115 does not require that the transporta-
tion costs had been continuously assessed as a common expense prior to the
1988 amendment.87 The court based this conclusion on the distinction made in
the amendment to that section between transportation services continuously
provided by the Association and those provided for in the condominium
documents or bylaws, noting that prior to 1988, these costs could only be
assessed if provided for in the documents or bylaws.88 Contrary to its prior
interpretation in which the court abandoned a plain and obvious meaning of
the statute, the court felt that, on this issue, the distinction required such an
interpretation, 9 and it decided that an interpretation including such a require-
ment would "obliterate the legislature's use of the word 'or' in the amendment
to section 718.115(1)(a)." 9
The next issue that the appellate court addressed was the constitutionality
of section 718.115(1)(a), a portion of which the unit owners contended was
unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous. 91 The court opined that any doubts
will be resolved in favor of constitutionality;92 that the statute provides people
84. Scudder, 663 So. 2d at 1366 (citing Scudder v. Greenbrier C Condominium Ass'n, 566
So. 2d 359, 361 n.1. (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990)).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1367.
89. Scudder, 663 So. 2d at 1367 (citing Koplowitz v. Imperial Towers Condominium, Inc.,
478 So. 2d 504, 505 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Martin v. Ocean Reef Villas Ass'n, 547 So.
2d 1237, 1238 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989), review denied, 557 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1990)).
90. Id.
91. Id. The unit owners objected to the following language:
However, such common expenses must either have been services or items pro-
vided from the date the control of the board of administration of the association
was transferred from the developer to the unit owners or must be services or
items provided for in the condominium documents or bylaws.
Il
92. Id. at 1367-68 (citing Department of Legal Affairs v. Rogers, 329 So. 2d 257, 263 (Fla.
1976)).
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of common understanding and intelligence with fair warning of its require-
ments; and that, although it has been subject to conflicting interpretations, it
was not unconstitutionally vague.93 Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial
court's determination of constitutionality. 94
As to the "one-rider rule," the court noted that the rule permitted only one
rider per unit be permitted to ride pursuant to the common assessment charged
to that respective unit. Any additional rider from that unit was required to pay
the Associations a surcharge. Section 718.115(2) explicitly requires that the
share of common expenses be in the same proportion as their ownership
interest in the common elements. 95 The court felt it was improper that the
system was funded in two distinct methods, the common assessment per unit,
which was proportional to the ownership interest in the common elements, and
the per rider surcharge, which bore no relation to the ownership interest in the
common elements.96 This method of collection was held contrary to section
718.115(2), and the rule also failed under the reasonableness test provided in
Juno by the Sea North Condominium Ass'n v. Manfredonia,97 because its effect
was unreasonable and discriminatory. 98 Under the rule, multiple resident unit
owners were being penalized and were subsidizing the system for the benefit
of single resident unit owners, and this was improper as a limited common
expense under section 718.103(17). 99 Thus, the appellate court reversed on
this issue.1t° It also ordered a remand on the attorneys' fees issue.1°
Winkelman v. Toll.10 2 The Fourth District Court of Appeal interpreted
section 718.104(2) of the Florida Statutes in this quiet title action to determine
when the property in question became subject to the declaration of condomin-
ium and its amendments. 0 3 Mission Lakes Condominium was created in 1980
by the recording of its declaration of condominium pursuant to the 1979
version of chapter 718 of the Florida Statutes. The declaration contemplated
93. Scudder, 663 So. 2d at 1368 (citing Department of Ins. v. Southeast Volusia Hosp. Dist.,
438 So. 2d 815, 820 (Fla. 1983)).
94. Id
95. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 718.115(2) (1993)).
96. Id
97. 397 So. 2d 297, 303 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980), review denied, 402 So. 2d 611 (Fla.
1981) (citing Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 181 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1975)).
98. Scudder, 663 So. 2d at 1369.
99. Id
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1370.
102. 661 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
103. See FLA. STAT. § 718.104(2) (1979).
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nine phases, each to be submitted to condominium by amendment to the
declaration.104 Phase II was submitted to condominium upon the recordation
of the original declaration. Phases I and III through VII were submitted by the
recording of an amendment to the declaration eleven days after the original
declaration had been recorded. The amendment stated that construction was
not substantially completed and that upon substantial completion of each
phase, a certificate of a registered land surveyor would be recorded as an
amendment to the declaration in accordance with section 718.104(e).'0 5
Additional amendments were later recorded, which attached land sur-
veyor certificates evidencing completion of Phases I and II. However, the
remaining proposed phases were never completed by the August 30, 1985
deadline contemplated in the declaration. Mission Lakes Condominium
Association was involuntarily dissolved on November 1, 1985 by the Secretary
of State.I°6
Appellant Winkelman purchased Phases I and II in 1985 and 1986,
respectively, from the institutional mortgagee on the project, which also
conveyed all of Phases IH through VII to appellee ICON Development
Corporation ("ICON"). The warranty deed through which ICON took title
described the property by the description contained in the amendment to the
declaration, and the deed was specifically subject to the declaration and
amendments. The parties operated their respective units as separate entities.
Two years after ICON purchased the remaining phases, Winkelman filed suit
to reinstate the condominium association and, thereafter, filed an amended
complaint seeking recovery from ICON for its share of the common condo-
minium expenses which Winkelman had been paying. ICON counterclaimed
to quiet title and to declare that it received title in fee simple and not subject to
the condominium. ICON also raised laches, estoppel, and running of the
statute of limitations as affirmative defenses to the Winkelman complaint. The
trial court found that ICON took in fee simple, reasoning substantial comple-
104. The court supplied language from the 1979 version of section 718A03. Subsection (1)
of that section provides that a developer may develop a condominium in phases, provided that the
initial declaration submitting the initial phase provides for and describes in detail the other
contemplated phases, any impact which completion of those phases would have upon the initial
phase, and the time period within which each phase must be completed. Id. at 104 (citing FLA.
STAT. § 718.403(1) (1979)). Subsection (4) provides that "[i]f one or more phases are not built,
the units which are built are entitled to 100 percent ownership of all common elements within the
phases actually developed and added as a part of the condominium." Id. (quoting FLA . STAT. §
718.403(4) (1979)).
105. Id. at 104-05.
106. Id.
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tion of the phases was a condition precedent to the phases becoming subject to
condominium.107
The Fourth District Court of Appeal rejected this interpretation.'08 The
court noted that, under section 718.104(2), "[i]t is the recording of the declara-
tion in the public records that subjects the property to condominium owner-
ship."' 9  The court also noted that prior to 1978 the statute required the
surveyor's certificate to be filed "'in order to have a validly created condo-
minium for conveyancing purposes,"' 0 and that this provision had been
deleted. On this reasoning, the court held that completion of construction was
not a condition precedent to the creation of a valid condominium."' Moreo-
ver,
[j]ust as the failure to complete the construction prior to recording
the declaration does not prevent the formation of the condominium
on the subject property, the failure to complete the construction in
a phase prior to recording the amendment does not prevent the in-
clusion of the land in the condominium, because the amendment is
effective when recorded." 12
Finally, the court noted that its decision made sense in light of the fact that
Florida has a notice type recording statute, and that in the present case, an
amendment submitting the property to condominium had been recorded, giving
notice to the world that the property is subject to the declaration and amend-
ments.'
1 3
107. Winkelnan, 661 So. 2d at 105.
108. Id.
109. Id. The court reasoned that although a requirement of a declaration of condominium is
that it contain a certificate of substantial completion of improvements, where the property is
subject to condominium prior to substantial completion of the construction, the developer may
submit the required surveyor's certificate by amendments to the declaration. Id. (citing FLA.
STAT. §§ 718.104(4)(e), .105 (1979)).
110. Id. at 106 (quoting FLA. STAT. §718.104(4)(e) (1977)).
111. Winkelman, 661 So. 2d at 106.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 107.
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VIII. CONSTRUCTION
Miracle Center Development Corp. v. M.A.D. Construction, Inc."4 A
tenant named Theme leased space in a shopping center for use as a nightclub.
Theme hired M.A.D., a contractor, for renovations that were permitted by the
lease. However, before the renovations could be completed, the electricity was
turned off because Theme failed to pay the electricity bill. Theme vacated the
premises. The landlord leased to a new tenant who made only cosmetic
improvements before opening the nightclub for business.'' 5
M.A.D. sued Theme for breach of the construction contract and sued the
landlord based on quantum meruit.1 6 The trial court held in favor of the
contractor and awarded damages against both defendants, but the district court
reversed.' 7 The court's logic began with the proposition that a plaintiff cannot
seek both contract damages and quantum meruit damages against the same
defendant because quantum meruit would apply only where no express
contract existed."18 The court then reasoned that the principle should also
apply to prevent simultaneous actions on these inconsistent theories against
these different defendants because that might give M.A.D. a double recov-
ery.119 That result would be unjust enrichment rather than the prevention of
unjust enrichment, the proper role of quantum meruit. In addition, the court
points out that M.A.D. had already received an adequate remedy at law, its
judgment for damages against the tenant.12t Probably the unstated point is that
quantum meruit is an equitable remedy and an equitable remedy should be
available only where the injured party has no adequate remedy at law. But,
quantum meruit is a legal remedy, not an equitable one.'
2
'
114. 662 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Judges Hubbart, Gersten, and Goderich
concurred in the per curiam opinion.
115. Id. at 1290.
116. M.A.D. also claimed a construction lien but that was denied by the trial court. The
denial was affirmed by the district court because, under section 713.10 of the Florida Statutes,
the lease prohibited construction liens against the landlord's property and the lease neither
required the improvements nor were the improvements the 'pith of the lease."' Id. at 1291
(relying on FLA. STAT. § 713.10 (1993)).
117. Id at 1290.
118. Id.
119. Miracle Center Dev. Corp., 662 So. 2d at 1290.
120. Id.
121. The proper common law action to recover in quantum meruit was indebitatus assunp-
sit. Furthermore, quantum meruit was one of the "common counts" pled in a traditional common
law complaint alleging money due based upon a transaction. See JOSEPH H. KoFFtER & AusON
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The result may make logical sense, but it has the potential to produce
unnecessary injustice. That the electricity was turned off suggests that the
tenant was in financial trouble making the judgment against it worthless.
Would the contractor have prevailed on the theory of quantum meruit if it had
sued only the landlord? If so, then the contractor was harshly penalized for a
tactical error by its lawyer. If the landlord reaped a windfall by getting its
property so substantially enhanced that a higher rent could be charged without
spending any money, there would be an unjust result. Conversely, the rent
increase, if one existed, might not have been enough to offset what the tenant
owed the landlord. Those are issues of fact that could have been determined
on remand rather than adopting an absolute no-recovery rule. There is no
justification for a rule that gives one party a windfall while another is left
uncompensated for work done unless the court intends to punish the contractor
for not getting a construction lien. That remote possibility could have easily
been avoided by ruling that any recovery from the landlord would decrease the
amount that the contractor could recover from the tenant on the contract
judgment.
Stinson-Head, Inc. v. City of Sanibel.12 2  The parties entered into a
construction contract that contained an arbitration clause requiring the demand
for arbitration be made within a reasonable time after the claim arose but, "in
no event shall it be made after the date when institution of legal or equitable
proceedings based on such claim ... would be barred by the applicable statute
of limitations."' 23 Subsequently, a dispute arose about alleged defects in the
roof. When the City sought arbitration, the contractor responded that the
statute of limitations had run out so arbitration was time barred. The trial court
referred the timeliness issue to arbitration, 24 and the contractor appealed.
The district court affirmed ordering the case to arbitration, but certified
that its decision created a conflict among the districts. 125 The court based its
decision on the fact that the arbitration clause was very broad. Prior cases
under the federal arbitration act had interpreted similar language to place the
REPPY, HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADING §§ 172-76 (1969). See also JOHN D. CALAMARI
& JOSEPH M. PERiLLo, THE LAw OF CONTRACS §§ 1-11 (1987).
122. 661 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. of App. 1995). Judge Blue wrote the opinion in
which Chief Judge Threadgill and Judge Whatley concurred.
123. IM at 120.
124. Id.
125. See Anstis Omstein Assocs., Architects & Planners, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 554
So. 2d 18 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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question of whether the arbitration was time barred before the arbitrator(s) . 26
This court followed that lead, reasoning that the timeliness issue is very fact-
oriented and requires an evidentiary hearing. 27 Requiring that the court hear
these facts to determine this issue and then the arbitrator hear the same facts
again to determine other issues would defeat the purpose of an arbitration
agreement. Generally, issues are presumed to be the subject of arbitration. It
would make no sense to interpret such a broadly worded arbitration clause not
to assign this issue to arbitration.
IX. CONTRACTS OF PURCHASE AND SALE
Taines v. Berenson.12  Dahlia Taines, the seller, appealed from the
Amended Final Judgment awarding Dr. Scott Berenson, the buyer, specific
performance and damages totalling $371,635. The Fourth District Court of
Appeal held that, under the terms of the contract, Berenson could not recover
both specific performance and damages and reversed the trial court accord-
ingly.129 The parties entered into a contract for the sale of the property. Due to
a gap in the chain of title and liens against the property, Taines would be
unable to provide clear title. The parties nevertheless entered into a second
contract in which the sale price was reduced from $215,000 to $190,000. This
contract also provided a ninety-day defective title cure provision. Berenson
then offered Taines an addendum to the second contract which contained
additional terms. Taines, viewing the addendum as an unfavorable modifica-
tion, declined. Berenson filed a three count complaint alleging breach of
contract, misrepresentation, and specific performance.
30
The appellate court reasoned that "Berenson's remedies were limited by
the terms of the contract itself."'13 Either of the remedies contained in Provi-
126. Wylie v. Investment Management & Research, Inc. 629 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1993); Marschel v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 609 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1992), review denied, 617 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1993).
127. Stinson-Head, 661 So. 2d at 121.
128. 659 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
129. Id at 1278.
130. Id. at 1277.
131. Id. The court quoted the following "pertinent" provision in the contract:
A. EVIDENCE OF TITLE... buyer shall have ten (10) days from the date of
receiving the evidence [February 15,1991] to examine same. If tite is found to
be defective, the buyer shall within said period notify the seller in writing speci-
fying the defects. If the said defects render the title unmarketable, the seller shall
have ninety (90) days from the receipt of such notice [February 19, 1991] to cure
the defects and if after said period seller shall not have cured the defects, buyer
19961
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sion A of the contract were available to Berenson. However, Berenson
exercised neither remedy. "He neither agreed to accept a deed for title as it
existed, nor did he request a refund and cancellation of the contract."
' 32
Instead, Berenson relied upon another paragraph of the contract which
provided that if the seller failed to perform any of the contract's covenants, the
deposit paid by the buyer, at the buyer's option, would be returned to the buyer
or the buyer would have the right to specific performance.133 This paragraph
was inapplicable because Berenson filed suit before the expiration of the
curative period provided in the contract.1 34 Therefore, the seller did not default
by not curing title because the contract already contemplated the seller's
inability to cure title and the buyer's remedies for such. Therefore, the trial
court erred by awarding Berenson both Provision A remedies. 135  So, the
appellate court remanded the case "for a final determination as to which of the
two provisions shall be applied."
136
X. DEEDS
Jakobi v. Kings Creek Village Townhouse Ass'n.' 37 For rationale that a
deed constituted a novation of the association's bylaws and the restrictive
covenants binding the community, please see the discussion of this case at
page 280 of this article.
Sargent v. Baxter.138 The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed a trial
court's judgment declaring two quitclaim deeds void. 139 One deed was from
John Smith, now deceased, in favor of his daughter, Connie Sargent. Smith
executed the deed but instructed his attorney not to record the deed, saying he
would give further instructions later. There was testimony that Smith asked
his nephew, Gerald Buscemi, to have the attorney record the deed, but Bus-
shall have the option of(1) accepting title as it then is or (2) demand a refund of
all monies paid hereunder which shall forthwith be returned to the buyer, and
thereupon the buyer and seller shall be released of all further obligations under
this contract.
Id.
132. Taines, 659 So. 2d at 1277.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1277-78.
135. Id. at 1278.
136. Id. The court instructed that in making this determination, the trial court could rely on
the existing record unless in his discretion determines that further evidence is necessary. Taines,
659 So. 2d at 1278.
137. 665 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
138. 673 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
139. Id. at 981.
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cemi never complied before Smith's death. After Smith's death, the attorney
mailed the unrecorded deed to Sargent who recorded it. Later, Smith's
personal representative executed a quitclaim deed to the same property to
himself, individually, and recorded it. The trial court found, after a non-jury
trial, that the Sargent deed failed for lack of delivery, and it ultimately found
both deeds void. 140
The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's finding of
failure of the Sargent deed for lack of delivery, since Smith, by instructing his
attorney not to record, had retained the "locus poenitentiae," or opportunity to
change his mind. 14' The court did not consider whether delivery would have
occurred had Buscemi advised the attorney of Smith's desire that the deed
should be recorded because that had not occurred, and, further, because
"[t]here [was] no indication that Buscemi had any authority other than as a
simple messenger."'
42
XI. EASEMENTS
Brewer v. Flankey.143 The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed the
trial court's judgment for a prescriptive easement because the plaintiffs failed
to produce any evidence that they or their predecessors had made actual,
continuous, and uninterrupted use of the contested land for the full twenty-year
prescriptive period."44 Evidence that members of the general public had used
the land during the 1970s did not suffice because it did not establish that
plaintiffs' predecessors used the land. 45 Thus, the plaintiffs could not make a
prima facie case as they had only used defendants' land for nine years.
Farley v. Hiers.14 6 The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial
court's determination that the appellee had a prescriptive easement to continue
the use of a well, pump, and pump house on appellant's property.147 In 1954,
the Blounts subdivided this property, installed a well, pump, and pump house
on the southeastern comer of Lot 23, and they began providing water service
for profit to seventy-three customers, including the various owners of Lot 23,
140. Id. at 980.
141. Id. at 981 (quoting Smith v. Owens, 108 So. 891, 893 (1926)).
142. Id.
143. 660 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
144. Id. at 762 (citing Supal v. Miller, 455 So. 2d 593, 595 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
145. Id.
146. 668 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Appellee Annie B. Hiers was named in
the suit in the capacity of Guardian for Lottie M. Blount. Id.
147. Id. at 249.
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operating the pumping system openly and continuously under lock and key. In
1993, Farley, the current owner of Lot 23, dissatisfied with the quality of water
service, sought to obtain a consumptive use permit from the Northwest Florida
Water Management District to build a well for his own use. He could not
obtain that permit due to the presence of the Blount well on the lot. After
obtaining the lot in 1974, Farley fenced in his property except for the comer on
which the fifteen by twenty foot pump house was located. 1
48
The appellate court noted that the elements of continuous use and
knowledge were undisputed, but three issues required closer scrutiny: 1)
whether the use of the well was adverse rather than permissive; 2) whether the
operation of the water service for profit precludes a finding of easement; and
3) whether the exclusiveness of the appellee's use of the southeastern comer
precluded finding an easement.1 49 Concerning the first issue, the court found
that use of the system had been adverse. 150 The appellee continuously main-
tained the pump house under lock and key, and Farley and his predecessors
had, for the same period, paid the Blounts for water service.1 51 The court
rejected the argument that operating the system for profit resulted in a "profit a
prendre" and precluded finding an easement.152 The court noted that a "profit
a prendre" is distinguishable from an easement, "since one of the features of an
easement is the absence of all rights to participate in the profits of the soil
charged with it."1  In rejecting Farley's contention, the court merely com-
mented that "[i]t appears, however, that water is not considered a product of
the soil in this context."' 54 Finally, the court concluded "'[c]omplete dominion
is inconsistent with a claim of easement, ' ""55 but the Blounts' use did not
completely exclude the Farley from any use of his lot, noting "rather, appellee
uses only so much of Lot 23 (a comer 15' x 25' in size) as is required to use
the well."' 56
Holloway v. Gargano.157 The First District Court of Appeal, in a de-
claratory decree action, reversed the trial court's conclusion that the appel-
148. Id.
149. Id. at 250.
150. Farley, 668 So. 2d at 250.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 250-51.
153. Id. at 250 (quoting 25 AM. JUR. 2D Easements and Licenses § 7 (1966)).
154. Il
155. Farley, 668 So. 2d at 251 (quoting Platt v. Pietras, 382 So. 2d 414, 416 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1980)).
156. Farley, 668 So. 2d at 251.
157. 657 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
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lants/plaintiffs, two property owners, were entitled to access to their waterfront
mobile home properties in Monroe County through an easement by necessity
over the property owned by the appellees, and that reasonable ingress and
egress had been provided by way of a road over the appellees' property.
58
The road had been used by appellants and their predecessors in interest since
1962. In 1992, the appellees erected a fence which narrowed the road to a
width of eleven feet. The appellate court found that such a width, contrary to
the trial court's finding, does not comply with the Monroe County Fire Code
which requires a twenty-foot minimum access way. 59 Thus, it precluded
access by fire and rescue equipment to plaintiffs' properties.
Further, the court noted access easements created by necessity "must be
capable of accommodating traffic incident to the normal requirements of the
property served by the easement 'consistent with the [reasonable] needs of the
owners of the lands that are hemmed in."" 6 In this case,
it is uncontradicted that whenever a car is parked in front of one
plaintiffs's property, access to the other plaintiff's property is to-
tally blocked due to the narrow width of the road.... [Tjhe three
decade use of the road by mail carriers, garbage collectors, meter
readers and others has been either severely curtailed or pre-
vented.'6'
The appellate court held the subject road legally insufficient under the above
rule and reversed and remanded to the trial court.'
62
Richardson v. Jackson.63 The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the
trial court's award of summary judgment and a mandatory injunction against
158. Id. at 1231.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1232 (quoting Hayes v. Reynolds, 132 So. 2d 781, 782 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1961)).
161. Id. at 1231-32.
162. Holloway, 657 So. 2d at 1232.
163. 667 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). In affirming, the fifth district considered
its decisions in Diefenderfer v. Forest Park Servs., 599 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.),
review denied, 613 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1992), and Hoff v. Scott, 453 So. 2d 224 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1984), to be controlling. In Diefenderfer, it was determined that in these types of cases, the
initial inquiry is whether the grant of easement is for the width described or for the description of
the property over which there is a right of ingress and egress, "[o]r put another way, is the right of
ingress and egress coterminous with the area set aside for the easement or something less than the
area." Richardson, 667 So. 2d at 929 (quoting Diefenderfer, 599 So. 2d at 1312). If cotermi-
nous, then there can be no encroachments. The 1986 final judgment contained language found to
be consistent with Diefenderfer.
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appellants to require them to remove improvements constructed on property
subject to an easement by prescription which had been confirmed in a 1986
final judgment.164 The appellants argued that as long as they left an eight foot
path for a vehicle to enter and leave the appellee's property, improvements
were permissible on the remainder of the property subject to the easement.
Trammell v. Ward.165 The Trammells brought three counts in the trial
court seeking access to the Wards' lands in order to obtain access to a land-
locked forty acre parcel owned by the Trammells: 1) a prescriptive easement;
2) a statutory way of necessity; and 3) injunctive relief prohibiting the Wards
from barring Trammells' use of an unpaved roadway. The Wards counter-
claimed for a statutory way of necessity over the Trammells' lands for which
the Wards were willing to pay reasonable compensation as determined by the
court. The Wards acknowledged the Trammells' need for access to the parcel,
but objected to a route through the middle of the Wards' lands, proposing
instead an easement across a comer of the Ward property as determined by the
court. This was objectionable to the Trammells because "much of the area was
wet."
, 166
The trial court indicated that upon finding a prescriptive easement, it
would require that the Trammells hire a registered surveyor to survey the
easement claimed.' 67 In an effort to avoid survey costs, the Trammells told the
trial court they would settle for a route of access proposed by the Wards. The
trial court directed, in its final judgment, that the Trammells were to have an
easement along the roadways marked E-1, E-2, and E-3, and the parties were
directed to negotiate in good faith for another roadway marked E-4.168 The
Trammells moved for rehearing because "the access which the judgment
purported to grant [them was] nonexistent, in that item 'E-I' ... does not
grant... access to their 40-acre parcel.' ' 169 The trial court denied rehearing,
and the First District Court of Appeal reversed on this issue.
170
The district court noted that the Wards' counsel stipulated that, pursuant
to section 704.01(2) of the Florida Statutes, the Trammells were indeed
In Hoff, the language in the grant of easement contained clear language that the entire area
had been granted for ingress and egress, and thus no obstructions could be placed in the
easement. The final judgment in Richardson which confirmed the easement was deemed to be
also consistent with the language in Hoff. Richardson, 667 So. 2d at 929.
164. ld.
165. 667 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
166. Id. at 224.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 225.
169. Id.
170. Trammell, 667 So. 2d at 225.
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entitled to a statutory way of necessity.171 This section requires a "practicable
route of egress or ingress."'172 According to Walkup v. Becker,173 "[a] roadway
which is impassable after the rainy periods of the year is not practicably usable
for egress or ingress within the contemplation of section 704.03."' 74 The only
evidence presented on the practicability of E-1 was Mr. Trammell's uncontra-
dicted statement that the route was sometimes impassable.175 Finding that on
this basis the Trammells raised an appropriate ground for rehearing on the
access question, the court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in
failing to grant rehearing, and it reversed "that portion of the final judgment
which does not provide the Trammels with practicable access to their 40-acre
parcel. 176
XII. EMINENT DOMAIN
A. Condemnation
Brevard County v. Ramsey.177 The County filed an action to condemn a
portion of property whose owners of record were the Ramseys. They were
also the owner of a business, Ramsey Enterprises ("Enterprises"), that operated
a business on the property. The Ramseys had signed, but had not acknowl-
edged, witnessed, or recorded a declaration of trust that declared that they held
the land in trust for Enterprises. They filed a motion to join Enterprises as an
indispensable party so that Enterprises could recover business damages.1
78
The district court concluded that the trust declaration was valid.179 The
lack of witnesses was not fatal. Since the grantors were to be the trustees, it
did not involve the transfer of title to the property.180 Furthermore, the trust
was not executed by the Statute of Uses even though it appeared to be a
passive trust. To so rule would have the effect of vesting legal title in the
beneficiary. Although that would be the traditional rule, it would defeat the
171. Id.
172. FLA. STAT. § 704.01(2) (1995). Section 704.03 of the Florida Statutes defines
"practicable" as used in section 704.01. FLA. STAT. § 704.03 (1995).
173. 161 So. 2d 893, 895 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
174. Trammell, 667 So. 2d at 225 (citing Walkup, 161 So. 2d at 895).
175. Id
176. Id. at 226.
177. 658 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Chief Judge Peterson wrote the opin-
ion. Judge Dauksch concurred. Judge W. Sharp dissented with a written opinion.
178. Id. at 1192.
179. Id.
180. See FLA. STAT. §§ 689.05-.06 (1993).
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statutory scheme which now requires two subscribing witnesses to any inter
vivos transfer of title.
Since the trust document did not specify the trustee's powers, the powers
were supplied by statute, 18' which provided the trustee with all management
power. Consequently, the trustee, not the beneficiary, would be the only
necessary and proper party to the condemnation. Thus, the court concluded
that this land belonged to the Ramseys, not Enterprises. 82 However, Enter-
prises was the owner of the business. A landowner may recover business
damages if a public body takes part of a landowner's land for a right of way
which in turn causes injury to that landowner's business located on the
adjoining land that is not taken. Consequently, business damages could not be
recovered unless Enterprises and the Ramseys were truly the same persons.
The Ramseys did not present any convincing reason to pierce the corporate
veil. The court reasoned that they chose the trust and the corporate entity for
their own reasons. 183 Thus, they have to accept the disadvantages as well as
the advantages of those forms.
Judge Sharp dissented. 8 4 The execution of passive trusts by the Statute
of Uses has long been recognized in Florida as well as other states. 85 The
legislature did not mean to subvert that traditional doctrine by requiring
witnesses for deeds. The Statute of Uses should execute the passive trust
vesting title in the beneficiary.' 86 Enterprises, as the owner of the land and the
business, should be able to recover business damages.
187
Broward County v. Conner.188 After the County filed an eminent domain
action to take the Connors' land, the parties explored the possibility of settling
the case by a real estate exchange. The parties met and reached an agreement
in principle. The Connors' lawyer sent a letter to the County's private attorney
which "confirmed the parameters" of the proposed settlement. The parties
subsequently had further meetings, exchanged letters, and exchanged unsigned
181. Id. § 737.401 (1993).
182. Ramsey, 658 So. 2d at 1197.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1197-99 (Sharp, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 1199.
186. Id.
187. Ramsey, 658 So. 2d at 1199.
188. 660 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995), review denied, 669 So. 2d 250 (Fla.
1996). Judge Klein wrote the opinion in which Chief Judge Gunther concurred. Judge Farmer
wrote a special concurrence.
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drafts of the settlement. Despite these negotiations, the County decided not to
settle according to the proposed terms.
189
The landowners filed a motion in the eminent domain proceeding to
enforce the settlement. The trial court granted specific performance because it
found that "the agreement had been partly performed; that [the landowners]
had relied to their detriment based on the representation of the county's agents
and employees; and, that the county was estopped to deny the settlement."'
19
The district court reversed relying on two alternative grounds, the Statute of
Frauds and the Sunshine Law.191
First, the court held that the settlement was a contract for the sale of
land.' 92 Consequently, the Statute of Frauds' 93 requires that the contract be in
writing and signed by the party to be charged; however, the County had not
signed the settlement. 94 The landowners had not established sufficient part
performance to take the contract out of the Statute of Frauds. The district court
summarily dismissed the landowners' estoppel claim, stating that the landown-
ers "cite[d] no authority which would support specific performance under
these circumstances."' 95 That really misses the point. If the County was
estopped from denying the validity of the contract and the Statute of Frauds
issue, then the landowners, who were to be the "buyers" of the exchanged
property, might have been entitled to specific performance even if there was no
precedent on all fours to that effect.
The court's alternative holding makes far more sense. There was no
contract. The provisions of the Sunshine Law require that formal governmen-
tal action must take place in open meeting unless some specific exception
applies. 96 There is an exception for settlement negotiations for pending
litigation, 197 but there was no suggestion that it was met here. Consequently,
this settlement could not have been entered except by action in an open
meeting and that never occurred.
Judge Farmer points out in his concurring opinion that this decision may
make the settlement of condemnation proceedings slower and more expen-
189. Id. at 289.
190. Id at 290.
191. Id at 289.
192. Id. at 290.
193. FLA. STAT. § 725.01 (1993).
194. The Statute of Frauds issue is discussed in part XXV of this survey. See discussion
infra p. 371.
195. Conner, 660 So. 2d at 290.
196. FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1) (1993).
197. Id § 286.011(8) (1993).
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sive.' 98 Perhaps so, but every lawyer should be wary of relying on a settlement
until it is actually signed by a person with clear authority to bind the other
party.
Caulk v. Orange County.199 Mrs. Caulk and her late husband owned land.
In 1978, they conveyed it to R. T. Hibbard by a deed which "reserves and
retains all rights, title, and interest in and to any and all proceeds arising out of
eminent domain, condemnation, or similar proceedings." 2°° Hibbard sold the
land to Hibbard Oil Company which in turn sold the land to Amoco Oil
Company, but neither of these deeds contained the covenant or anything
similar. When Mrs. Caulk learned that the County had filed a condemnation
action against Amoco, she intervened. The trial court denied her motion for
compensation on the theory that the clause was a personal covenant between
the Caulks and their immediate grantee. 1 The district court affirmed.2°2
The court did not explain how it concluded that the clause created a
covenant rather than an interest in the land. It jumps right into the discussion
of whether this covenant runs with the land, i.e., whether it would bind a
remote grantee. But this author20 3 agrees that it is a covenant. Nothing about
the language used suggests that the grantor intended to retain any interest in the
land.2°4
Not every covenant in a deed runs with the land. First, the covenant must
touch and concern the land. That means the covenant must have a relation to
the land. The court concluded that this covenant "has no effect whatever on
the land.' °5 What the covenant really concerned was the money, i.e., intangi-
ble personal property. Furthermore, there was no evidence that the covenant
was intended to run with the land and that is also a requirement. The language
that the parties used in the deed does not even suggest an intent for the
covenant to run. It does not state that the covenant would be binding on
grantees.2°6 It refers only to the "grantor" and to the "Grantee herein, ' 2°7 and
198. Conner, 660 So. 2d at 291 (Farmer, J., concurring specially).
199. 661 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Chief Judge Peterson wrote the opinion.
Judges Goshorn and Thompson concurred.
200. Id. at 933.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Professor Brown.
204. Caulk, 661 So. 2d at 934.
205. IdM
206. Traditionally that would be expressed by the use of words of limitation and inheritance,
e.g., heirs, successors, and assigns.
207. Caulk, 661 So. 2d at 933.
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the court finds that the language "sounds personal." 208 Finally, the court finds
that it would be "incongruous" that a subsequent purchaser would have to give
a remote grantor the condemnation proceeds. 209 Perhaps the court was
thinking that land burdened by such a covenant would almost certainly become
unmarketable and, in all probability, that courts would find such a covenant
void as it would violate the rule against restraints on alienation.
City of Dania v. Broward County.210 Broward County began condemna-
tion proceedings against several parcels of land for the purpose of airport
expansion. The City moved to intervene alleging, inter alia, that the condem-
nation would harm the City by removing the subject properties from its tax
base and depriving it of the benefits of money it had expended for infrastruc-
ture improvements. The trial court denied intervention and the district court
affirmed. 1 In order to intervene, the proceeding must have a direct legal
effect upon the intervenor. There was no statutory basis for a city to recover
from a county for these losses, so this indirect harm does not satisfy the
statutory requirement. Furthermore, the County's alleged failure to comply
with the procedural requirements for condemnation would not be a proper
basis for intervention.
City of Ocala v. Red Oak Farm, Inc.212 The landowners' parcels were
subject to a power company's 100-foot-wide easement for an electrical
transmission facility before this action was commenced. In this case, the City
took a fifty-foot-wide perpetual easement for a similar electrical transmission
facility adjacent to the power company's easement. The power company had a
formal written policy and permitting procedure by which landowners could get
permission to make certain uses of the property. The City had no written
policy but claimed to have a similar long-standing, unwritten policy. The City
wanted to introduce the easement documents on which the power company's
preexisting easement was based and the formal written policy into evidence.
The landowners objected and the trial court rejected the City's proffer.213 The
district court reversed. 4
208. Id. at 934.
209. Id.
210. 658 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Judges Dell, Farmer, and Stevenson
concurred in the per curiam opinion.
211. ldMat 166.
212. 673 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, Gold Land Corp. v. City of
Xcala, No. 88,238, 1996 LEXIS 1752, at *1 (Fla. Sept. 27, 1996). Judge Griffin wrote the
)pinion in which Chief Judge Peterson concurred. Judge Thompson dissented.
213. Id. at 86.
214. Id. at 87.
... ..... -....... ,.: k. , " 7'A 'T .
y
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The court ruled that this evidence was relevant on the issues of valuation
of the property and severance damages.1 5 Surprisingly, the court based its
conclusion, in part, on the intensity of the landowners' counsel's efforts to
exclude this evidence. The rest of its logic is a little obscure. The court
concluded that the jury might have been confused and mislead by the fact that
they were not informed about the parallels in the City's unwritten policy and
the power company's written one.216
Judge Thompson's dissent provides some illumination.1 7 Apparently, the
jury was informed that the power company had an easement, that it had the
written policy, and that the City had an unwritten policy. Part of the power
company's written policy was read to the jury. The jurors viewed the land and
the power company's transmission facilities. This made introduction of the
easement documents and the written policy unnecessary, particularly in light of
the prejudicial effect the documents might have since they contained the price
the power company had paid for its easement thirty-five years earlier. Judge
Thompson pointed out that the trial court had "the superior vantage," and the
trial judge's decisions did not fail the reasonableness test. 218
Hartleb v. Department of Transportation.219 The Department of Trans-
portation ("DOT") brought this eminent domain action and made an offer of
judgment to the landowner for $60,000. The jury verdict was $60,971, but it
was apportioned between the landowner, who got $53,630, and his tenant. The
trial judge denied the landowner attorney's fees and costs incurred after the
offer of judgment based upon section 73.092(7) of the Florida Statutes220
because he had received less than the offer of judgment. 2 '
The district court disagreed for two reasons. First, the district court found
that the offer of judgment was ambiguous.2 2  It made no reference to appor-
tionment of the award or compensation of the tenant, nor did it indicate that it
215. Id.
216. let
217. Red Oak Farm, 673 So. 2d at 87-88.
218. Id. at 88 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
219. 677 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judge Stone wrote the opinion. Judge
Polen concurred. Judge Klein concurred specially.
220. FLA. STAT. § 73.092(7) (1987). The statute provides:
Where an offer of judgment made by the petitioner ... is either rejected or ex-
pires and the verdict or judgment is less than or equal to the offer of judgment,
no attorney's fees or costs shall be awarded for time spent by the attorney or
costs incurred after the time or rejection or expiration of the offer.
Id.
221. Hartleb, 677 So. 2d at 336.
222. Id. at 337.
[Vol. 21:279
Brown / Grohman
would be free of any claim by the tenant for compensation. 223 In fact, it
purported to be a "complete and total settlement."224 So, it is unclear if the
landlord's recovery was actually less than the offer of judgment.
Second, the DOT made substantial changes to its construction plans after
that offer of judgment had expired.23 These changes reduced the scope of the
taking.226  Consequently, the jury verdict concerned a taking of a lesser
magnitude than the earlier offer of judgment. If it was these subsequent
changes that caused the jury verdict to come in under the offer, then "simple
equity and the requirements of fair dealing 227 would prevent the DOT from
invoking this statute.
Judge Klein wrote a special concurrence to express his dismay with the
DOT's conduct in pursuing this appeal. 28 Although he did not use the word
"frivolous," it seems clear that was what he was thinking about the DOT's
position. Note that these merely compound the department's earlier errors in
making an ambiguous offer of judgment and failing to make an updated offer
of judgment following a substantial change in plans.
Morr v. Department of Transportation.229 Morr operated a salvage yard
on land leased from Kreider. Morr had an occupational license from DeSoto
County, but the salvage yard was not permitted by the County's land use
regulations. The DOT brought a condemnation action and obtained an order
taking the property. Subsequently, the County brought an action to prevent the
landlord and tenant from violating the land use regulations by operating the
salvage yard there. The stipulated settlement provided that Morr would
remove the salvage automobiles, but he could continue the salvage business on
adjacent land if he complied with certain conditions. 230
In the condemnation action, the trial judge decided that the above settle-
ment conclusively established that the salvage yard had been operating
illegally.231 Consequently, Morr was not entitled to business damages. The
district court disagreed and reversed. 232 The settlement had been entered after
223. Id. at 336.
224. Id.
225. ld. at 337.
226. Hartleb, 677 So. 2d at 337.
227. Id.
228. Id. (Klein, J., concurring specially).
229. 667 So. 2d 888 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judge Blue wrote the opinion. Acting
Chief Judge Patterson and Judge Altenbemd concurred.
230. Id. at 889.
231. Id.
232. Id.
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the DOT had already taken the land. At that time, Morr no longer had any
interest in the property that would enable him to continue operating the
business there. At the critical time, the time of the taking, Morr did have an
ongoing business. If Morr had a reasonable chance of continuing the business
by obtaining rezoning or a variance, then he would be entitled to compensation
for its loss. Whether he could have obtained a variance or rezoning would be a
jury question unless there was no credible evidence to the contrary. Since the
record does not establish that the county would have prevented its continuation
if the DOT had not taken the land, the trial court should not have granted
summary judgment that he could not recover business damages.233
Seminole County v. Clayton;234 Seminole County v. Delco Oil, Inc.; 235
Seminole County v. Butler;236 and Seminole County v. Rollingwood Apart-
ments, Ltd.237 Together, these four cases clarify the fifth district's approach
to attorneys' fees in eminent domain cases. The statute provided:
(1) In assessing attorney's fees in eminent domain proceed-
ings, the court shall give greatest weight to the benefits resulting to
the client from the services rendered.
(a) As used in this section, the term "benefits" means the dif-
ference between the final judgment or settlement and the last writ-
ten offer made by the condemning authority before the defendant
hires an attorney....
(b) The court may also consider nonmonetary benefits which
the attorney obtains for the client.
(2) In assessing attorney's fees in eminent domain proceed-
ings, the court shall also give secondary consideration to:
(a) The novelty, difficulty, and importance of the questions
involved.
(b) The skill employed by the attorney in conducting the
cause.
(c) The amount of money involved.
(d) The responsibility incurred and fulfilled by the attorney.
233. Id. at 890.
234. 665 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Judge Cobb wrote the opinion in
which Chief Judge Peterson and Judge W. Sharp concurred.
235. 669 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (replacing the original opinion at 21
Fla. L. Weekly D254 (5th Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1996)). Judges Cobb, Harris, and Griffin
concurred in the per curiam opinion.
236. 676 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judge Antoon wrote the opinion.
Chief Judge Peterson and Judge Dauksch concurred.
237. 678 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judge W. Sharp wrote the opinion in
which Chief Judge Peterson and Judge Harris concurred.
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(e) The attorney's time and labor reasonably required ade-
quately to represent the client in relation to the benefits resulting to
the client.
(4) In determining the amount of attorney's fees to be paid by
the petitioner, the court shall be guided by the fees the defendant
would ordinarily be expected to pay if the petitioner were not re-
sponsible for the payment of fees and costs.238
In Clayton, the compensation issue was settled without a trial.2 39 The only
issue before the circuit court was the amount of attorneys' fees. The court
used a two tier approach, first figuring out a reasonable fee based upon an
hourly rate and then adding twenty percent of the difference between the
final agreed compensation and the initial offer, i.e., the betterment accom-
plished by the attorney. That produced a total attorney's fee of $159,261.00,
which worked out to $1,276.64 per hour.240 The district court reversed. 241
First, the district court rejected the constitutional challenge to the
attorneys' fee statute, section 73.092 of the Florida Statutes.242 While the
court agreed that a statute that mandated an unreasonable attorneys' fee
would be unconstitutional, it concluded that the statute could be interpreted
to comport with the Florida Constitution.2 3 Furthermore, an excessive rate
could not be justified as a punishment for a condemning authority which had
made a bad faith initial offer as a bargaining ploy.244 The case was re-
manded with an order that the trial court consider the statutory criteria rather
than relying on a percentage approach.245
In Delco, the landowner had contracted to pay its attorney twenty-five
percent of the benefits obtained. The parties quickly reached an agreement on
the amount of compensation to be paid for the property, an amount $270,000
higher than the County's original offer. The landowner's attorney worked 29.3
hours settling the case, and the time increased to 46.2 hours by including the
238. FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (1993).
239. Clayton, 665 So. 2d at 364.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 366.
242. Id. at 365 (citing FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (1993)).
243. Id.
244. Clayton, 665 So. 2d at 365. Note, a low initial offer would already increase the
attorney's fees under the statute if the attorney was able to successfully negotiate a fair price
because it would increase the amount of "betterment" which the attorney could produce for his
or her client.
245. Id. at 366.
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time involved in recovering attorney's fees. The trial court awarded fees of
$67,500.24 The district court reversed.247
The appellate court reasoned that Florida decisions provided what a
reasonable attorneys' fee was and how it was to be calculated in most cases.
248
Condemnation is not a contingent fee case. Consequently, an attorneys' fee
based upon a percentage of the recovery would be inappropriate. In eminent
domain cases, the legislature has provided that the condemning authority pay a
reasonable fee except as provided by section 73.092 of the Florida Statutes.2 49
The district court interpreted that to mean that the fee reached by applying the
factors in section 73.092 must still fit within the general parameters for a
reasonable fee, i.e., the fee would be unreasonable if the effective hourly rate
would be excessive after taking into account all relevant factors.250 The fee
awarded in this case, over $2,000 per hour,251 was excessive by this standard.
Moreover, applying the factors in section 73.092 would have also led the
court to conclude that the attorney's fees had not been correctly calculated.
The statute directed courts to give the greatest weight to the benefits resulting
from the legal services and, secondarily, to consider a list of other factors.252
Those factors were the same as used in the lodestar approach of Florida
Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe.2 3  Thus, the place to begin that
calculation was with those statutory factors, using them to figure a lodestar
amount. Then, that amount could be adjusted up or down in light of the
benefits the attorney had obtained for this client, keeping in mind that the
statute provides that the benefits should be the primary factor in the calcula-
tion. The recovery should not be controlled by what the condemnee has agreed
to pay its attorney or what fees have become customary based upon a misun-
derstanding of the statutory criteria.
246. Delco, 669 So. 2d at 1164.
247. Id. at 1163.
248. Id. at 1166.
249. FLA. STAT. § 73.092 (1993).
250. Delco, 669 So. 2d at 1166.
251. This $2,000 figure was figured using the 29.3 hours it took to settle the case.
252. The secondary factors are:
(a) The novelty, difficulty, and importance of the questions involved.
(b) The skill employed by the attorney in conducting the cause.
(c) The amount of money involved.
(d) The responsibility incurred and fulfilled by the attorney.
(e) The attorney's time and labor reasonably required adequately to repre-
sent the client in relation to the benefits resulting to the client.
FLA. STAT. § 73.092(2)(a)-(e) (1993).
253. 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985).
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The trial court in Rollingwood Apartments also used an elaborate, but
incorrect formula. In essence, "the court awarded a top hourly rate plus a
generous percentage award, which resulted in a fee of over $630 per hour. '' 54
Because this was not consistent with the interpretations of section 73.092
above, the district court reversed.255 It may, however, be noteworthy, that the
district court did not say that $630 per hour was per se unreasonable.
In Butler, the court faced three similar attorneys' fees calculations and
disapproved of them for the same reasons.2 6 However, this case had an
additional wrinkle. The landowner owned two buildings. Each was leased to a
tenant. The land that the County was condemning did not include the two
buildings; however, because the County admitted that the condemnation would
make the buildings valueless, it agreed to compensate the condemnee for the
loss. The County also agreed to allow the tenants to stay in the buildings
during the eminent domain proceedings. The landowner informed the tenants
that he expected them to keep paying rent during that period. They responded
by filing successful motions with the court to abate their rent. The landowner
filed a motion to set that order aside, but the parties eventually settled the
matter. Under the settlement, the landowner received $139,475. In calculating
the attorney's fees in the eminent domain action, the judge included that
amount in the benefits that the attorney had obtained for his client.257 The
district court found that to be error.25
8
"Full compensation within the meaning of our constitution includes the
payment of attorney's fees necessary to enforce the property owner's rights,
including fees incurred in proceedings arising out of, and ancillary to, the
original condemnation proceeding."5 9 Disputes arising out of the proceeding
are such things as apportionment of the damages or enforcement of the
condemnation award. Even the statute only provides attorneys' fees incurred
in the defense of the condemnation action.260 That the landowner's dispute
with his tenants was triggered by the condemnation action does not make it a
proceeding arising out of the condemnation. It was a private dispute between a
landlord and his tenants, and there is no reason that the public should pay his
attorney's fees in resolving that dispute.
254. RollingwoodApartments, 678 So. 2d at 371.
255. Id.
256. Butler, 676 So. 2d at 455.
257. Id. at 454.
258. Id. at 455.
259. Id. at 454.
260. FLA. STAT. § 73.091 (Supp. 1994).
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The County had also claimed the court erred in awarding attorneys' fees
for time spent litigating the issue of attorneys' fees. The established rule is
that attorneys' fees can be recovered for time spent litigating the issue of
whether an attorney is entitled to fees, but they cannot be recovered for time
spent litigating the amount of the attorney's fees. The record in this case was
silent as to which issue the attorney's time was spent on, so the appellant
cannot establish that an error occurred.26'
Department of Transportation v. Murray.262 The DOT was in the process
of condemning part of a restaurant parking lot. On the issue of severance
damages, DOT sought unsuccessfully to introduce expert testimony that the
injury could be partially cured, arguing that the thirteen parking spaces that
would be lost by the taking could be recovered if the landowner added spaces
to existing parking bays and striped over a paved area then being used only for
overflow parking. That ruling was made in an interlocutory order by the
original trial judge. 63 When that judge was removed, his successor felt bound
by the interlocutory order.264 The district court held that the proffered testi-
mony should have been excluded but for a different reason. 265
The fatal flaw with the expert testimony was that it did not consider the
effect the proposed cure would have on the value of the remaining property
and business. Converting the overflow parking into regular marked parking
would leave the landowner with the same number of striped parking spaces,
but it would not make the landowners whole because the landowner would still
have a smaller parking area. That would probably reduce the value of the
restaurant, a factor which the expert testimony did not address. Therefore, the
testimony was inadmissible as a matter of law.
266
In addition, the landowners' expert had testified regarding the calculation
of business damages. Business damages were, and still are, provided for by
statute267 rather than by constitutional authority, but the statute provides little
guidance regarding how they are to be calculated. The expert had described
his calculation as a "deprivation appraisal,' 268 but the court characterized it as
261. Butler, 676 So. 2d at 455.
262. 670 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 677 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1996).
This was a per curiam opinion in which Judges Ervin and Miner concurred. Judge Benton wrote
an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
263. Id. at 978.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 980.
267. FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3) (1991).
268. Murray, 670 So. 2d at 979.
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a lost profit analysis.269 The calculation of business damages should focus on
lost profits and lost ability to make profits, but it should also consider business
losses caused by the taking. This lost profit analysis must also include
consideration of any fixed expenses that will be incurred despite the taking. In
this case, the expert purposefully excluded fixed expenses such as advertising,
depreciation, insurance, utilities, and the landowners' salaries. Since the
expert's analysis here did not account for fixed expenses, it should not have
been admitted into evidence.
The district court certified two questions as being of great public impor-
tance.270 They are:
[1] IN AN EMINENT DOMAIN CASE IN WHICH AN ESTAB-
LISHED BUSINESS IS NOT TOTALLY DESTROYED BY A
TAKING, DOES SECTION 73.071(3)(b), FLORIDA STAT-
UTES, CONTEMPLATE CALCULATION OF BUSINESS
DAMAGES BY ANY MEANS OTHER THAN A LOST PROFIT
ANALYSIS? [2] IN THE INSTANT CASE IS THE EXPERT'S
BUSINESS DAMAGE CALCULATION A LOST PROFIT
ANALYSIS REQUIRING THE DEDUCTION OF FIXED EX-
PENSES, SUCH AS SALARIES, INTEREST, DEPRECIATION,
AND UTILITIES, OR AN ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS, COG-
NIZABLE UNDER SECTION 73.071(3)(b), BASED ON DE-
DUCTION OF CERTAIN VARIABLE EXPENSES AND THE
EXCLUSION OF FIXED EXPENSES FROM THE ANALY-
SIS?271
Judge Benton disagreed and, therefore, dissented in part.272 The calcula-
tion of business damages would be different if the business is forced to shut
down as a result of the taking rather than becomes less profitable. If the
business shuts down, then the deduction of fixed expenses is appropriate
because those expenses will cease. However, if the business continues, then
the expenses will also continue as they had before the taking. Judge Benton
argues that the majority applied the wrong standard to a business which would
269. Ma2
270. The same two questions were certified in Department of Transp. v. Coleman, 673 So.
2d 874 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996), a per curiam opinion involving the same three judges as in
Murray. The Supreme Court of Florida granted review of the certified questions on July 2, 1996.
See Murray v. Department of Transp., 677 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1996).
271. Murray, 670 So. 2d at 980.
272. Id. (Benton, J., dissenting in part).
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continue. 3 Moreover, the expert's testimony was sufficiently supported by
the facts so that it could be left to the jury to decide whether to accept it or not.
Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Authority v. Casiano-Torres.2 74
The condemnee sought and won severance damages.275 Among the things it
apparently claimed was damage to its business, which it could recover if the
taking would "damage or destroy an established business of more than 5 years'
standing. ' 76 The government appealed, inter alia, the trial court's submitting
to the jury the question of whether the condemnee's business had been in
existence for five years. The government's theory was that court had ignored
the provision that: "[t]he jury shall determine solely the amount of compensa-
tion to be paid .... The district court held that the trial court had not erred,
stating that "[s]uch an interpretation ignores the remainder of the statute which
establishes what 'compensation' shall include and the requirements for
arriving at the proper amount of compensation. 278 Apparently, the court's
point was that whether the business was in existence for the requisite five years
was only an element in determining the amount of damages, not whether
damages should be paid.
Weese v. Pinellas County.279 The sole issue in the case was the amount of
business damages. The facts in the case were somewhat unusual. A used car
lot occupied the land. The order "taking" part of it was entered on July 2,
1991, but the construction project did not actually get to that vicinity until
September of 1993. Cars were displayed on the land until then. The project
was completed in February of 1994. The first expert witness testified that the
actual damage began in February of 1994, which is the date on which he began
calculating the damages. Because the statute280 provided that compensation
shall be based on the earlier of the date of the taking or the date of the trial, the
281trial judge excluded this testimony.
273. Id. at 981.
274. 659 So. 2d 1125 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 666 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1995).
Acting Chief Judge Campbell wrote the opinion. Judges Patterson and Fulmer concurred.
275. Id. at 1125. See FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3)(b) (1991) (governing the award of severance
damages).
276. FLA. STAT. § 73.071(3)(b) (1991).
277. Id. § 73.071(3).
278. Casiano-Torres, 659 So. 2d at 1126.
279. 668 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Acting Chief Judge Ryder wrote the
opinion in which Judges Altenbemd and Lazzara concurred.
280. FLA. STAT. § 73.071(2) (1991).
281. Weese, 668 So. 2d at 222.
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Then the trial court refused to allow the next witness to testify. He was
the prior owner of the car business; he had continued to help the current
owner; he was the owner of the underlying land; and he had the same last
name as the current owner. M Exactly what it was about this combination of
facts that led to the trial court's decision was not specified. Then, because of
the lack of testimony on the amount of damages, the court entered a direct
verdict in favor of the County.2 3 The district court reversed. 2 4
First, the court concluded that the first expert had complied with the
statute.285 He had begun his calculations at the correct date, the date of the
taking, but had clearly stated that there were no business damages between the
date of the taking in 1991 and the date when the project was complete in 1994.
He merely continued his calculations from that date. Furthermore, the second
expert was qualified to testify. "A witness may testify as an expert if he is
qualified to do so by reason of knowledge obtained in his occupation or
business."' 6 He had knowledge of the used car business in general and also of
the particular business that had been damaged. Implicit in the court's decision
is that there is nothing inherent in this witness' connection to the claimant to
disqualify him as an expert.
B. Inverse Condemnation
City of Riviera Beach v. Shillingsburg and Taylor v. City of North Palm
Beach 8 involve contiguous submerged land, although in different cities.
They involve similar facts and were decided by the same panel of judges from
the Fourth District Court of Appeal. In Shillingburg, the City amended its
comprehensive plan to include the following policy: "It is the expressed policy
objective of the City to preclude any development of submerged lands, includ-
ing but not limited to mangroves, wetlands... to the maximum extent permis-
sible by law. It is further the policy of the City to oppose any applications for
dredge and fill permits ..... ,'289 The landowners claimed this affected a taking
282. The exact relationship, if any, was not mentioned in the decision.
283. Weese, 668 So. 2d at 223.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 222.
286. Id. at 223 (relying upon Harvey v. State, 129 Fla. 289 (1937) and FIA. STAT. § 90.702
(1991)).
287. 659 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Judge Pariente wrote the opinion in
which Judge Warner and Associate Judge Fredericka Smith concurred.
288. 659 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Judge Pariente wrote the opinion in
which Judge Warner and Associate Judge Fredericka Smith concurred.
289. 659 So. 2d at 1177.
1996]
Nova Law Review
of their land. The trial court initially rejected the claims as not being ripe
because there was no final decision as to what would be ultimately allowed,
but stayed the proceedings for four months pending developments.290 During
that time, the land use plan was amended to allow a viewing dock, and one
landowner's application for a permit to build a viewing dock was approved
subject to stringent conditions and limits. The trial court concluded that this
proved the highest level of development that would be allowed, but it was not
enough.29' It violated the landowner's reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions which constituted a taking.292  The district court disagreed and re-
versed.293
A land use ordinance that leaves open the possibility of reasonable use
should not be found on its face to violate the Takings Clause.294 This plan by
its express language contemplated viable uses consistent with the policy
objectives. The amendment to allow the viewing dock demonstrated that the
plan has some flexibility and that further amendments were possible. So the
facial challenge failed.295
The as applied challenge failed because it was not ripe.296 The doctrine is
intended to give the land use agency the chance to reach its own well-reasoned
conclusion before a court will consider the matter. Getting permission to build
a dock did not prove what the land use agency would ultimately allow or deny.
While the landowners here asserted that any further applications would be
futile, that was not conclusively established from the facts in the record.
In Taylor,297 the landowner's family had held title since 1971. Back then
the zoning was C-1A which permitted limited commercial uses and high
density, multifamily residential uses. That it was in the midst of an environ-
mentally sensitive area was gradually recognized by various levels of govern-
ment, culminating with the zoning being changed in 1989 to a conserva-
tion/open space classification, consistent w~h the City's comprehensive use
plan. Low density single family housing and passive recreation were permis-
sible uses. The landowner sued on the theory that this reclassification affected
290. Id. at 1178.
291. Id. at 1179.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1176.
294. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
295. Shillingsburg, 659 So. 2d at 1179.
296. Id. at 1180.
297. Taylor, 659 So. 2d at 1167.
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a taking of the property. The trial court rejected her claims and she ap-
pealed. 298
The landowner's first claim was that the zoning classification was a per se
taking of her property. Where a land use regulation leaves open the possibility
of reasonable uses, a claim of a facial taking will fail. The district court found
that the record did not preclude all reasonable uses of the land.299 Further-
more, the plan had a mechanism for seeking amendments. So it was possible
that the landowner could have gotten an amendment allowing a proposed use.
Any claim that the landowner would be deprived of all economically
viable uses would depend on an as applied challenge based upon the facts of
the case. However, that challenge failed because the landowner had failed to
exhaust her administrative remedies by seeking the amendment. 300 She also
had not submitted a development plan that had been rejected by the City.
Whether there has been a taking depends on the extent to which the landowner
will be deprived of her reasonable investment-backed expectations, but that
depends on what development the government will allow. Until the govern-
ment made a final determination, the takings issue could not be decided.
Therefore, this case was not yet ripe.
30 1
City of St. Petersburg v. Bowen.302 The landlord brought this action for
inverse condemnation after the City's Nuisance Abatement Board ordered his
apartment house closed for a period of one year.30 3 The landlord was not
accused of any wrongdoing. The order was based upon a finding that there
was drug use by tenants and other persons at the property. The trial court first
granted a motion to dismiss filed by the City.304 It ruled that the taking was
temporary and, at the time, it was the accepted law that an inverse condemna-
tion action could not be brought to recover for a temporary taking.305 Because
298. Id. at 1168.
299. Id. at 1171.
300. Id. at 1172-73.
301. Id. at 1174.
302. 675 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, No. 88,373, 1996 LEXIS 1563,
at *1 (Fla. Aug. 29, 1996). Acting Chief Judge Campbell wrote the opinion in which Judges
Frank and Blue concurred.
303. The order was based upon the authority of section 893.138 of the Florida Statutes and
sections 19-66 to 19-71 of the St. Petersburg, Florida, City Code. See FL4. STAT. § 893.138
(1991); ST. PETERSBURG, FLA., Crry CODE §§ 19-66 to -71 (1989). There was no claim that the
order was invalid.
304. Bowen, 675 So. 2d at 628.
305. Id.
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the Supreme Court of Florida changed the law3°6 after the trial court's decision
307
was made, the district court reversed. The trial court then granted summary
judgment to the landlord.08 The district court affirmed, adopting the opinion
of Circuit Court Judge Horace A. Andrews which it found to be "complete,
concise, scholarly and well-grounded.
' 309
A regulation that denies all economically beneficial or productive use of
the land is compensable without inquiry into the public interest advanced in
support of the regulation. Ordering the apartment house closed for one year
did deny all economically beneficial or productive use. The taking claim is not
avoided by invoking the nuisance exception. The state may legitimately
prohibit conduct which would be a common law nuisance, e.g., the use or sale
of drugs. But the conduct prohibited goes far beyond that. This order prohib-
its the use of the premises for human habitation. In essence, the City is trying
to force this landowner to disproportionately bear the cost of its war on drugs.
Sarasota Welfare Home, Inc. v. City of Sarasota.310 The landowner's
property was subject to a public easement. When the City buried a sewer and
wastewater pipe in 1970, it extended beyond the public easement and en-
croached on the this landowner's land. The encroachment was discovered in
1988 when the landowner began a construction project. Due to the location of
the pipe, the City refused to allow the construction according to the proposed
plans. Just under four years after the discovery, the landowner filed this
inverse condemnation action against the City. The trial court granted the
City's motion for summary judgment on the basis that the action was barred by
the statute of limitations, but the district court reversed. 31
There is no specific inverse condemnation statute of limitations, but that
does not mean that the action is not subject to a time limit. The district court
ruled312 that it is subject to the four year statute of limitations applicable to real
property actions for which the legislature has not provided a specific limit.313
The critical question in this case is when the four year period began to run.
314
306. Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S. Corp., 640 So. 2d 54 (Fla.
1994).
307. Bowen v. City of St. Petersburg, 642 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
308. Bowen, 675 So. 2d at 628.
309. Id. at 629.
310. 666 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Chief Judge Threadgill and Judges
Campbell and Fulmer concurred in this per curiam opinion.
311. Id. at 173.
312. On this point, the district court affirmed the trial court's ruling. Id.
313. Id at 172 (citing FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(p) (1991)).
314. Id.
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The trial court ruled that the four year period began in 1970 when the en-
croaching pipe was installed, but the district court concluded it was when the
City refused to approve the development plan because of location of its own
pipe.315 The court's logic is that "a 'taking' occurs when an owner is denied
substantially all economically beneficial or productive use of the owner's
land. 316 Whether a taking has occurred is determined by a factual inquiry
made on a case-by-case basis, so when it occurred must be determined the
same way. Here, the court concluded that the landowner was not deprived of
the use of the land taken until it was prevented from building according to its
plans. 3
17
The court also reversed the trial court's denial of the landowner's motion
for leave to amend the complaint.318 The landowner wanted to add a trespass
claim, apparently on the theories that the encroaching pipe was a continuing
trespass; damages for the preceding four years of encroachment would not be
barred by the statute of limitations; and an injunction should be awarded
against the encroachment's continuation. Such motions "shall be given freely
when justice so requires."31 9 Apparently nothing in the record justified the
trial court's denial of the motion.
Department of Environmental Protection v. Burgess.320 The landowner
owned approximately 166 acres in the wetlands. His application for a dredge
and fill permit was denied by the Department following an administrative
hearing. Rather than appeal the Department's final order, he brought this suit
in circuit court claiming that the denial constituted a taking for which compen-
sation must be paid. He filed a motion for partial summary judgment sup-
ported only by his own affidavit and the Department's final order denying the
permit. The Department responded by filing the landowner's deposition and
an affidavit from a county official that the proposed development would
require a county building permit. In his deposition, the landowner admitted
that the Department had offered to issue the dredge and fill permit if he would
give it a conservation easement, an offer he refused. The trial court granted the
landowner's motion for partial summary judgment and the Department
appealed.321
315. Sarasota Welfare, 666 So. 2d at 173.
316. Id. (citing Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth., 640 So. 2d at 58).
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a).
320. 667 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Judge Van Nortwick wrote the opinion.
Judges Ervin and Benton concurred.
321. Id at 268.
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The district court reversed.322 A regulatory taking occurs when the
landowner is deprived of substantially all economically beneficial or produc-
tive use of the property. Could the landowner still use the land productively?
Would available uses be economically beneficial in light of his investment-
backed expectations? Finally, would the proposed use be a nuisance? No
compensation is required if the state prevents a landowner from engaging in
nuisance activity. These fact-based questions remained. "A summary judg-
ment should not be granted unless the facts are so crystallized that nothing
remains but questions of law."323 So the trial court erred in granting the
summary judgment.324
The district court noted that the case presents an interesting question. The
landowner never tested the validity of the Department's order by judicial
review.325 Does the Department's denial of the permit conclusively establish
in this case that the landowner could not get a permit? The court declined to
answer because the issue had not been raised in or ruled upon by the trial
court.
3 26
XIII. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Department of Community Affairs v. Moorman.32 7  In this case, the
Supreme Court of Florida assessed the validity of a land use ordinance
affecting Big Pine Key, enacted to protect the endangered Florida Key deer.
The court noted, in an opinion authored by Justice Kogan,328 that human
development has "put the deer perilously close to extinction., 329 The respon-
dent property owners were prohibited under the ordinance from erecting
fences, 330 representing a threat to the Key deer which must roam freely in
322. Id. at 271.
323. Id. (citing Coastal Petroleum Co. v. Chiles, 656 So. 2d 284, 285 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1995)).
324. Id.
325. Burgess, 667 So. 2d at 270.
326. Id. at 269-70.
327. 664 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, No. 95-2035, 1996 WL 337490, at *1 (U.S.
Oct. 7, 1996).
328. Justices Overton, Shaw, Harding and Anstead concurred, while Chief Justice Grimes
authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, with which opinion Justice Wells
concurred. Id.
329. Id. at 931.
330. Interestingly, Respondent Charles Moorman not only owned lands affected by the
ordinance, but also owns Your Local Fence, a company that was also a respondent in the
litigation. Id.
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search of food and water. The ordinance, a blanket prohibition on fencing,
was intended as an interim effort which would "be replaced within a year by a
more comprehensive regulation that would better identify where fence restric-
tions would be proper and where they were unnecessary." 331 However, the
ordinance had been in place for five years before the relevant dates in this
litigation.
332
Notwithstanding the ordinance, Monroe County officials granted Moor-
man a permit to build a six-foot-high, 400-foot-long fence, and Justice Kogan
noted that "[t]he record contains evidence that Moorman's fence is in a
location that will adversely affect the Key deer."333  The Department of
Community Affairs ("DCA") appealed the County's decision under its
"authority over areas of critical state concern." 334 Moorman's lots are located
in an area which was designated as a critical state concern in 1979.335 Upon
referral, a Department of Administrative Hearings' hearing officer found the
permits improper, noting that the permits were issued as a matter of right.
336
The hearing officer recommended that the Cabinet (sitting as the Florida Land
& Water Adjudicatory Committee) rescind the permits, which it did.337
Moorman then appealed to the Third District Court of Appeal, which found the
ordinance facially unconstitutional.338
The Supreme Court of Florida held that such a finding of facial unconsti-
tutionality was improper because it promotes the valid public policy interests
in protecting the environment.339 Zoning ordinances are to be upheld unless
they bear no substantial relation to legitimate societal policies.340 Neverthe-
less, the court questioned whether any valid basis existed for denying the
331. Id. at 932.
332. Moorman, 664 So. 2d at 932.
333. Id.
334. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 380.07(2) (1993)).
335. Id. Justice Kogan added in a footnote that this fact was "crucial to the result in this
case, because it identifies an environmental concern unique to Big Pine Key." Id. at 932 n.1.
336. Moorman, 664 So. 2d at 932.
337. In a footnote, Justice Kogan noted that "the Cabinet sitting as the Florida Land & Water
Adjudicatory Commission may rescind land use permits in the Florida Keys or 'may attach
conditions and restrictions to its decisions."' Id. at 933 n.2 (citing FLA. STAT. § 380.07 (1993)).
Justice Kogan further noted that the record was unclear as to why the Cabinet had not attached
such conditions or restrictions, instead rescinding the permit altogether. Id.
338. Id. at 932.
339. Id. at 933.
340. Moorman, 664 So. 2d at 933. For this proposition, the court cited Harrell's Candy
Kitchen v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 111 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1959), one of the cases with
which the third district's opinion was thought to conflict with. Id. at 931.
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Moormans a permit.341 That the blanket prohibition was intended as an interim
measure meant that it was never regarded as an essential feature of public
policy.342 However, the DCA's expert testified that there were "good fences
and bad fences" and that the blanket prohibition extended beyond the expert's
"specific recommendations." 343 "[T]he uncontroverted expert evidence clearly
indicated that the Moormans' fence-the only one at issue here today-was
harmful to Key deer habitat. 344 On the basis of this testimony, the supreme
court quashed the third district's decision and remanded.345
Kaplan v. Peterson.346  The current landowner purchased the land in
1986. In 1989, an environmental site assessment report showed that a leaking
underground storage tank had contaminated the land. The current landowner
cleaned up the land and sued his seller to recover his costs and expenses.347
The parties agreed that the complaint did not make any claim based on a
recognized exception to the doctrine of caveat emptor. It only claimed that the
landowner can recover under a new cause of action impliedly created by
chapter 376 of the Florida Statutes (1989).348 The second district had already
decided that such a cause of action was not impliedly created, 349 but the fifth
district disagreed.350
The court found sufficient reasons to overcome a general judicial reluc-
tance to read a private cause of action into a statute.35 1 The statute requires
current owners to clean up a polluted site. If the current owner had failed to do
it, the state could have handled the clean up and then recovered from the prior
owner who caused the pollution. The state could not, however, have recovered
from the current owner who purchased without notice of the pollution.
341. ld. at 933.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Moorman, 664 So. 2d at 934.
345. Id. Justice Wells joined in Chief Justice Grimes' opinion, concurring in part and dis-
senting in part, failing to agree that the ordinance "was necessarily constitutional as applied." Id.
These justices would have remanded for a determination of whether the ordinance was constitu-
tionally applied or, alternatively, whether modification of the permit would be proper. Id.
346. 674 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judge W. Sharp wrote the majority
opinion. Judge Thompson concurred. Judge Griffin wrote an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
347. This action was consolidated with an action against his tenant, but that does not affect
the outcome of this decision.
348. See Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985).
349. Mostoufi v. Presto Food Stores, Inc., 618 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, 626 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1993).
350. Kaplan, 674 So. 2d at 206.
351. Il
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Neighbors injured by the pollution could recover from a prior owner who
caused it. A city could recover from a nearby landowner who had caused
contamination of its well field. Any person injured by the prior owner's
release of hazardous materials could recover for their injury. It would not
make sense to hold that the only one who could not recover was the current
owner who had obeyed the statute and cleaned up the mess caused by its seller.
Consequently, the court concluded that chapter 376 does create a private cause
of action against a prior owner who polluted.352
The court also recognized that the doctrine of caveat emptor had been
rejected in residential real estate sales.353 The Supreme Court of Florida had
not yet addressed the question of whether that holding should be expanded to
include commercial real estate transactions, and the third district had expressly
refused to do SO.354 However, this court simply ruled that caveat emptor was
not a bar to this cause of action.35 5 Apparently, the court felt it was clear
enough that the cause of action would have little applicability if it could be
barred by caveat emptor, so if the legislature had intended to give a buyer the
cause of action, it must have also intended to exempt it from the reaches of that
doctrine.
The court concluded by certifying the following question to the Supreme
Court of Florida:
DOES THE DOCTRINE OF CAVEAT EMPTOR BAR A CUR-
RENT LANDOWNER OF COMMERCIAL REAL PROPERTY
FROM SUING THE PRIOR LANDOWNER TO RECOVER THE
COST AND EXPENSES OF CLEAN UP OF THE PROPERTY,
WHICH WAS CAUSED BY THE PRIOR OWNERS UNLAW-
FUL DISCHARGE OF POLLUTANTS ON THE SITE, CON-
TRARY TO CHAPTER 376?356
Judge Griffin dissented from the finding that a private cause of action was
created for buyers by chapter 376. Applying the purpose approach to this
problem, the judge points out that "this legislation was not designed to protect
subsequent purchasers of polluted property." 358 What it was designed to do
352. Id. at 203.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Kaplan, 674 So. 2d at 205.
356. Id. at 205-06.
357. Id. at 206 (Griffin, J., dissenting in part).
358. Id.
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was protect people who had been harmed by a discharge of pollutants, not
indirectly harmedby the purchase of polluted property.
XIV. EQUITY
Bauerle v. Weisman."9 Landowners sought to rescind the conveyance by
which they had acquired their title and the contract of sale which led to the
conveyance. Their theory was mutual mistake. Their action was triggered by
the failure of the Department of Environmental Resources ("DER") to approve
their application for construction of a house and access road. The trial court
granted the relief after concluding that the DER would prevent the property
from ever being used as a residence, as was contemplated by the parties to the
conveyance. 36° The grantors/sellers appealed.
In order to prevail on the merits, the party seeking rescission must prove
its right to relief by clear and convincing evidence.361 A surveyor had testified
that the location of the line established the DER's wetlands jurisdiction over
this land, but that testimony was based upon the surveyor's assumption that the
DER's jurisdiction had already been established. The uncontradicted testi-
mony of a former DER permit processor was that the DER had never made a
jurisdictional determination because the plaintiffs had failed..to provide certain
essential information. Consequently, there was not competent, substantial
evidence that DER had the power to prevent the plaintiffs from building a
residence on this property as planned.362
Metropolitan Dade County v. O'Brien.363  The O'Briens opened a
business knowing that they were violating some County ordinances and had
not secured the appropriate permits, so the County sued. The trial court denied
the County's motion for a preliminary injunction, allowing the O'Briens ninety
days to get a variance.364 When the time was up, the County again moved for a
temporary injunction, but the trial court again denied it, giving the O'Briens
359. 664 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Judge Dauksch wrote the opinion.
Chief Judge Peterson and Judge Antoon concurred.
360. Id. at 364.
361. Id. at 365. See Rosique v. Windley Cove, Ltd., 542 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1989).
362. Id.
363. 660 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Judges Hubbart, Jorgenson, and Gersten
concurred in the per curiam opinion.
364. Id. at 365.
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another sixty days. 365 This time the County appealed and the Third District
Court of Appeal reversed.366
It has long been the settled rule that "[w]here the government seeks an
injunction in order to enforce its police power, any alternative legal remedy is
ignored and irreparable harm is presumed., 367  The O'Briens knowingly
violated the ordinances and continued to violate the ordinances. in these
"extreme circumstances," it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
deny the temporary injunctions.368
369Dorton v. Jensen. The sellers testified that under heavy rains, water
would rush from the street, into their yard, and hit the side of the house leaving
a water mark on the wall. On three or four occasions water had come under
the back door sill. To prevent that, they had caulked the bottom of the door sill
with silicone, a fix that had worked, but they never told the buyers about the
water problem. In fact, when the buyers asked if they should buy flood
insurance, the sellers had answered it was unnecessary as they had never
experienced a flooding problem.370
After moving in, the buyers experienced severe flooding after several
heavy rainfalls. The buyers eventually stopped making the purchase money
mortgage payments to the sellers. This suit followed with the buyers seeking
rescission and the sellers seeking foreclosure. After a non-jury trial, the circuit
court, applying the principle of Johnson v. Davis,371 ruled in favor of the
sellers because the buyers had experienced only "minor water damage.' 372
The district court reversed.373
Johnson required sellers to disclose any material fact that would materi-
ally affect the value of the property and that was not readily observable to the
buyers. 374 A latent flooding problem might be such a material fact, but the
court had not addressed that question. The court focused instead on the
amount of damage the buyers suffered when the house flooded.375 There was
365. Id.
366. I
367. Id.
368. O'Brien, 660 So. 2d at 365.
369. 676 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judge Lazzara wrote the opinion. Acting
Chief Judge Parker and Judge Blue concurred.
370. Id. at 438.
371. 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985).
372. Dorton, 676 So. 2d at 439.
373. Id. at 440 (relying on Johnson, 480 So. 2d at 625).
374. Johnson, 480 So. 2d at 629.
375. Dorton, 676 So. 2d at 439.
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evidence that it was a material fact affecting the value in that the buyers had
testified that they would not have bought the house if they had known about
this flooding problem. Consequently, the case was remanded for a new trial.376
KCIN, Inc. v. Canpro Investments, Ltd.377 Canpro Investments filed an
action against KCIN for breach of a commercial lease. Canpro filed an answer
and a counterclaim. The trial court found all claims to be without merit and
refused to award attorney's fees to Canpro on the theory that there was no
prevailing party.378 Canpro appealed based on the argument that the trial court
is required to name a prevailing party, a position supported by other districts.
379
The district court affirmed on this issue, but noted the conflict with the other
circuits and certified the conflict to the Supreme Court of Florida. 
380
Wiborg v. Eisenberg.381  The buyers brought an action for specific
performance of a contract to buy land. The seller refused to convey the land.
At issue was whether there was a contract and, if so, whether it failed to satisfy
the Statute of Frauds. The trial judge awarded relief to the buyers because it
found that the seller had
demonstrated a lack of candor in his dealings with the BUYERS
and has testified untruthfully in the course of the trial. This court
can not and will not allow the utilization of the Statute of Frauds as
a shield to perpetuate unfair dealings, when the party invoking its
protection has perjured himself on multiple material points.382
However, the trial judge refused to award damages to the buyers.383
The district court affirmed the judgment of specific performance, al-
though on the grounds that there was a valid and enforceable contract under
376. Id. at440.
377. 675 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judge Blue wrote the opinion. Acting
Chief Judge Campbell and Judge Fulmer concurred.
378. Id. at 223.
379. Id. See also Green Cos. v. Kendall Racquetball Inv. Ltd., 658 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Lucite Ctr., Inc. v. Mercede, 606 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
380. The case was reversed on the issue of whether attorneys' fees should have been
awarded under section 768.79 of the Florida Statutes (1991) based upon Canpro's offer of
judgment. KCIN, 675 So. 2d at 223. The case was remanded so the trial court could reconsider
the issue in light of TGI Friday's, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1995), which was decided
after the trial court's decision in this case. Id.
381. 671 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Associate Judge Patti Englander Hen-
ning wrote the opinion. Chief Judge Gunther and Judge Shahood concurred.
382. Id. at 834.
383. Id.
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any of the three possible interpretations of the facts.384 However, the district
court reversed on the trial court's failure to award the damages to the buyer.385
It ruled a court of equity may award compensation to parties who have
succeeded in a specific performance action when that is necessary "to place
them in a position [the parties] would have occupied had the contract been
timely performed. 386 This is really an adjusting of the equities between the
parties rather than the award of damages for breach of contract.
387
XV. FORECLOSURE
Barnes v. Resolution Trust Corp.388 The Resolution Trust Corporation
("RTC"), as receiver for City Federal Savings Bank ("CFSB"), received a
favorable judgment of foreclosure, and the Barneses appealed. 389 The Barne-
ses sold the property to James and Florence Marsh who executed a promissory
note and first mortgage in favor of CFSB, as well as a second mortgage in
favor of the Bameses. After the Marshes defaulted on the second mortgage,
the Bameses continued making payments to CFSB and requested that CFSB
send appropriate paperwork for assumption of the mortgage by the Barneses.
CFSB accepted some payments (totalling about $15,000), but the RTC refused
to accept payments when it took over. Although the RTC returned their
payments, the Barneses made expenditures on the property for maintenance,
including roof upkeep and painting, as well as taxes and hazard insurance.
390
Moreover, the Barneses rented the property and retained income in contradic-
tion of a court order directing them to deposit such income into the court
registry. The CFSB loan went into default, and the RTC obtained judgment of
foreclosure.39'
The Barneses contended that, based on CFSB's acceptance of the
installment payments, the RTC is estopped from refusing payment and forcing
default of an otherwise current mortgage. The Fourth District Court of Appeal
held that the RTC had a contractual right to foreclose on the mortgage when
the Marshes defaulted, and it was not obligated to the Barneses as they were
384. Id.
385. Id. at 835.
386. Wiborg, 671 So. 2d at 835.
387. Id.
388. 664 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
389. Id. at 1172.
390. An RTC representative testified that CFSB records indicated that CFSB had responded
to the Bameses inquiry, but the Bameses claimed that the bank never responded.
391. Barnes, 664 So. 2d at 1172.
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not parties to the first mortgage and had never assumed that mortgage.' Also,
there was no evidence that either CFSB or the RTC had induced the Barneses
to make payments on the first mortgage.393 However, although the RTC was
not estopped from accelerating the mortgage according to the acceleration
clause, it was not entitled to retain the Barneses' earlier payments. 394 The
court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount
that the Barneses had paid in satisfaction of the first mortgage, which the
Barnses would be entitled to receive from the RTC, plus interest.
395
XVI. HOMESTEAD
Miskin v. City of Fort Lauderdale.39 6 In this case, the trial court granted
the City's motion for summary judgment, and the Fourth District Court of
Appeal affirmed.397 The City recorded a favorable final order issued by the
Code Enforcement Board as a lien against Miskin's homestead property
pursuant to section 162.09 of the Florida Statutes (1993). The Board had
found for the City for two code violations on the property and gave Miskin
until January 26, 1992 to comply; thereafter, he was subject to a $150.00 fine
for each day of noncompliance. Miskin filed for a declaratory judgment that
the order did not exist as a lien on the property.
398
The court quoted section 162.09(3) and explained that the order underly-
ing the lien was not a "judgment, decree or execution," as prohibited by Article
X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution.? The court believed that section
162.09(3) demonstrates legislative recognition of this fact by declaring that
these orders not be deemed to be court judgments except for enforcement
purposes, and that no lien created under that part of the statute may be en-
forced against real homestead property.4°° Although unenforceable, the lien
392. IdM at 1173.
393. Id. See Department of Revenue v. Anderson, 403 So. 2d 397, 400 (Fla. 1981) (citing
Greenhut Constr. Co. v. Henry A. Knott, Inc., 247 So. 2d 517, 524 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1971)
(stating that "to prevail under estoppel theory, movant must demonstrate that (1) defendant or an
agent made a representation with regard to a material fact; (2) movant relied on the representa-
tion; and (3) changed his position to his detriment in reliance on the representation.")).
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. 661 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
397. Id.
398. Id. at416.
399. Id.
400. Id.
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was not invalid.4° ' The court noted that "the prohibition of the constitutional
provision is a prohibition against the use of process to force the sale of
homestead property and does not invalidate the debt or lien.''4 2 Thus, if the
property lost homestead status in the future, the City would be able to enforce
the lien.4°3
XVII. LAND USE PLANNING
City of New Smyrna Beach v. Andover Development Corp.404 In 1970, the
City passed Ordinance 797 that created a special planned unit development
zoning classification. Under it, a developer could submit a plan for a large
development that had to satisfy large scale guidelines rather than the traditional
zoning rules for each lot or unit. The developer, the plaintiff in this case, did
submit such a plan and the City Commission approved it. Pursuant to the plan,
the City Commission rezoned the land to an R-R Pud zone that incorporated
the project plan into the zoning. The citizens of the City reacted by repealing
Ordinance 797 in a referendum vote. However, in earlier litigation, the district
court determined that the referendum did not revoke the ordinance as to this
development, the R-R Pud zone, or the developer's approval to develop this
land.405 It merely prevented the City Commission from approving any more
plans.
Eighteen years later, the developer sought to amend its project plans by
increasing the height of some buildings from twenty to twenty-nine stories and
relocating some buildings. The City Commission rejected the proposed
amendments, so the developer sued to enforce the earlier judgment on the
theory that Ordinance 797 did not have any fixed height limitations or location
limitations. The trial court granted relief, but the district court reversed. 4°
Although Ordinance 797 did not have these limitations, once the details
of the project plan were incorporated into the R-R Pud zone, its details became
the limits under the zoning classification of this land.4°7 The plan did specify
the location and heights of the buildings and provided that all except minor
401. Miskin, 661 So. 2d at 416.
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. 672 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judge Harris wrote the opinion. Judges
Dauksch and Sharp concurred.
405. See Andover Development Corp. v. City of New Smyrna Beach, 328 So. 2d 231 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 1976).
406. Andover, 672 So. 2d at 622.
407. d at 621.
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changes had to be approved by the City Commission. If the developer wanted
to modify the plan, it would have to follow the amendment procedures
provided by Ordinance 797.
408
DSA Marine Sales & Service, Inc. v. County of Manatee.4 9 DSA Marine
Sales & Services, Inc. ("DSA") wanted to build a marina and dry boat storage
facility. The County Commission approved the needed zoning change but
disapproved the construction proposal. DSA reacted by filing a petition for a
writ of certiorari in the circuit court. Simultaneous with the petition, it moved
to supplement the record as the documents became available. A short time
later, DSA filed an amended petition with an expanded appendix. Although
the appendix was still not complete, the circuit court summarily denied the
amended petition on the grounds that the petitioner failed to make a prima
facie case.410 Later, the circuit court also denied DSA's motion for rehear-
ing.41' On review, the district court determined that DSA had been denied
412procedural due process.
Procedural due process requires that the litigants have a reasonable
opportunity to be heard. To obtain review, DSA had to file its certiorari
petition within thirty days of the order's rendition, but the court noted that, in
such circumstances, "it is sometimes impossible to compile and contempora-
neously file the entire record as an appendix to the petition. 41 3 Consequently,
procedural due process required that DSA be afforded a reasonable opportu-
nity to complete the appendix. On the record, it did not appear that DSA had
been given that reasonable opportunity. The court also pointed out that the
circuit court order failed to explain in detail why the petition was dismissed.414
Such detail would have been helpful to the parties and the appellate court.415
Implicit is the suggestion that the court provide such details in the future.
Board of County Commissioners v. Karp.416 Pursuant to the County's
comprehensive plan, the Board of County Commissioners of Sarasota County
("Board") adopted a plan for the University Parkway Corridor. Under this
408. Id. at 621-22.
409. 661 So. 2d 907 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Acting Chief Judge Ryder and Judges
Frank and Parker concurred in the per curiam decision.
410. Id. at 908.
411. Id.
412. l at 909.
413. Id.
414. DSA Marine, 661 So. 2d at 908.
415. Id. at 909.
416. 662 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Acting Chief Judge Campbell wrote the
opinion. Judges Blue and Whatley concurred.
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plan, respondents' property was designated for "office" use despite respon-
dents' demands that their land be designated commercial so it could be used
more intensely. The circuit court's writ of certiorari ordered, inter alia, that
the property be designated commercial, but that was reversed by the district
court.
4 17
The critical issue was whether the Board's adoption of the corridor plan
was quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative. The circuit court, relying on Board of
County Commissioners v. Snyder,418 had concluded that the decision was
quasi-judicial, i.e., it involved the application of a general rule or policy to
specific facts.4 19 The plan applied to only forty-eight parcels of land covering
179 acres, and it conditioned development approvals on the reservation of a
waterline easement. The district court, however, pointed out that Snyder,
unlike this case, involved a rezoning request.420 Adopting the plan was a
quasi-legislative action, i.e., it involved the formulation of a general rule or
policy, because it involved a plan for a substantial, although finite, number or
parcels of land. Moreover, conditioning development approvals on the
reservation of a waterline easement did not convert this decision into a quasi-
judicial one because that condition was invalid.
A quasi-legislative decision that is "fairly debatable" should not be
disturbed by a reviewing court. The Board's decision here met that standard
given the evidence before it. The circuit court should not have, in essence,
ordered the property rezoned where there has never been a rezoning applica-
tion. Such a rezoning application would not necessarily be a futile act; even
though a property is designated "office" in the plan, rezoning (or a variance)
for a particular parcel may be obtainable.4 1
Metropolitan Dade County v. Blumenthal.422 The Third District Court of
Appeal, sitting en banc, revisited an earlier decision by a three judge panel 4 23
A landowner wanted his land rezoned to RU-4L (Residential Limited Apart-
417. Id. at 720.
418. 627 So. 2d469 (Fla. 1993).
419. Karp, 662 So. 2d at 719.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 720.
422. 21 Fla. L. Weekly D464 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 1996), review dismissed, No.
88,405, 1996 LEXIS 1580 (Fla. Aug. 29, 1996). Chief Judge Schwartz and Judges Barkdull,
Nesbitt, Cope, Levy, and Gersten concurred in this per curiam opinion. Judge Hubbart wrote a
lengthy dissent.
423. Metropolitan Dade County v. Blumenthal, 675 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1995). See Ronald B. Brown et al., Property Law: 1995 Survey of Florida Law, 20 NOVA L.
REv. 257,313-14 (1995).
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ment House with a maximum of twenty-three units per acre) so he could
develop a 360-unit apartment complex. A neighboring federation of home-
owners' associations objected, claiming that a trend had begun to limit density
in the area. The only opposition testimony was from neighbors who did not
want the apartment complex there. The Dade County Commission denied the
rezoning application because the application was inconsistent with the trend.
The circuit court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari, finding that the
Commission's decision was arbitrary and not based on substantial competent
evidence.424
The petition to the district court for a writ of certiorari was denied by the
three judge panel which noted that the standard of review in such situations
was limited to whether procedural due process was afforded and whether the
circuit court applied the correct law.425 There was no claim of a denial of due
process. After concluding that the correct law was applied, the decision was
426affirmed. Judge Cope wrote a lengthy dissent stating that the circuit court
had applied incorrect law in that: 1) it should have determined whether the
commission's resolution was based upon substantial competent evidence rather
than whether the comments of an individual commissioner were based upon
such evidence; 427 2) the circuit court's inquiry should not have been whether it
would have made the same choice as the commission, but whether there was
sufficient evidence in the record to support the choice that the commission did
make;428 and 3) the circuit court should not have denigrated citizen testimony
because it was fact-based and the material facts were not in dispute.429 He
argued that the majority was applying the wrong scope of review, i.e., the
scope of review for administrative decisions, rather than the review a district
court should exercise over circuit court decisions. 430 The district court may
determine whether the law has been correctly applied to the facts in the record.
Upon reconsideration by the court en banc, Judge Cope's dissent was adopted
431
as the majority opinion.
Judge Hubbart, author of the original opinion, was the dissenter this
time.432 He emphasized that when the circuit court sits as an appellate court,
424. Blumenthal, 675 So. 2d at 600-01.
425. Id. at 601.
426. Id.
427. Id. at 604 (Cope, J., dissenting).
428. Id. at 605.
429. Blumenthal, 675 So. 2d at 607 (Cope, J., dissenting).
430. Id.
431. Blumenthal, 21 Fla. L. Weekly at D464.
432. Id. (Hubbart, J., dissenting).
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review of its decisions should be more limited.433 A petitioner should not be
entitled to a second appeal once he has had one before the circuit court except
on the issues of denial of due process, lack of jurisdiction, or commission of an
error so fundamental as to render the decision a miscarriage of justice. From
the standpoint of judicial economy, he has a point, but then from the standpoint
of judicial economy, a second appeal to the district court makes no sense at all.
In total, the logic of having the circuit court have an appellate function has
always escaped this author.43 4 The mixture of trial and appellate jurisdiction in
one court seems certain to result in confusion, as this case proves.
Lee County v. Zemel.435 In 1990, the Lee County Comprehensive Plan
was amended to create a category called "Density Reduction/Groundwater
Resource." To their extreme displeasure, the plaintiffs' land was included in
that category. They claimed that their land did not fit the criteria for that
classification. They utilized their remedies under section 163.3213 of the
Florida Statutes436 which resulted in a hearing before the Division of Admin-
istrative Hearings, but the hearing officer concluded that there was adequate
data and analysis to support the decision. The Department of Community
Affairs adopted the hearing officer's ruling and that decision was affirmed by
the First District Court of Appeal.437
The landowners brought this action for a declaratory judgment and
injunction in circuit court on the theories that the classification of their land
violated their substantive due process rights, their procedural process rights,
and constituted a temporary or permanent taking without compensation. The
district court interpreted this as a claim that the ordinance had been unconsti-
tutionally applied to their land because their expert testified that land was
incorrectly classified.438 However, the proper forum for such a challenge was
the district court when it reviewed the agency's action. The circuit court was
presented with the same evidence that the hearing officer and the district court
had already reviewed. Having lost there, the landowner is not entitled to
relitigate the issue. The only proper claim before the circuit court was that the
classification had somehow worked a taking entitling this landowner to
433. Id.
434. Professor Brown.
435. 675 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judge Quince wrote the opinion. Act-
ing Chief Judge Parker and Judge Whately concurred.
436. FLA. STAT. § 163.3213 (1989).
437. Zemel v. Department of Community Affairs, 642 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1994).
438. Zemel, 675 So. 2d at 1380.
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compensation, and the case was remanded to the circuit court to consider that
issue.439
Martin County v. Section 28 Partnership, Ltd.440 The landowner wanted
to develop its land as a mixed use golf course community, but that would first
require a zoning change. However, a zoning change was impossible without
first obtaining an amendment to the County's comprehensive land use plan so
that the adjoining county could provide utility services. Following a series of
hearings, the County refused to take the steps necessary to amend the plan.
Therefore, the landowner sued.44'
The developer claimed that the County's action was a violation of its
substantive due process rights. The trial court decided that the County's action
involved the application of an existing policy, i.e., that it was a quasi-judicial
decision.442 The court applied the strict scrutiny standard of review and
concluded that the County's action was arbitrary and capricious.443 It enjoined
the County for enforcing the development restrictions, ordered the County to
approve the application for the zoning change, and awarded damages to the
landowner.444 The district court reversed, reasoning that a decision not to
amend a comprehensive plan based upon the large size of the proposed
amendment, the pristine state of the land, and the possible impact of the
proposed development on the public because of the proximity to a state park
and a state preserve was quasi-legislative. 445 Since the correct standard of
review of a quasi-legislative decision is the fairly debatable test,446 the circuit
court erred. The case was remanded so the trial court could apply the correct
test.447 The trial court's award of damages and injunctive relief were accord-
ingly vacated, but the court stated that the opinion should not be read to
439. Id. at 1381-82.
440. 676 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judge Stevenson wrote the opinion in
which Chief Judge Gunther and Judge Dell concurred. This opinion replaced the original
opinion at 668 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) which was withdrawn after the district
court granted a motion for rehearing.
441. Section 28 Partnership, 676 So. 2d at 535.
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Id
445. Id. at 536.
446. Section 28 Partnership, 676 So. 2d at 535. The district court relied upon its earlier
decision in Section 28 Partnership, Ltd. v. Martin, 642 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1994), review denied, 654 So. 2d 920 (Fla. 1995), which the court refers to as "Section 28
Partnership I," but pointed out that it was issued after the trial court decision in the case being
discussed. Section 28 Partnership, 676 So. 2d at 536.
447. Id. at 535-36.
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suggest that the trial court could not reach the same conclusion when it applies
the correct test.
448
Martin County v. Yusem. 4 9 A landowner's fifty-four acres were part of a
900-acre tract. Under the Martin County Comprehensive Land Use Plan, the
landowner was allowed up to two units per acre. However, under the future
land use map, the landowner was allowed only one unit per two acres, i.e., one
quarter the density allowed by the plan. The landowner filed an application for
an amendment to the map raising the use to match that allowed by the plan, but
the application was denied. The landowner sought relief by common law
certiorari, but the County moved to dismiss claiming that certiorari was the
wrong method of obtaining relief; it is the method for reviewing a quasi-
judicial decision and this decision was legislative. The landowner voluntarily
dismissed that petition. Then, the landowner filed this action seeking declara-
tory and injunctive relief. Applying the strict judicial scrutiny standard of
review, the circuit court held in favor of the landowner, and the County
appealed, arguing that the court had applied the wrong standard of review, i.e.,
it should have used the fairly debatable standard because the decision was
legislative, not quasi-judicial. 450
The district court clearly framed the issue to be "whether Martin County
was making a legislative or quasi-judicial decision when it denied the
appellee/landowner's request to amend the county's future use map to allow
more residential units on his property." 45' It decided the decision was quasi-
judicial.452 Because it was quasi-judicial, the only way to get judicial review
was by common law certiorari.453 Consequently, the circuit court did not have
jurisdiction and this action should be dismissed 4 54 The landowner should
have stuck to his guns in his original certiorari action. To avoid injustice, the
court noted that the judgment would be without prejudice to the landowner,
once again beginning his quest for an amendment to the map.455
448. Id. at 537. This is the point on which the new opinion differs from the earlier one
which has been withdrawn. The earlier opinion concluded that the zoning did not violate
substantive due process requirements.
449. 664 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995), review granted, 678 So. 2d 339 (Fla.
1996). Judge Kelin wrote the opinion in which Judge Glickstein concurred. Judge Pariente
dissented in a written opinion.
450. Id. at 977.
451. Id. at 976.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 978.
454. Yusem, 664 So. 2d at 978.
455. Id.
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The court reached its conclusion by following the logic in Snyder.456
Amending the map to increase the density on this landowner's land was a
determination of the appropriate land use designation for a particular piece of
property that "will have a limited impact on the public. ' 457 Thus, this was not
a decision on what should be the policy but how to apply existing policy. Such
a decision is quasi-judicial.
Judge Pariente provided an extensive and well-reasoned dissent. Briefly,
she argued that amendments to a land use plan should, due to logic and
statutory mandate, receive the same careful consideration process as the
adoption of the plan received.a 8 Once that process has been followed, the
decision to amend or not should get the same judicial deference as the legisla-
tive decision to adopt the plan. That amending the plan may be legislative in
some cases and quasi-judicial in others creates confusion about what procedure
must be followed by a board in making the decision, what method must be
followed by a disgruntled applicant in seeking judicial review of the decision,
and what standard must be applied by the reviewing court. That confusion has
already wasted, and will continue to waste, the time and resources of the courts
and the parties. Judge Pariente is correct in arguing that this uncertainty
should be eliminated.
XVIII. LANDLORD AND TENANT
City of St. Petersburg v. Bowen.459 The City's Nuisance Abatement
Board ordered an apartment house closed for a period of one year based upon a
finding that there was drug use by tenants and other persons at the property.46
The landlord was not accused of any wrongdoing. The landlord did not
contest the validity of the order, but brought this action seeking compensation
based upon the theory of inverse condemnation, i.e., that his property had been
taken for public use. The trial court first granted summary judgment for the
City, ruling that because the taking was temporary no recovery was allowed. 461
456. Board of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
457. Yusem, 664 So. 2d at 977.
458. Id. at 979 (Pariente, J., dissenting).
459. 675 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Acting Chief Judge Campbell wrote the
opinion in which Judges Frank and Blue concurred.
460. The order was based upon the authority of section 893.138 of the Florida Statutes and
sections 19-66 through 19-71 of the St. Petersburg, Florida, City Code. See FLA. STAT. §
893.138 (1991); ST. PETERSBURG, FLA., CrrY CODE §§ 19-66 to-71 (1989). There was no claim
that the order was invalid.
461. Bowen, 675 So. 2d at 628.
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Based on a Supreme Court of Florida decision rendered after the trial court's
decision,462 the district court reversed. 463 The trial court then granted summary
judgment to the landlord. The district court affirmed. 465
The court adopted the trial opinion of Circuit Judge Horace A. Andrews
which it found to be "complete, concise, scholarly and well-grounded." 6 A
regulation that denies all economically beneficial or productive use of the land
is compensable without inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of
the regulation. Ordering the apartment house closed for one year did deny all
economically beneficial or productive use. The taking claim could not be
avoided by invoking the nuisance exception. The state may legitimately
prohibit conduct that would be a common law nuisance, e.g., the illegal use or
sale of drugs, but this order prohibits conduct which is clearly not a nuisance,
e.g., the use of the premises for human habitation. In essence, the city was
trying to force this landowner to disproportionately bear a common expense,
the cost of its war on drugs. That is what the Takings Clause prohibits.
Coastal Fuels Marketing, Inc. v. Leasco Investments.467 In June 1977, the
tenant leased real property for an oil terminal. Under the terms of the twenty-
year lease, referred to as a "terminalling agreement," the fee for the first three
years would be $54,400 per month. After that, the base fee would be $30,000
per month, but that fee would be adjusted in the fifth, tenth, and fifteenth years
of the lease according to a formula based on the Consumer Price Index
("CPr'). The formula was:
[T]he monthly payment shall be adjusted upward or downward us-
ing the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index for urban
Wage Earners and Clerical Workers (CPI-W)-U.S. City Average
and Selected Areas (Base Period 1967=100) for the previous five
(5) year period (for September 7, 1982 [the first adjustment], the
monthly payment shall be calculated by multiplying $30,000 times
the resultant of dividing the CPI-W for June 1982 by the Consumer
Price Index for June 1977).468
462. Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S. Corp., 640 So. 2d 54 (Fla.
1994).
463. Bowen v. City of St. Petersburg, 642 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
464. Bowen, 675 So. 2d at 628.
465. Id. at 632.
466. Id. at 629.
467. 662 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Judge Thompson wrote the opinion in
which Chief Judge Peterson and Judge Harris concurred.
468. Id. at 376.
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The dispute arose at the time of the second adjustment. The landlord
claimed that the denominator in the above fraction should be the CPI for June,
1977. The tenant claimed that the denominator should be the CPI for June,
1982. The trial court was convinced by the landlord's arguments and reformed
the contract accordingly, but the district court reversed.469 It held that refor-
mation could not be granted where the terms of the contract were clear and
unambiguous. 470 The contract here anticipated that the rent would be adjusted
every five years according to the changes in the CPI during that five-year
period, so the fraction should reflect that change. The adjustment in 1982
should have been based on the CPI for 1977, the adjustment for 1987 on the
CPI for 1982, and the adjustment for 1992 on the CPI for 1987.47 ,
Inglesia Bautista de "Renovacion Cristiana" v. Tamiami Baptist Church
of Miami, Inc.472  Plaintiff's suit for damages on the theory of wrongful
eviction included a claim for special damages. The circuit court granted
summary judgment to the landlord, ruling that special damages were non-
recoverable as a matter of law.473 The district court reversed, holding that if
the premature eviction necessitated the rental of a substitute church site, that
expense could be recovered as special damages. 74
Marquez-Gonzalez v. Perera.475 The commercial lease at issue in this
case provided that the tenant would take the premises "as is" and refurbish it.
After taking possession, the tenant learned that part of the structure was illegal
because it had been built without the necessary permits. When the landlord
did nothing to fix that problem, the tenant sued for rescission. The trial court
held for the landlord because the tenant had taken the premises "as is," but the
district court reversed. 76 The landlord had not disclosed that the permits were
lacking. There was no way that the tenant could have discovered it from an
inspection of the premises. There was nothing from which the tenant would
get inquiry notice, i.e., there was nothing to make a reasonably prudent person
469. Id. at 377.
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. 678 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judges Jorgenson, Goderich, and Green
constituted the panel that issued this per curiam opinion.
473. Id. at 2. The circuit court also ruled in the alternative that the tenant had waived its
special damages claim, but the district court reversed on this point because the record lacked any
evidence of waiver. Id.
474. Id.
475. 673 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judges Jorgenson, Cope, and Gersten
concurred in this per curiam opinion.
476. Ud. at 503.
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suspicious that there was a permit problem. The permit problem was "a matter
which the landlord was obliged to correct, not the tenant.' '477 Under these
circumstances, rescission should have been granted.4 78
Sontag v. Department of Banking and Finance.479 Landlords prevailed in
an eviction action and were also awarded very substantial compensatory and
punitive damages. A Florida statute provided that the state is entitled to sixty
percent of any punitive damage award.480 Subsequently, the landlords and
tenant reached a settlement agreement which was structured without any
punitive damages. By cutting out the State, both the landlords and tenant
would come out ahead. The State did not give up this windfall so easily. It
sued and received a summary judgment in its favor.481 The district court
affirmed.482 Judge Baskin disagreed about the reading of the statute, conclud-
ing that since no punitive damages were paid, the State was not entitled to any
payment.483 The statute was amended in 1992484 to require that the parties
provide for the state's share in any settlement agreement, but that amendment
was too late to apply to this case. The case is included primarily to remind
parties seeking punitive damages, and their defendants, that the state has an
interest and a claim on the outcome.
Statutory Changes. The Florida landlord-tenant statutes were amended
during the survey period.485 Now, a real estate broker planning to disburse a
tenant's security deposit is not required to follow the notice requirements in
chapter 475,486 which regulates real estate brokers. He or she need only follow
the notice requirements in chapter 83487 which governs landlords and tenants.
The statute has been clarified to specify that the landlord's agent may remove
the personal property of the tenant after the writ of possession has been served
by the sheriff.488 Previously, the statute had only specified that the landlord
could remove the tenant's personal property at the time when the writ of
possession was served. Finally, the lease may now contain a provision that the
477. Id.
478. Id
479. 669 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judges Levy and Goderich concurred in
the per curiam opinion. Judge Baskin dissented.
480. FLA. STAT. § 768.73(2) (1991).
481. Sontag, 669 So. 2d at 284.
482. Id.
483. Id. (Baskin, J., dissenting).
484. FLA. STAT. § 768.73(4) (Supp. 1992).
485. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-146.
486. See FLA- STAT. § 475.25(1)(d) (1995).
487. Ch. 96-146, § 1, 1996 Fla. Laws at 131 (amending FLA. STAT. § 83.49).
488. Id § 2, 1996 Fla. Laws at 131 (amending FLA. STAT. § 83.62(2)).
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landlord is not responsible for storing, or liable for disposing of, the tenant's
personal property where the tenant has surrendered or abandoned the prem-
ises. 489 Previously, such an agreement was permissible, but only if it appeared
in an agreement separate from the lease.
In addition, a change in the nuisance abatement statute is worth noting.
As of October 1, 1996,
[i]n a proceeding abating a public nuisance pursuant to s.
823.10 49°] or s. 823.05,14913 if a tenant has been convicted of an of-
fense under chapter 893 [492] or s. 796.07, the court may order
the tenant to vacate the property within 72 hours if the tenant and
owner of the premises are parties to the nuisance abatement action
and the order will lead to the abatement of the nuisance.4
94
Dealing with drugs and prostitution is a landlord's nightmare, but it is a very
hot topic between landlords and decent tenants. This act provides a landlord
an additional tool to deal with these troublesome tenants. The eviction process
may be too cumbersome, particularly if it requires relitigation of issues already
decided in a nuisance abatement action. Perhaps it will provide a better
alternative if it is interpreted to allow a court to order an offending tenant off
the premises while leaving the innocent family members in place. Whether
that will be possible under the cryptic words of this statute will have to be
determined in the future.
XIX. LIENS
BancFlorida v. Hayward.495 In this case, the Third District Court of
Appeal affirmed a final summary judgment for the contract purchasers of new
homes496 and certified the following question as being of great public impor-
tance:
489. Id. § 3, 1996 Fla Laws at 131-32 (amending FLA. STAT. § 83.67(3)).
490. "Place where controlled substances are illegally kept, sold, or used."
491. "Places declared a nuisance."
492. "Drug abuse prevention and control."
493. "Prohibiting prostitution."
494. 1996 Fla. Laws ch. 96-237 (amending FLA. STAT. § 60.05).
495. 659 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995). This per curiam opinion, upon granting
a motion for rehearing, revised and substituted the original panel opinion published at 20 Fla. L.
Weekly D761 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 1995).
496. BancFlorida, 659 So. 2d at 1333.
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Where a lender requires a pre-qualified contract purchaser before it
will lend on the construction loan which creates a purchase money
mortgage, does the contract purchaser's prior equitable lien against
the purchase money mortgagor have priority over the lender's sub-
sequent purchase money mortgage?49
7
In this case the developer, Shores Contractors, Inc., held an interest in unde-
veloped lots, being an equitable owner under an option contract with American
Newlands in some lots and having bought others as inventory for future
development. BancFlorida extended Shores a line of credit for use in con-
struction loans. When developed, lots were sold to individual purchasers
under purchase and sale agreements, which contained express terms prohibit-
ing recordation. Once in their respective contracts, the purchasers would
obtain a mortgage commitment for the home to be built by Shores. Under the
contract, the purchasers paid deposits to Shores. On the lots owned by Shores
and secured by a mortgage from BancFlorida, each contract purchaser subse-
quently entered into a separate construction loan agreement with BancFlorida
under which the purchasers were required to make four progress payments
during construction, a portion being used to pay off BancFlorida's mortgage.
On the lots held under the option contract, monies from the construction loan
were used to pay the balance owed to American Newlands.49 s
"At some point the developments at issue failed."499 Shores and others
assigned fault for the failure to alleged breach of the construction loan agree-
ments committed by BancFlorida and filed suit. The contract purchasers
intervened as plaintiffs. The parties agreed to sell the properties and create a
fund from which damages could be paid, necessitating foreclosure on the lots
to extinguish all liens. Final summary judgment of foreclosure was stipulated
to by the parties, with the stipulation that "all liens or claims by each party
were directed solely to the entire fund and not solely to the specific sales price
of an individual lot."500 The contract purchasers then proceeded against
BancFlorida with motion for final summary judgment, asserting superior
equitable liens on their respective lots over BancFlorida's construction loans.
The trial court entered final summary judgment and.BancFlorida appealed.50'
The trial court, noting that the question of who was a purchase money
mortgagee was a question of law, held that BancFlorida could not be a pur-
497. Id.
498. Id. at 1330.
499. IM
500. Id. at 1331.
501. BancFlorida, 659 So. 2d at 1331.
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chase money mortgagee in this situation. 0 It found that, before it loaned any
money to Shores for construction, BancFlorida had actual notice of the
purchase and sale agreements and the deposits paid thereon.50 3 Such agree-
ments and deposits were prerequisites without which BancFlorida would not
make the construction loans.
The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the orders of the trial court,
which it stated "was solely concerned with the equities of the case and, for the
trial court, the equities favored the contract purchasers as members of the
general public less knowledgeable in these matters over the sophisticated bank
and the sophisticated builder."5°4 These facts "set[] up a clash between two
competing theories of real property law. BancFlorida is a purchase money
mortgagee but it is also a subsequent creditor with notice of the contract
purchasers' equitable claims against the property." 505
According to the court,5° the "tension" between these theories is epito-
mized by Carteret Savings Bank v. Citibank Mortgage Corp.507 and Caribank
v. Frankel,508 which the court went on to compare. In Caribank, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal held that actual knowledge of a prior unrecorded
conveyance or mortgage is the equivalent to the recording of the instrument.5 9
In Carteret, the parties agreed that the purchase money mortgage held by
Carteret had priority, but disagreed over the portion of the construction loan
constituted the purchase money mortgage.510 The Supreme Court of Florida
affirmed the district court's holding that "only the portion of the proceeds used
to acquire the land constituted a purchase money mortgage. The balance of the
loan proceeds were not protected by the purchase money mortgage.
' 51
'
BancFlorida relied on Carteret for the proposition that it was a purchase
money mortgagee and thus "automatically has priority under Carteret over the
contract purchasers. 51 2  The court first assigned error to the trial court,
agreeing that BancFlorida was a purchase money mortgagee, at least on those
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. See BancFlorida, 659 So. 2d at 1331.
507. 632 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1994).
508. 525 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
509. BancFlorida, 659 So. 2d at 1332 (citing Caribank, 525 So. 2d at 944).
510. Id. (citing Carteret, 632 So. 2d at 599).
511. Id.
512. Id. (relying on Carteret, 632 So. 2d at 599).
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lands which Shores held under the option with American Newlands 5 13 The
court determined that whether BancFlorida was a purchase money mortgagee
was not dispositive, and it distinguished Carteret as involving no dispute over
the priority of the liens.514 The court reasoned that, since 'Florida has adopted
a notice provision as the benchmark for assessing the priority of liens on real
property,' 515 "purchase money mortgage priorities may be subject to the
equities of the particular transaction." 516 The court adopted the reasoning of
Caribank and held that because BancFlorida had actual notice of the contract
purchasers' prior equitable liens against Shores, those equitable liens were
superior in interest to BancFlorida's purchase money mortgages.517 The court
affirmed the orders of final summary judgment in favor of the contract
purchasers.518
Beckham v. Rinker Materials Corp.519 The Third District Court of
Appeal reversed a summary judgment in favor of defendant Rinker in an action
brought by trustees in a two count action to quiet title and recover damages for
slander of title5 20 In 1985, land was conveyed to Michael Edelman and Aaron
Podhurst as trustees. Under the unrecorded trust agreement, the property was
held in trust for several beneficiaries, with Edelman holding a twenty percent
interest, which he assigned to the remaining beneficiaries after resigning. The
deed neither named the beneficiaries of the trust nor declared the nature and
purpose of the trust. The resignation and assignment were not recorded. In
1992, Rinker obtained two judgments against Edelman, unrelated to the
property, and had the judgments recorded as liens on the property. When
Beckham, another trustee, and Podhurst attempted to sell the property, they
discovered the judgment liens in a title search and brought the action.52 '
Rinker asserted that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief because
Edelman owned a fee simple estate under section 689.07(1) of the Florida
Statutes.522 The court agreed that the statute was implicated because Edelman
513. Id.
514. BancFlorida, 659 So. 2d at 1332.
515. Id. The court went on to quote from section 695.01 of the Florida Statutes (1989).
516. Id. at 1333 (citing Van Eepoel Real Estate Co. v. Sarasota Milk Co., 129 So. 892 (Fla.
1930)).
517. Id. at 1333 (relying on Caribank v. Frankel, 525 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1988)).
518. Id.
519. 662 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
520. Id. at 762.
521. Id. at 761.
522. Id.
1996]
Nova Law Review
took title "as trustee" through a deed that neither names the beneficiaries nor
set forth the nature and purpose of the trust, and because the declaration of
trust was not recorded.523 However, it disagreed with Rinker's assertion that
Edelman's trustee capacity was immaterial.524  The court relied on First
National Bank of Arcadia v. Savarese,525 from which it quoted the following
passage:
[I]t is also generally recognized that a judgment creditor cannot
have his debt satisfied out of property held by his judgment debtor
under a resulting trust for another, no matter how completely his
debtor has exercised apparent ownership over it, unless it is made
to appear that it was on the faith of such ownership that the credit
was given which resulted in the judgment sought to be satisfied.526
The contemplated exception did not apply in the present case because Rinker
extended the credit to Edelman on the basis of his personal guarantee, not
relying on the record title, having no specific knowledge of the property at
issue.527 Thus, the beneficiaries were not equitably estopped from asserting
their interests in the property against Rinker, and the judgment liens did not
attach to the property.52s Accordingly, the summary judgment in favor of
Rinker was reversed, and the case was remanded.529
Beason-Simons v. Avion Technologies, Inc.530 The Fourth District Court
of Appeal reversed the circuit court's determination that an unpaid seller's
right to reclaim equipment was superior to a landlord's statutory lien.53'
Appellee sold and installed electronic equipment on premises leased to
appellee Avion by appellant landlord Beason-Simons, providing in the sales
contract that title to the goods would remain in the seller until full payment
was made. However, the seller did not record the purchase agreement or file a
UCC financing statement. When Avion abandoned the leased premises, the
landlord claimed it was entitled to the equipment on the basis of a statutory
landlord's lien under section 83.08(2) of the Florida Statutes, while the seller
claimed the same through a right of reclamation under section 672.507(2) of
523. Id.
524. Beckham, 662 So. 2d at 761.
525. 134 So. 501,504 (1931).
526. Beckham, 662 So. 2d at 761 (quoting Savarese, 134 So. at 504).
527. Id. at 761.
528. Id. at 762.
529. Id.
530. 662 So. 2d 1317 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
531. Id. at 1318.
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the Florida Statutes.532 Section 83.08(2) expressly states that the statutory
landlord's lien "shall be superior to any lien acquired subsequent to the
bringing of the property on the premises leased. 533 The court noted that a
landlord's statutory lien need not be filed or recorded to be perfected; rather, it
attaches at the commencement of tenancy or as soon as the property is brought
onto the premises.
534
The appellate court then analyzed section 672.507(2) and found that
although that section gives an unpaid seller an interest superior to that of a
buyer, the statute does not determine priorities between an unpaid seller and a
third party such as the landlord.535 The seller could have perfected its security
interest in the equipment under the UCC before delivery,536 and failure to do so
rendered the landlord's statutory lien superior. The appellate court reversed
the circuit court.537
Gordon v. Ruvin.538 Robert Gordon appealed from an adverse summary
judgment of foreclosure which found an equitable lien on real property was
transferable to a bond under section 55.10(6) of the Florida Statutes.539 The
Third District Court of Appeal affirmed. ° Gordon obtained a judgment
foreclosing his mortgage on property owned by appellee Flamingo Holding
Partnership ("Seller"). 541 The judgment provided that should the sale produce
insufficient funds to satisfy the amount due Gordon, an equitable lien of
$962,000 would be imposed upon the Seller's adjacent property. The property
was purchased in 1995 by appellee First Equitable Realty I, Ltd. ("Buyer")
for $24.1 million, which intended to convert the apartment complex into
condominiums. Apparently, pursuant to the contract of purchase and sale, the
532. Id.
533. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 83.08(2) (1993)).
534. Id. (citing Lovett v. Lee, 193 So. 538, 542 (Fla. 1940); Florida E. Coast Properties, Inc.
v. Best Contract Furnishings, Inc., 593 So. 2d 560,562 n.6 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
535. Beason-Simons, 662 So. 2d at 1318 (citing Florida E. Coast Properties, 593 So. 2d at
562; Suburbia Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Bel-Air Conditioning Co., 385 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1980)). In Suburbia, the district court held that a construction mortgage on real
property was superior in priority to the claim of a seller of air conditioning equipment which had
been installed on the property, where the seller's claim was only by virtue of a retain title contract
and not by a perfected security interest. 385 So. 2d at 1153-54.
536. Beason-Simons, 662 So. 2d at 1318-19 (citing Florida E. Coast Properties, 593 So. 2d
at 562 n.8).
537. Id. at 1319.
538. 664 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
539. Id. at 1078.
540. Id. at 1080.
541. Id. at 1078.
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Seller was required to post a bond allowing the Buyer to take title unencum-
bered by Gordon's equitable lien. After the Seller obtained the bond for two
million dollars, appellee Harvey Ruvin, Clerk of the Circuit Court for the
Eleventh Judicial Circuit ("clerk"), issued a clerk's certificate transferring
Gordon's lien to the bond, after which the sale was closed with title passing to
the Buyer in February of 1995.542
Gordon sued the Buyer, the Seller, and the clerk. The Third District
Court of Appeal disagreed with Gordon's assertion that an equitable lien is a
constitutionally protected right which cannot be extinguished by substituting
security without the lienholder's consent.5 43 The court noted that the "transfer
to bond" provision of section 55.10(6) was added in 1977 and amended in
1987 to provide that any lien claimed under subsection (1) of that section may
be transferred from the real property to security. 5a The amendment, according
to the court, furthers an important public policy in favor of free alienability of
property.5 45 The statute, by specifically stating that the bond must be executed
by a surety licensed by the Florida Insurance Department to do business in
Florida, protects the valid substantive property rights of the lienholder while
also furthering the legislature's intent of providing for free transferability of
real estate.5 46 The court distinguished the present case from White v. White,
547
a case relied upon by Gordon, because of the change in statutory law in the
sixteen years since that decision, and because White, unlike the present case,
involved a transfer to government securities rather than a corporate surety
bond as required by the present statute.
548
Hanley v. Kajak.5 49 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the
circuit court's finding of a valid mechanic's lien in favor of the subcontractor,
Kajak, and the corresponding award of statutory attorneys' fees under section
713.29 of the Florida Statutes.550 The circuit court had concluded that
Hanley's commencement of an action pursuant to section 713.21(4) of the
Florida Statutes resulted in a waiver of the section 713.06(3)(d)(1) require-
ment that Kajak file a contractor's final affidavit.551 The Fourth District Court
542. Id. at 1079.
543. Gordon, 664 So. 2d at 1079.
544. Id.
545. Id.
546. Id.
547. 129 So. 2d 148 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
548. Gordon, 664 So. 2d at 1079.
549. 661 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
550. Id. at 1249.
551. Id. at 1248.
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of Appeal disagreed, holding that the affidavit requirement is a condition
precedent to the maintenance of a lien foreclosure action under chapter 713,
and the fact that the foreclosure was filed as a counterclaim did not alter that
requirement. 5 2 The court felt that Kajak had not shown good cause or a
justifiable excuse for failure to comply with the statutory requirements and
held the lien invalid.5 3
Holly Lake Ass'n v. Federal National Mortgage Ass'n. 54 The Supreme
Court of Florida, reviewing Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. McKesson,
555
asserted jurisdiction under Article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitu-
tion and answered the following certified question in the negative, approving
the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal:
WHETHER A CLAIM OF LIEN RECORDED PURSUANT TO
A DECLARATION OF COVENANTS BY A HOMEOWNERS'
ASSOCIATION HAS PRIORITY OVER AN INTERVENING
RECORDED MORTGAGE WHERE THE DECLARATION
AUTHORIZES THE ASSOCIATION TO IMPOSE A LIEN FOR
ASSESSMENTS BUT DOES NOT OTHERWISE INDICATE
THAT THE LIEN RELATES BACK OR TAKES PRIORITY
OVER AN INTERVENING MORTGAGE.
556
Holly Lakes is the homeowners' association ("Association") for a mobile
home park. The Association's predecessor recorded a declaration of covenants
covering the real property within the park in 1974, requiring residents to pay
monthly assessments for maintenance of their sites, and including the follow-
ing provision:
In the event the monthly mobile type home site charge is not paid
when due, Owner, or its designee, shall have the right to a lien
against said site and the improvements contained thereon for any
such unpaid charges; and shall have the right to enforce said lien in
any manner provided by law for the enforcement of mechanics' or
552. IL
553. Id. at 1249. See Timbercraft Enters., Inc. v. Adams, 563 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1990). See also Holding Elec., Inc. v. Roberts, 530 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 1988)).
554. 660 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1995).
555. 639 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review granted, 650 So. 2d 990 (Fla.
1995).
556. Holly Lake Ass'n, 660 So. 2d at 267.
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statutory liens, but Owner shall not be restricted to such procedure
in the collection of said overdue charges.
557
John and Denise McKesson became the owners of a Holly Lakes site and
executed a mortgage thereon, recorded in 1983, which was assigned to Federal
National Mortgage Association ("FNMA"), the respondent.
In 1991, the Association recorded a claim of lien against the McKessons'
site for failure to pay the monthly maintenance fee. Then in 1992, FNMA
commenced a foreclosure action against the McKessons for failure to pay the
promissory note secured by the mortgage, and the Association filed a counter-
claim against FNMA, asserting superiority of lien because its lien related back
to the 1974 declaration of covenants. FNMA answered that its mortgage lien,
having been recorded eight years before that of the Association, was superior,
but the trial court found for the Association and granted summary judgment in
its favor.558 The Fourth District Court of Appeal subsequently reversed,
reasoning that the 1974 declaration, rather than creating an ongoing automatic
lien, merely created a right to a lien and that because FNMA's mortgage lien
was recorded before the Association's maintenance fee lien, FNMA's lien had
priority.5
59
The Association relied on Bessemer v. Gersten560 for the proposition that
its lien related back to the date the declaration was recorded. The court found
Bessemer inapplicable.56' Unlike the present dispute between two creditors,
Bessemer involved a dispute over a creditor's lien and the property owner's
homestead right.562 Also, the language of the present declaration differed
significantly from that in Bessemer, which "put all parties on notice that an
ongoing, automatic lien had been created at the time that the property was
purchased, and that this lien would continue each month until the owner paid
the monthly assessment fee. 563 The court concluded that the present declara-
tion failed to put FNMA on such notice and that FNMA could not be charged
with constructive notice because the Association had not yet filed its lien when
FNMA's mortgage was recorded in 1983.564 After commenting on the similar
557. Id.
558. Id. at 268.
559. Id.
560. 381 So. 2d 1344 (Fla. 1980).
561. Holly Lake Ass'n, 660 So. 2d at 268.
562. Id.
563. Id.
564. Id.
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factual situation and holding in the Illinois case of St. Paul Federal Bank for
Savings v. Wesby,565 the court also declared a general rule that:
in order for a claim of lien recorded pursuant to a declaration of
covenants to have priority over an intervening recorded mortgage,
the declaration must contain specific language indicating that the
lien relates back to the date of filing of the declaration or that it
otherwise takes priority over intervening mortgages.
566
Lamchick, Glucksman & Johnson, P.A. v. City National Bank of Flor-
ida.567 Appeal was taken from an adverse final summary judgment awarding
diligent creditors a priority lien over the appellants' prior recorded lien. The
Third District Court of Appeal, per curiam, reversed, ruling that unlike
personal property, the diligent creditor rule does not apply to liens on real
property.568 The court found that section 695.11 of the Florida Statutes
governs judgment liens on real property, as in this case, and further noted that
"because of the different concerns involved in the context of real property," the
diligent creditor rule did not apply.
569
Appellants obtained a judgment and filed it in the official records of Dade
County on June 28, 1988, creating a lien on the property. Pursuant to section
695.11, appellants' lien, recorded before appellee's, had priority. The court
noted further that appellants' "lien had neither expired nor been satisfied, and
there is no evidence in the record, and no allegation in the pleadings, that the
judgment lien was void or voidable."570  Thus, relying on Sharpe v.
Calabrese,571 the court held that appellant's lien "must be accorded its legal
effect. 5
72
Pappalardo v. Buck.573 Pappalardo, the principal on a preexisting lien
transfer bond, was ordered by the trial court to increase the face amount of that
bond to add coverage for attorneys' fees and costs incurred by the claimant in
565. 501 N.E.2d 707 (El. App. Ct. 1986).
566. Holly Lake Ass'n, 660 So. 2d at 269.
567. 659 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995), review denied, 670 So. 2d 937 (Fla.
1996).
568. Id. at 1119.
569. Id. at 1120.
570. Id. at 1119.
571. 528 So. 2d 947, 950 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
572. Lamchick, 659 So. 2d at 1119.
573. 659 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995), review denied, 669 So. 2d 251 (Fla.
1996).
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excess of the original face amount.574 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
quashed this decision, holding that Pappalardo was not personally liable
because he was not made a party to the action.575
This case had already worked its way through the court system as Aetna
Casualty and Surety Co. v. Buck,57 6 in which the Supreme Court of Florida
determined that a surety's liability for attorneys' fees could not be imposed
above the face amount of the bond.577 Having thus been denied access to
Aetna's pocket by the supreme court, Buck apparently regrouped and directed
its efforts at Pappalardo personally. Buck had initially sued only Aetna and
Pappalardo's construction company and moved to add Pappalardo individually
after final judgment. That motion was denied by the trial court, and Buck did
not appeal the order.578 The court intimated that merely obtaining a transfer
bond is insufficient to find that the party has submitted to the court's jurisdic-
tion so as to expose him to liability in excess of the bond's face.
579
Robie v. Port Douglas (Florida), Inc.580  Upon default by the tenant,
Inverrary Cinema Corporation, the landlord, Port Douglas and chattel mortga-
gees, Kenneth L. and Barbara G. Robie, asserted liens to claim possession of
equipment in the theater. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the
trial court's determination of superiority of the landlord's statutory lien
because the landlord and tenant terminated the original lease prior to the
tenant's default and entered into a new lease.58'
The tenant took possession of the theater pursuant to an assignment of
lease from R & R Cinemas, Inc., a company owned by the Robies. The Robies
filed a Form UCC-1 to secure the furnishings located in the theater. After
574. Id. at 423.
575. Id. at 424. The court cited Canam Sys., Inc. v. Lake Buchanan Dev. Corp., 375 So. 2d
582, 583 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 386 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1980) and Vic Tanny
of Fla., Inc. v. Fred McGilvray, Inc., 348 So. 2d 648, 651 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977) for the
following proposition: "The principal on a bond to which there has been a transfer from lien
must be made a party to be held personally liable." Pappalardo, 659 So. 2d at 423.
576. 594 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1992).
577. Id. at 283. The Fourth District Court quoted the supreme court's opinion, which ex-
plained the powers and limits thereto conferred upon a trial court by section 713.24(3) of the
Florida Statutes, which "allows a trial court to order the party providing the bond to either
purchase an additional bond or increase the existing bond, or to otherwise provide increase
security, [but] the statute does not permit the trial court to increase the liability of the surety
beyond the amount of the bond." Pappalardo, 659 So. 2d at 423.
578. Pappalardo, 659 So. 2d at 423.
579. Id.
580. 662 So. 2d 1389 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
581. Id. at 1391.
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perfection of the Robies' interest, Inverrary and Port Douglas entered into a
lease termination agreement and, thereafter, executed a new lease while the
tenant was still current under the old lease.
58 2
The court noted that under section 83.08 of the Florida Statutes, a
landlord's statutory lien, which is not required to be filed or recorded in order
to be perfected, attaches at the commencement of the tenancy or as soon as the
property is brought onto the premises.583 However, "[w]hen the commence-
ment of a tenancy, based upon a lease, creates a statutory landlord's lien,
pursuant to section 83.08, Florida Statutes, such lien is viable only as long as
the underlying lease exists."584 Although the chattel mortgage did not have
priority over the original lease, that mortgage gained priority when the original
lease was terminated and retained such priority over the subsequent lease.
5 5
That the second lease was neither an option nor a renewal of the first
lease was critical to a determination of priority of the Robies' lien.586 In the
appellate court's opinion, the trial court relied too heavily on the fact that the
new lease was between the same parties and involved the same premises as the
old lease, and neglected the "operative inquiry" of "whether landlord and
tenant continued their relationship under the initial lease either through an
extension, a renewal or an option. 58 7
Shawzin v. Sasser.58 8  Sasser represented Shawzin in a dissolution of
marriage action, having first obtained a representation agreement which
granted Sasser "all general, possessory and retaining liens and all equitable,
special and attorney's charging liens upon the client's interest in any and all
real and personal property ... for any balance due, owing and unpaid at the
conclusion of the case or the sooner termination of employment."589 The trial
court granted Sasser's December 1992 motion to withdraw as counsel. 59
Thereafter, Shawzin and his former wife entered into a settlement agreement
with Shawzin retaining title to the marital home. When the trial court entered
582. Id. at 1390.
583. Id. at 1391 (citing Lovett v. Lee, 193 So. 538, 542 (Fla. 1940); Beason-Simons Tech-
nologies, Inc. v. Avion Technologies, Inc., 662 So. 2d 1317, 1318 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995)).
584. Id. at 1391 (quoting Flowers v. Centrust Say. Bank, 556 So. 2d 1123, 1125 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1989)).
585. Robie, 662 So. 2d at 1390.
586. Id. at 1391.
587. Id.
588. 658 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995), review denied, 669 So. 2d 252 (Fla.
1996).
589. Id. at 1149.
590. Id
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final judgment which incorporated the settlement agreement, Sasser moved for
a charging lien, obtaining a money judgment of $52,337.37 and a charging lien
on the marital home.591 Shawzin appealed. Sasser cross appealed, assigning
error to the court's setting aside the proceeds of the sale of the marital home
under the homestead exemption.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal upheld the award of the lien,
outlining the four requirements for the imposition of such a lien, which the
court found present.592 The court, however, reversed the money judgment
because Sasser had moved for the lien only.593 Shawzin thus had insufficient
notice that such a judgment might be rendered against him.594
On Sasser's appeal of the homestead set aside, the court noted that, under
Orange Brevard Plumbing & Heating Co. v. La Croix,595 only proceeds
intended to be reinvested in another homestead qualify for homestead protec-
tion.596 In the present case, Sasser had demonstrated that "a significant portion
of the proceeds derived from the sale of the homestead [were used] for
purposes other than for reinvestment in another homestead.,,597 Thus, the court
also reversed the trial court's setting aside of all the townhouse proceeds under
the homestead exemption and remanded.598
Stunkel v. Gazebo Landscaping Design, Inc.59 9 In this case the Supreme
Court of Florida, noting jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(4) of the
591. Id. at 1150.
592. Il According to the court, these requirements include:
(1) In order for a charging lien to be imposed, there must first be a contract be-
tween the attorney and the client.
(2) There must also be an understanding, express or implied, between the parties
that the payment is either dependent upon recovery or that payment will come
from the recovery.
(3) The remedy is available where there has been an attempt to avoid the pay-
ment of fees or a dispute as to the amount involved.
(4) There are no requirements for perfecting a charging lien beyond timely no-
tice.
Shawzin, 658 So. 2d at 1150. For this proposition, the court cited Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath,
Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A. v. Baucom, 428 So. 2d 1383, 1385 (Fla. 1983), among others.
593. Shawzin, 658 So. 2d at 1151.
594. Id.
595. 137 So. 2d 201, 207 (Fla. 1962).
596. Shawzin, 658 So. 2d at 1151.
597. Id. Shawzin apparently diverted funds from the $1,850,000 sale of the townhouse to
pay his former wife's $550,000 lump sum alimony and to pay his present counsel's fees and
costs.
598. Id.
599. 660 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 1995).
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Florida Constitution, answered the following certified question from the
Fourth District Court of Appeal 6°° in the negative:
DOES A SUBCONTRACTOR BEGIN TO FURNISH SERV-
ICES, FOR THE PURPOSE OF TIMELY PROVIDING A NO-
TICE TO OWNER IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION
713.06(2)(a), FLORIDA STATUTES (1991), WHEN, WITHOUT
ANY BINDING CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION TO DO SO,
HE OR SHE BEGINS TO SELECT MATERIALS AT SOME
LOCATION OFF THE JOB SITE, FOR FUTURE INSTALLA-
TION ON THE JOB SITE?601
The Stunkels contracted with general contractor Bill Free Custom Homes for
the construction of a home on their property, who in turn orally contracted with
landscaping subcontractor Gazebo. The Stunkels flew on their private plane
with a Gazebo representative to a Tampa site to select trees on November 7,
1990. Gazebo began digging on the property on December 5, 1990 and
planted the selected trees two days later on December 7, 1990. On February
11, 1992, Gazebo filed suit against the Stunkels and Bill Free Custom Home
for breach of contract and to foreclose on its claim of lien.
602
After an unsuccessful attempt to notify the Stunkels of an impending
claim of lien on January 15, 1991, Gazebo posted a notice on the gate of the
residence. Because section 713.06(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes requires
posting of notice to the owner within forty-five days after a subcontractor
begins furnishing services or materials, the court needed to determine whether
commencement occurred, within the meaning of the statute, when the trees
were selected by the Stunkels or when Gazebo began working on the Stunkel
residence.60 3 The trial court entered an involuntary dismissal of Gazebo's
claim of lien after concluding Gazebo began furnishing services when the
Stunkels selected the trees and Gazebo failed to give notice within forty-five
days of commencement, as required by section 713.06(2)(a).(' 4 The Fourth
District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's ruling, noting that there was
no authority on the timing question, and it "suggested that the trial court
600. Gazebo Landscaping Design, Inc. v. Bill Free Custom Homes, Inc., 638 So. 2d 87 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
601. Stunkel, 660 So. 2d at 624.
602. Id.
603. Id.
604. Id.
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consider all relevant factors 'based on the totality of the circumstances' in
determining when the subcontractor actually began to provide services." 60 5
The supreme court noted that a contract is essential to a mechanic's
lien,606 and when the selection of the trees was made, there was no binding
contractual obligation. 6 7 Therefore, the subcontractor could not have brought
a claim of lien against the owner.6°8 On this basis, the certified question was
answered in the negative.6°9 The supreme court rejected the district court's
suggested approach because it failed to provide certainty and would frustrate
one of the purposes of mechanic's lien law.610 The court believed that under
the suggested approach, "giving notice to owner would be determined on a
case-by-case basis, and subcontractors would never know for sure when they
had to give notice.'
611
In a separate issue, the trial court refused to enforce the claim of lien,
finding that Gazebo's president took no oath when signing the claim.612
Additionally, despite being signed on January 14, 1991, the claim included a
statement that the lien was hand-posted on January 18, 1991. After noting that
section 713.08(3) imposes an attestation by notary requirement for claims on
lien, the supreme court remanded for a determination by the trial court in
accordance with section 713.08(4)(a)613 on the question of whether the faulty
claim of lien adversely affects the Stunkels. 614 Finally, the court denied
attorneys' fees to both parties under section 713.29, which allows the prevail-
ing party in an action to enforce a construction lien to recover reasonable
attorneys' fees, until such time as the trial court determines a prevailing party
on remand and any subsequent appeals are finalized.615
605. Id. at 625 (quoting Gazebo Landscape Design, 638 So. 2d at 89).
606. Stunkel, 660 So. 2d at 625. The court cited Viking Communities Corp. v. Peeler Const.
Co., 367 So. 2d 737, 739 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979) and section 713.06(1) of the Florida
Statutes (1991) for the proposition that "[a] subcontractor ... has a lien on the real property
improved for any money that is owed to him for labor, services, or materials furnished in
accordance with his contract."
607. Stunkel, 660 So. 2d at 625.
608. Id.
609. Id.
610. Id. at 625-26.
611. Id. at 626.
612. Stunkel, 660 So. 2d at 626.
613. Section 713.08(4)(a) provides: "The omission of any of the foregoing details or errors
in such claim of lien shall not, within the discretion of the trial court, prevent the enforcement of
such lien as against one who has not been adversely affected by such omission or error." FLA.
STAT. § 713.08(4)(a) (1991).
614. Stunkel, 660 So. 2d at 627.
615. Id.
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Viyella Co. v. Gomes.616 Viyella Company appealed from an adverse
partial final summary judgment, assigning error to the trial court's deternina-
tion that no genuine issue of material fact existed concerning the value of work
performed by Viyella and Viyella's intent to willfully exaggerate the amount
of a mechanic's lien.6 17 Viyella and the Gomeses executed a contract contem-
plating Viyella's completion of a $76,900 contract for improvements to the
Gomeses' residential property. Viyella was terminated prior to completion of
the work and filed a claim of lien for the contract price above the twenty-five
percent deposit of $19,225 paid by the Gomeses at the time of execution of the
contract.618 The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that no
genuine issue of material fact existed and that the lien was fraudulent under
section 713.31(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes.619 The Gomeses thus could
invoke the complete defense provided under section 713.31(2)(b) which
renders a fraudulent lien unenforceable.
62
Julio Viyella, president of Viyella Company, first filed a claim of lien for
$57,675, the remainder of the contract price, stating that he completely
performed the contract. He then filed a Contractor's Final Affidavit asserting
that the Gomeses owed a smaller amount, $51,883.95, acknowledging that he
in fact failed to complete a substantial portion of the work. Then, at deposi-
tion, he testified that he had failed to perform an amount of work worth no less
than $27,740. The district court noted that "[t]hese facts are undisputed by the
[Gomeses] and any contradictions stem completely from [Viyella's] own
statements." 621 On this basis, the district court agreed with the trial court's
616. 657 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
617. IdM at 84. The company also appealed the denial of its motion for rehearing and/or
clarification. Id.
618. Id. The Gomeses thereupon posted a $78,938 bond, transferring the lien from the
property to the bond. Id.
619. Viyella Company, 657 So. 2d at 84. The court quoted the following language from
sections 713.31 of the Florida Statutes:
(2)(a) Any lien asserted ... in which the lienor has willfully exaggerated the
amount for which such lien is claimed or in which the lienor has willfully in-
cluded a claim for work not performed upon or materials not furnished for the
property upon which he seeks to impress such lien... shall be deemed a fraudu-
lent lien.
(b) It is a complete defense to any action to enforce a lien.., that the lien is
a fraudulent lien; and the court so finding is empowered to and shall declare the
lien unenforceable, and the lienor thereupon forfeits his right to any lien on the
property upon which he sought to impress such fraudulent lien....
Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 713.31(2)(a)-(b) (1993)).
620. Id.
621. Id. at 85.
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finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the fraudu-
lent nature of the lien and affirmed the trial court's award of partial final
summary judgment in favor of the Gomeses. 622
Ward v. 3900 Condominium Ass'n.623  The Fourth District Court of
Appeal reversed, in part, this action to foreclose a $1,000 assessment lien. 624
The court held that the trial court erred "in not considering the condominium
association's decision not to deposit the unit owner's belated 1994 check
which was less than the full sum then owed by the unit owner."625 The check
should have been deposited and applied under section 718.116(3) of the
Florida Statutes (1993), which would have resulted in the amount in dispute
being halved "and the matter possibly resolved without all of the litigation."
626
The court also ordered that the attorneys' fee award of $13,100 "be reduced,
without further hearing, to a reasonable sum based on a reduced, properly
disputed amount.,
627
XX. LIs PENDENS
Lennar Florida Holdings, Inc. v. First Family Bank.628 Lennar sought
certiorari review from the trial court's order denying its motion to dissolve
First Family's notice of lis pendens on a Lake County property in which First
Family had acquired a substantial interest, and which Lennar had contracted to
sell at an amount which First Family alleged was below fair market value in
breach of a participation agreement by which Lennar is bound. 629 The Fifth
District Court of Appeal granted Lennar's petition for certiorari and quashed
the order of the trial court denying Lennar's motion to dissolve First Family's
notice of lis pendens.
630
In 1972 and 1973 First Family purchased an interest in two loans secured
by properties in Lake and Orange Counties made by American Federal Savings
and Loan Association of Orlando through contracts referred to as participation
622. Id. The district court commented that the trial court had applied the standard for deter-
mining the fraudulent nature and resultant unenforceability of such a lien set forth in section
713.31. Viyella Company, 657 So. 2d at 85.
623. 670 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
624. Id. at 1183.
625. Id.
626. Id.
627. Id.
628. 660 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
629. Id. at 1122.
630. Id. at 1124.
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agreements. Under these participation agreements, First Family was to share a
percentage of the accumulated principal and interest for contributing a per-
centage of the loan amount. American held the notes and mortgages for the
benefit of all participants, and the agreements provided that, although Ameri-
can was authorized to deal with the loans as absolute owner, it would act as a
prudent lender upon default. Upon breach or other failure to perform its
obligations by American, the other participants could demand repurchase of
their interest in the loans at par value. Successors and assigns were bound by
the terms of the original participation agreements.63'
After American Federal merged with AmeriFirst Federal Savings and
Loan Association, the Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") took possession
of AmeriFirst's assets, including the participation agreements underlying the
present litigation. The loans went into default. The RTC filed separate
foreclosure actions on the Lake and Orange County mortgages, later obtaining
a final summary judgment in Lake County and a final judgment of foreclosure
in Orange County. First Family did not participate in the foreclosure pro-
ceedings. The RTC was the high bidder at an auction for the sale of the Lake
County property and obtained a certificate of sale.632
Lennar purchased a large portfolio from the RTC, obtained assignments
of the RTC's interest in the notes, mortgages, and judgments of foreclosure
relating to the properties, and it was later issued a certificate of title to the Lake
County property. On May 25, 1994, Lennar entered into a contract to sell the
Lake County property for $200,000, which First Family alleged was below fair
market value. First Family alleged further that Lennar, successor in interest to
American's obligations, breached its dut' to exercise judgment as a prudent
lender and refused to repurchase First Family's participation interest after its
breach. First Family sought money damages for unpaid principal and interest
and improperly charged maintenance costs, as well as a constructive trust and
judgment conveying to it a fee simple ownership interest in the property of
thirty-four percent, an amount proportional to its interest in the participation
agreement.633
The appellate court noted that one of the purposes of the doctrine of lis
pendens, aside from the protection of a plaintiff's interest, is to wam third
parties of a dispute concerning the property.634 Courts may discharge a notice
of lis pendens if the initial pleading fails to demonstrate that the action is
631. Id. at 1123.
632. Id.
633. Lennar, 660 So. 2d at 1123.
634. Id. See Chiusolo v. Kennedy, 614 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1993).
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founded on a duly recorded instrument or mechanic's lien.635  The court
framed the issue in the present litigation as "whether the proponent of the lis
pendens, First Family Bank, has shown that there is a sufficient nexus between
its action and the property in question. 636  The court, without explicitly
explaining its reasoning, held that First Family had not so shown.637
XXI. MOBILE HOMES
Sandpiper Homeowners Ass'n v. Lake Yale Corp.638 The residents of a
mobile home park purchased water and wastewater services from a utility
company owned by the park owner. Originally the charge for water and
wastewater was included in the rent. A dispute in 1990 led to a settlement
agreement that annual rent in 1992, 1993, and 1994 would be adjusted ac-
cording to the Consumer Price Index. After that agreement, the utility com-
pany applied for and received a new consumptive use permit from the Water
Management District. Pursuant to the permit, water meters were installed in
the homes in the park. Then, the utility company applied for and got approval
of a new rate structure from the Florida Public Service Commission ("PSC").
The homeowners' association ("Association") objected on the basis that the
rate structure would violate the settlement agreement and the park prospectus,
but the PSC ruled that those were contract disputes that belonged in circuit
court rather than before the PSC. Then, the park unilaterally notified the
residents that their rent was being reduced twenty dollars per month to reflect
the new separate billing for water and wastewater.
639
635. Id See FLA. STAT. § 48.23(3) (1993); Mohican Valley, Inc. v. MacDonald, 443 So. 2d
479 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
636. Id. at 1124.
637. Id. The only evidence of the court's reasoning were the several factual circumstances it
noted before announcing its judgment on the issue. The court noted that "[a]lthough First Family
had a 'participation' interest in the subject note and mortgage, that mortgage was foreclosed and
the collateral property sold pursuant to the judgment." Id. The court also took note of the fact
that First Family failed to intervene in the foreclosure action, but did not explain how or if First
Family's failure to do so would have made any significant difference in the court's present
decision. Another fact similarly treated by the court was that First Family never alleged that
Lennar fraudulently obtained title to the Lake County property. The court thus felt that First
Family's action did not sufficiently implicate the property itself to sustain its notice of lis
pendens. In so holding, the court did not directly address the fact that First Family had sought a
34% fee simple ownership interest in the subject property.
638. 667 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judge Goshom wrote the opinion.
Judges W. Sharp and Griffin concurred.
639. Id. at 922.
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The Association brought this suit seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief. The claim was that the rental reduction was inadequate and that the
park owner had violated the terms of the settlement agreement and the park
prospectus. The circuit court dismissed their claim on the basis that the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over what was essentially a dispute over
utility rates.640 The district court reversed.64'
Judge Goshorn wrote a thorough and well-reasoned opinion. It boiled
down to this simple distinction. The PSC has exclusive jurisdiction over rate
disputes, but this was not a rate dispute. This was a dispute over rent. As the
PSC had recognized in its opinion, such a contract dispute belonged in the
circuit court.
642
XXII. MORTGAGES
Coral Springs Tower Club II Condominium Ass'n v. Dizefalo.63 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal granted the association's petition for writ of
mandamus, holding that the circuit court erroneously refused to exercise
jurisdiction over this action to foreclose a mortgage where the amount in
controversy was less than $15,000.644  Under Alexdex Corp. v. Nachon
Enterprises, Inc.,645 the circuit and county courts have concurrent jurisdiction
over foreclosure actions where the action falls within the county court's
monetary jurisdiction.646 After noting that the trial court transferred the case to
county court sua sponte, the court noted that "[wie are unaware of any statute,
rule of procedure or local administrative order which authorizes transfer
because a trial judge just does not want to hear the case." 647
Lakeside Regent, Inc. v. FDIC.648 Lakeside appealed the trial court's
award of summary judgment for the FDIC649 in a dispute over the proper
amount of setoff Lakeside was entitled to apply to FDIC's judgment in a
mortgage foreclosure deficiency action. Lakeside had commenced the action
640. Id. at 923.
641. Id. at 926.
642. Id. at 922.
643. 667 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
644. I. at 967.
645. 641 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1994).
646. Il at 862.
647. Dizefalo, 667 So. 2d at 967.
648. 660 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
649. Id at 368. FDIC in this case was acting as receiver for First American Bank and Trust,
which was declared insolvent. Id
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on claims arising from a note, guaranty, and mortgage security agreement, and
FDIC counterclaimed for the amounts due on the note and for foreclosure.
Lakeside and two individuals, Carl A. Sax and Lanny Horowitz,650 were found
liable to FDIC for $6,694,017.651 The subject property was later sold to the
City of West Palm Beach for $1000, whereafter "FDIC noticed for a non-jury
trial the issue of the amount of the deficiency judgment."652 The FDIC moved
for summary judgment on this issue, contending that Lakeside, Sax, and
Horowitz were only entitled to a setoff in the amount of the $1000 paid by the
City. Although Lakeside contested the propriety of summary judgment on this
issue, and had sought discovery on several issues including the terms and
conditions of the foreclosure sale,653 the trial court granted FDIC's motion for
a protective order preventing this discovery, finding that these issues were not
relevant to the setoff issue.654 The FDIC was granted summary judgment by
the trial court.655
The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed with Lakeside, and re-
versed.65 6 The court noted that the trial court erroneously held that Lakeside's
affidavits, which were not formal appraisals, were insufficient to create an
issue of fact.657 The trial court "appear[ed] to have done so based on its
erroneous belief that the only valid evidence that could be presented by the
defendants to oppose a deficiency judgment was a formal appraisal of the
property by a qualified expert." 658 The trial court had a duty to consider
several factors in deciding whether a deficiency judgment is warranted,
including the adequacy of the sale price.659 The court held that the information
650. Carl A. Sax and Lanny Horowitz were found jointly and severally liable on the guar-
anty, while final judgment was entered against Lakeside on the note. Id. at 369 n.1.
651. This figure included principal, interest, and post-judgment interest. Id.
652. Lakeside, 660 So. 2d at 369.
653. The other issues mentioned in the opinion on which Lakeside sought discovery were
tax arrearages, asbestos removal, and the FDIC's meetings with the FDIC. Id.
654. d
655. Id.
656. Id. at 370.
657. Lakeside, 660 So. 2d at 369.
658. Id
659. Id. at 370. The court quoted the following language from R.K. Cooper Constr. Co. v.
Fulton, 216 So. 2d 11, 13 (Fla. 1968):
A shockingly inadequate sale price in the foreclosure proceeding can be asserted
as an equitable defense and the trial judge has the discretion and duty to inquire
into the reasonable and fair market value of the property sold, the adequacy of
the sale price, and the relationship, if any, between the foreclosing mortgagee and
the purchaser at the sale, before entering a judgment on the note.
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was discoverable and that "the debtor here ought not to be deprived of the
opportunity to make a showing of additional factors justifying his right to
challenge the deficiency judgment. ' 660 As a result of this "first" error regard-
ing the discoverability of this information, the court felt that it must conclude
that Lakeside had indeed raised material issues of fact such that summary
judgment was improper and, accordingly, reversed.661
Mellor v. Goldberg.662 The Second District Court of Appeal reversed the
trial court's dismissal with prejudice of appellant's complaint on a promissory
note.663 William and Patricia Mellor filed a complaint against Morton A.
Goldberg seeking $750,000 on a promissory note, attaching the note to the
complaint. The Mellors' complaint survived Goldberg's initial motion to
dismiss by filing a copy of a mortgage executed in conjunction therewith,
containing a clause reading "[t]he land subject to this mortgage shall be the
sole security for the indebtedness secured hereby, and a deficiency judgment
shall not be obtained against the mortgagor in the event of foreclosure. ' 664 The
court granted Goldberg's renewed motion, in which he argued that the two
documents reflected an agreement precluding a personal judgment against him,
and it dismissed the Mellors' complaint with prejudice, while ruling that the
Mellors were entitled to enforce the mortgage.
665
The appellate court disagreed with the trial court's dismissal with
prejudice.666 The court noted the sparsity of the record, which contained no
documents other than the note and mortgage, and espoused the "general rule
... [that] a holder of a promissory note secured by real property is permitted to
pursue both an action on the note and an action to foreclose the mortgage.
These remedies are not inconsistent and are each available to satisfy the
underlying obligation. 667 The court declared, "We cannot hold, as a matter of
law, that the limitation precluding a deficiency judgment was intended
unambiguously either to prohibit or permit a personal judgment.' 668 It agreed
Lakeside, 660 So. 2d at 369. Without expressly labeling the sale price at the foreclosure sale
of the property in the present case as "shockingly low," the court did note that the $1000
"represented less than .07% of its assessed value." Id. at 370.
660. Id. at 369 (citing Merrill v. Nuzum, 471 So. 2d 128, 129 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
661. Id. at 370.
662. 658 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
663. Id. at 1164.
664. Id. at 1163.
665. Id.
666. Id.
667. Mellor, 658 So. 2d at 1163 (citing Gottschamer v. August, Thompson, Sherr, Clark &
Shafer, P.C., 438 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).
668. Id. at 1164.
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the note and mortgage should be construed together, but declared that
"evidence of intent is necessary to explain a latent ambiguity within the two
,,669documents. Such evidence was not apparent from the sparse record in the
present case.670 The court reversed the trial court's order dismissing the
Mellors' complaint with prejudice and remanded.671
Noonan-Judson v. Surrency. 672 The Fifth District Court of Appeal
determined that the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of election of
remedies.6 73 Surrency held a second mortgage on the subject property, and
NationsBank foreclosed on its first mortgage. Surrency, seeking to save her
interest in the property, found another party, Noonan-Judson, who was also a
client of Surrency's attorney, William Dixon. The parties agreed to the
following terms: 1) Noonan-Judson would put up $97,000 to bid for the
property at the foreclosure sale; 2) the property would be placed on the market
and sold; 3) Noonan-Judson's initial investment of $97,000 would be repaid
from the sale proceeds; and (4) the amount remaining would be divided in half
between Noonan-Judson and Surrency. Noonan-Judson tendered a check for
$97,000 with a notation stating "investment" thereon.674
Dixon bid $97,000 at the judicial sale, in his name as trustee for Surrency,
and later prepared a mortgage deed and note for Noonan-Judson for the
$97,000, which provided for $1,500 monthly payments. Dixon "delayed
putting the trust terms in writing to give Surrency time to hammer out auxiliary
terms related to the marketing of the property." 675 Surrency failed to make the
payments.
Noonan-Judson filed a two-count claim for foreclosure on the mortgage,
asking the court to impose an express, resulting, or constructive trust on the
property. The trial court awarded Noonan-Judson partial summary judgment
669. Id.
670. Judge Altenbrand's statements raise interesting questions. How much more evidence of
such intent other than an unambiguous clause in such documents would be required? Can a party
to such a document ever ensure that the language is legally sufficient to serve the party's bona
fide intent to protect oneself from personal liability? Is not the legitimate purpose in using such
unambiguous language to avoid subsequent litigation? Can such a purpose ever be served by the
court's implication that such language does not preclude the admission of other sources of
evidence dispositive of the intent of the parties to such a document, which conceivably could be
many years old whenever such litigation arises? Is not the motivation in including such language
in these documents to avoid other problems of proof of the parties' intent?
671. Mellor, 658 So. 2d at 1164.
672. 669 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
673. Id. at 1059.
674. Id.
675. Id.
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on the mortgage claim, granting her a mortgage lien of $113,378.51, and
ordered sale, at which Surrency redeemed.676 Later, the court denied Noonan-
Judson's claim of trust, despite its finding that Surrency understood and
consented to the terms of the agreement.677 The court's reasoning was that
Noonan-Judson, in pursuing a mortgage foreclosure claim, had elected her
remedy, thus eliminating the preliminary agreement to enter into a written trust
agreement as a remedy.678
The Fifth District Court of Appeal offered two reasons in assigning error
to the court's application of the doctrine of election of remedies. 679 First,
Surrency failed to plead the doctrine as an affirmative defense, and the court's
inquiry was framed by the pleadings, noting that "[w]here an issue is not
presented by pleading or litigated by parties during a hearing, a judgment
based on that issue is voidable on appeal. 68 ° Second, the remedies were not
inconsistent, and thus the doctrine was simply inapplicable.
68 1
Pignato v. Great Western Bank.682 In 1993, the appellants defaulted on
their mortgage executed in 1991 in favor of Great Western. Great Western
filed suit to foreclose, and the appellants raised affirmative defenses, including
an allegation that Great Western violated the Federal Truth in Lending Act
("TJLA") 683 by failing to include as a finance charge the intangible tax which it
paid to the Clerk of the Court to record the mortgage, instead including the
figure in the amount financed. 684 A violation would, among other things,
permit the borrower to rescind the loan.685 The circuit court found that the
lender had complied with the TILA and ordered foreclosure.
686
The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed, interpreting an exception in
the definition of finance charge in Federal Reserve Board Regulation Z687 to
676. Id.
677. Noonan-Judson, 669 So. 2d at 1059.
678. Id.
679. Id. at 1060.
680. Id. (citing Cortina v. Cortina, 98 So. 2d 334, 337 (Fla. 1957)).
681. Id. (citing Barbe v. Villeneuve, 505 So. 2d 1331, 1333 (Fla. 1987); Goldstein v. Serio,
566 So. 2d 1338, 1340 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1990), review denied, 576 So. 2d 291 (Fla.
1991)).
682. 664 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995), review denied, 673 So. 2d 30 (Fla.
1996).
683. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-77 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
684. Pignato, 664 So. 2d at 1012-13.
685. Id. at 1013 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(a) (West 1982)).
686. Id.
687. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1994).
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include the Florida intangible tax68 In so doing, the court rejected the federal
eleventh circuit's holding in Rodash v. AIB Mortgage Co., 68 9 decided after the
circuit court entered the present judgment of foreclosure, that the TILA
required that the intangible tax be included as a finance charge.690 The court
did not feel bound by Rodash "because it construes Florida law, not federal
law. ,6
91
Actually, the court construed both Florida law and federal law in this
case. The court looked to Regulation Z for the definition and exceptions to
finance charge, and it looked at an exception for "'[t]axes and fees prescribed
by law that actually are or will be paid to public officials for... perfecting...
a security interest.' '' 692 The Rodash court had, according to the Fourth District
Court of Appeal, found the exception inapplicable because the purpose of the
tax was revenue enhancement, not perfecting a security interest.693 The court
looked to Florida law to clarify the nature of the Florida intangible tax, and it
decided that although revenue enhancement was the purpose of the tax, the
above exception fit because "[w]ithout payment, the mortgage will not be
recorded and the security interest will not be perfected. 694
In its reasoning, the appellate court disputed the notion that the tax's
purpose was relevant.695 All that was required, in the minds of the Fourth
District Court of Appeal, was that the tax be prescribed by law, paid to a public
official, for perfecting a security interest, and the Florida intangible tax fit.6
96
Since the exception fit, there was no TILA violation, and the court affirmed.6 97
688. Pignato, 664 So. 2d at 1014.
689. 16F.3d 1142 (1lth Cir. 1994).
690. Pignato, 664 So. 2d at 1015.
691. Id. The court commented that "[o]nly decisions of the United States Supreme Court are
binding on the state courts of Florida." Id. (citing Board of County Comm'rs v. Dexterhouse,
348 So. 2d 916, 918 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977), affd, 364 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 1978), appeal
dismissed, 441 U.S. 918 (1979)).
692. Id. at 1014 (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(e)(i) (1994)). Under TILA, finance charge is
generally defined as "the sum of all charges, payable directly or indirectly by the person to whom
credit is extended, and imposed directly or indirectly as an incident to the extension of credit."
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a) (West Supp. 1995)); Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a) (1994)).
693. Pignato, 664 So. 2d at 1014 (citing Rodash, 16 F.3d at 1148-49).
694. Id. at 1015. Here too, the court looked to federal sources when it submitted a 1995
revision to the Commentary to Regulation Z. Id. at 1016 (citing Reg. Z, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,771
(1995)).
695. Id. (noting that the Rodash court supplied no authority for the proposition).
696. Id. (citing Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(e)(1) (1994)).
697. Pignato, 664 So. 2d at 1016.
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Powers v. ITT Financial Services Corp.698 The Fifth District Court of
Appeal affirmed the trial court's order granting relief from judgment of
foreclosure on account of excusable neglect.699 Powers executed a mortgage
and promissory note to Family First Mortgage Company for $50,700, which
was subsequently assigned to First Nationwide Bank, and another mortgage in
favor of IT for $22,560. Upon default by Powers, iT filed a foreclosure
action, listing Powers and Nationwide as defendants.7°
Plaintiff executed service of process on Nationwide through Suzanne
Podegraz, First Vice President of the human resources department of Nation-
wide in Sacramento, California. Podegraz accepted service because she
recognized the name "Gary Powers." A person by that name had been
employed at the bank and was involved in a divorce proceeding. Believing the
documents to be related to that divorce action, Podegraz failed to forward the
documents to the appropriate division in the company. As soon as the error
was discovered, the papers were duly forwarded. 0
A final judgment of foreclosure was issued upon =fr's motion for
summary judgment, which was followed by a judicial sale and issuance of a
certificate of sale from the clerk of the court.7 2 After learning of the Pode-
graz' mistake, Nationwide moved to vacate the judgment of foreclosure, IT's
certificate of title, and the foreclosure sale on grounds of excusable neglect
pursuant to Rule 1.540 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court
granted Nationwide relief, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed,
finding no error in the trial court's ruling.
70 3
Warehouses of Florida, Inc. v. Hensch.704 The issue in this mortgage
foreclosure action was whether it was error to enter a deficiency judgment in
favor of the mortgagees where the mortgagees bid the entire amount of the
final judgment of foreclosure at the foreclosure sale. The Fifth District Court
of Appeal held that it was error and, therefore, reversed.
705
The Hensches were second mortgagees who filed a foreclosure action
when Warehouses failed to make payments. The court entered a judgment of
698. 662 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
699. Id. at 1344.
700. Id.
701. Id.
702. Id.
703. Powers, 662 So. 2d at 1345. Powers argued that Nationwide's mortgage was extin-
guished by the judgment of foreclosure, but the Fifth District Court of Appeal disagreed, stating
that "once set aside, the judgment has no effect on the rights of either party." Id.
704. 671 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
705. Id. at 886.
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foreclosure which included the principal balance due on the note, accrued
interest thereon, costs, and attorneys' fees, totaling $336,343.91 .7 6  The
Hensches were the sole bidders at foreclosure, bid the entire amount of the
judgment of foreclosure, and, thereafter, filed a petition for entry of a defi-
ciency judgment which the trial court granted. Included in the deficiency
judgment were $44,271.85 in first mortgage payments made by the Hensches
to preclude foreclosure on the first mortgage, $14,375.02 in delinquent 1992
property taxes, $9,733 in prorated 1993 property taxes, and $8,500 represent-
ing a security deposit paid to Warehouses by a tenant during Warehouses'
possession.707 These sums were added to the balance due on the first mortgage
and the foreclosure judgment, which the trial court then subtracted from the
"fair market value of $700,000.00 to arrive at $139,037.20, the amount of the
deficiency judgment."708
The Hensches relied on section 45.031(8) of the Florida Statutes, which
provides in part:
If the case is one in which a deficiency judgment may be sought
and application is made for a deficiency, the amount bid at the sale
may be considered by the courts as one of the factors in determin-
ing a deficiency under the usual equitable principals.
709
In rejecting the Hensches' arguments and reversing, the Fifth District Court of
Appeal noted that "the established law in this district is that when a mortgagee
purchases the foreclosed property by bidding the full amount of the final
judgment of foreclosure, the mortgagee's judgment is satisfied in full and a
deficiency judgment is not possible." 710
Wilken v. North County Co.7 11 In this case, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal, relying on the authority of Bauer v. Resolution Trust Corp.,71 2 held
that the clerk of the court need not refund registry and sales fees to a successful
bidder at a foreclosure sale where the mortgagor/debtor, prior to the sale and
706. IdM
707. Id.
708. Id
709. Warehouses, 671 So. 2d at 886 (citing FLA. STAT. § 45.031(8) (1991)).
710. Id. at 887.
711. 670 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Appellant, Dorothy H. Wilken, appealed
in her capacity as Clerk of the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit. Id.
712. 621 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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without written notice to the clerk, filed a suggestion of bankruptcy in federal
court, requiring the sale to be later invalidated. 13
XXIII. QUIEr THLE
Skelton v. Martin." This case "demonstrates a serious variance between
the statutory method for the maintenance of public records and the electronic
means by which most private and public records are now retrieved."
715
Skelton took title to the subject property under a tax deed recorded January 20,
1994. The previous owner, Ernest Martin, had failed to pay the 1990 taxes on
the lot, and a tax certificate was issued to Bank Atlantic for the unpaid taxes.
The sale was conducted on January 19, 1994, after public notice was published
on four separate dates in the Pinellas County Review.
716
Sandy K. Perry received a deed from Ernest Martin to the same property
at a closing on January 7, 1994. The deed was recorded on January 25, 1994.
Equity Title conducted a title search on the property. Equity neither sent an
abstractor to the courthouse nor examined the notices in the Pinellas County
Review. The abstractor instead used a computer to connect to the "Pinellas
County Computer Dial-Up System" and examined the current tax year screen
which normally indicates if there are delinquent taxes. No delinquencies were
so indicated, and the abstractor did not check the delinquent tax screen.7 17
Since she did not challenge the validity of the tax certificate or of the tax
sale, "[i]n essence, Ms. Perry maintained that the current tax screen on the dial-
up computer misled Equity Title, and that she would have learned of the tax
sale but for this mistake. 7 13 The appellate court responded by stating that
"[t]he question remains whether this error deprived Ms. Perry of constitutional
notice of either the tax certificate or of the pending sale.' 719 The court
concluded that it did not, since the tax certificate was recorded in the manner
required by statute, and it noted that "there is no present statutory right to
accurate information on the Internet. At this point in history, such computer-
ized data is not a form of notice constitutionally guaranteed by article I, section
713. Wilken, 670 So. 2d at 181.
714. 673 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied sub nom. Perry v. Skelton, No.
88,141, 1996 LEXIS 1741, at *1 (Sept. 16, 1996).
715. Id. at 879.
716. Id. at 878.
717. Id.
718. Id. at 879.
719. Skelton, 673 So. 2d at 879.
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9, of the Florida Constitution, or by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution."
720
XXIV. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
Kilgore v. Killearn Homes Ass'n.721 The question before the First District
Court of Appeal was whether the property in question became subject to the
covenants and restrictions of Killeam Estates. 22 The Kilgores were allegedly
in violation of the covenants and restrictions by keeping more than thirty
723miniature horses on the property. The appellate court reversed a portion of
the partial summary judgment which determined that the entire parcel of
Appellant's property was subject to the covenants and restrictions of Killeam
Estates.724
In 1994, the Kilgores purchased the subject property surrounded on three
sides by property that is within Killeam Estates. The property itself is within
Killeam Estates and provides access to a public road and additional adjacent
acreage not within Killearn Estates. The homeowners' association
("Association") alleged that the Kilgores purchased the property subject to all
covenants and restrictions, reservations, and easements of record. The
Association further alleged that J.T. Williams, the initial owner and developer,
made Lot 14 subject to the covenants and restrictions, but did not subject the
several adjacent acres of property. The association also alleged that the
Kilgores' predecessors in title, the Hintikkas, had applied to the City of
Tallahassee to create a minor subdivision, Gardenview Too, from a portion of
the unplatted additional acreage formerly owned by Williams, and in the
process were required by the City to execute a unity of title document, under
which the additional acreage which the Hintikkas retained merged with and
became part of Lot 14 of Killearn Estates and subject to the covenants and
restrictions in question.
The trial court found that the Kilgores' land was subject to the covenants
and restrictions, and it permanently enjoined them from keeping the animals on
the land.725 The First District Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the unity
720. Id.
721. 676 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996). The opinion in this case was modified on
grounds not pertinent to the discussion of this case. See Kilgore v. Killearn Homes Ass'n, 21 Fla.
L. Weekly D1532 (1st Dist. Ct. App. June 25, 1996).
722. Kilgore, 676 So. 2d at 5.
723. Id. at 6.
724. Id. at 5.
725. Id. at 6.
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of title document did not have the effect of merging Lot 14 and the additional
acreage for a purpose other than that intended by the parties to the agree-
ment! 26 The court noted that in general, a unity of title document is meant to
restrict or transfer development rights, and that it is an agreement entered into
by the property owner and the governing authority.727 The appellate court
found that the purpose of the document in this case was to prevent further
subdivision of the additional property without the City's approval, and it noted
that the Association was not a party to the agreement.728 The court also noted
that "covenants restraining the free use of realty are not favored in the law" 729
and are enforceable as private rights arising out of contract.730 In closing, it
found that there was no agreement between the Kilgores, or their predecessors
in title, and the Association which made the subject acreage subject to the
covenants and restrictions. 3
XXV. SALES
Alvarez v. Garcia.7 32 Less than a month after Hurricane Andrew, the
parties entered into a contract for the sale of a house. Before signing the
contract, the buyers knew that the hurricane had damaged the roof. Both sides
got estimates for what the repairs would cost, and the sellers collected under
their property insurance policy. Before closing, the buyers discovered that the
roof damage was more extensive than they had thought and that the roof
damage was causing the house to deteriorate. The seller, having refused to
repair the damage or give the insurance proceeds to the buyers, canceled the
726. Id.
727. Kilgore, 676 So. 2d at 6. See generally Gordon v. Flamingo Holding Partnership, 624
So. 2d 294 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, 637 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 1994); Maturo v.
City of Coral Gables, 619 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
728. Id. at 7.
729. Id. (citing Sinclair Refining Co. v. Watsorr, 65 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 1953); Hagan v.
Sabal Palms, Inc., 186 So. 2d 302,308 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 192 So. 2d 489 (Fla.
1966); Ortega Co. v. Justiss, 175 So. 2d 554,559 (Fla. 1st Dist. CL App. 1965)).
730. Id. (citing Dade County v. Matheson, 605 So. 2d 469, 474 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1992); Board of Public Instruction v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 81 So. 2d 637, 641 (Fla.
1955)).
731. Id. at 7.
732. 662 So. 2d 1312 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995), review denied, 670 So. 2d 938 (Fla.
1996). Judge Jorgenson wrote the opinion for the panel which included Judges Hubbart and
Gersten.
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contract. The buyers sued for reformation of the contract and specific per-
formance and won in the trial court.733 The district court reversed. 3
Based on what the broker had said to the buyers, the trial court reformed
the contract, requiring the seller to apply the insurance proceeds to the roof
repairs.735 That constituted error. A court of equity has the power to reform a
written contract to reflect what the parties actually intended, but there was no
evidence that the seller ever intended this term. There was no evidence that
the broker had the authority to bind the seller to any terms that varied from the
terms of the written contract. Nor was there any evidence that the parties had
left that term out of the written agreement by mutual mistake.
736
The trial court also erred in relying on the doctrine of equitable conver-
sion to find that the buyers were entitled to insurance proceeds.737 First, the
buyers had never pled the doctrine, and second, the doctrine would only apply
if the casualty occurred after the contract had been signed, i.e., when the
buyers were arguably the equitable owners of the land that suffered the
casualty.738 Here, the property was damaged before the contract was signed,
and, therefore, the doctrine was inapplicable.
739
The contract explicitly provided that the seller would be responsible for
roof repairs up to two percent of the purchase price. The seller could have
voluntarily paid more, but was not required to do so. If roof repairs exceeded
two percent and the seller was unwilling to pay the excess, the buyers would
have the right to cancel the contract. 74° An addendum to the contract provided
in essence that if neither party was willing to pay for a required repair and a
compromise could not be reached, then either party could cancel the contract.
The district court ruled these provisions should be read together.74' The roof
repairs easily exceeded the two percent. Neither the seller nor the buyers were
willing to pay the excess. Clearly a compromise was not reached. Thus, the
seller had the right to cancel the contract.
733. Id. at 1313.
734. Id. at 1314.
735. Id.
736. It
737. Alvarez, 662 So. 2d at 1314.
738. Id.
739. hi
740. Id. at 1313.
741. Id.
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Broward County v. Conner.742 The County began an eminent domain
action to take the Conners' land. Settlement negotiations began and the parties
explored the possibility of settling the case by a real estate exchange. The
parties reached an agreement in principle, and the landowners' lawyer sent a
letter to the County's private attorney which "confirmed the parameters" of the
proposed settlement. The parties subsequently had further meetings, ex-
changed letters, and exchanged unsigned drafts of the settlement. Then, the
County decided not to settle according to these terms.
743
The trial court granted the landowners' motion in the eminent domain
proceeding to specifically enforce the settlement because "the agreement had
been partly performed; that [the landowners] had relied to their detriment
based on the representation of the county's agents and employees; and, that the
county was estopped to deny the settlement."744 The District Court of Appeal
reversed relying on two alternative grounds, the Statute of Frauds and the
Sunshine Law.745 The latter is discussed in the Eminent Domain section of this
survey.74
The court held that the settlement was a contract for the sale of land.7 47
Consequently, the Statute of Frauds748 required that the contract be in writing
and signed by the party to be charged, but the County had not signed the
settlement. The court relied upon Collier v. Brooks749 and the cases cited
therein for the proposition that "[p]art performance does not remove an oral
contract for sale of land from the statute of frauds unless there is payment of
all or part of the consideration, possession by the vendee, and valuable
improvement so as to constitute a fraud on the vendee if there were no per-
formance." 750 The landowner had not established these elements and, there-
fore, could not rely on part performance to take the contract out of the Statute
of Frauds. This author?5 thinks that the court's conclusion on this point was
incorrect. Assuming in fact that there was a contract, a point that this court
742. 660 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995), review denied, 669 So. 2d 250 (Fla.
1996). Judge Klein wrote the opinion in which Chief Judge Gunther concurred. Judge Farmer
wrote a special concurrence.
743. Id. at 289.
744. Id. at 290.
745. Idl
746. See discussion supra pp. 304-06.
747. Conner, 660 So. 2d at 290.
748. FIA. STAT. § 725.01 (1993).
749. 632 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
750. Conner, 660 So. 2d at 290 (citing Collier, 632 So. 2d at 155).
751. Professor Brown.
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does not address, the court should not have determined part performance by a
rigid mechanical test. Part performance is an equitable doctrine designed to
prevent the Statute of Frauds from being used as a tool to perpetrate a fraud.
The court should look at all the circumstances to determine if that is what the
county was doing. It is impossible to tell from the facts in the opinion whether
the landowners could have prevailed under the proper analysis.
Judge Farmer made an interesting point in his special concurrence.752 He
would have remanded the case to see if any of the writings signed by the
county's attorneys were sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.75 3  His
approach seems to recognize that the writing requirement can be satisfied by a
combination of writings.
Caronte Enterprises, Inc. v. Berlin.754 The contract of sale provided that
the seller would make certain repairs prior to the closing but did not specify a
closing date, and the "time is of the essence" clause was crossed out. Although
the buyers complained for several months that the repairs were not being made
quickly enough, they never made a formal demand that the repairs be com-
pleted by a particular date. Finally, the seller notified the buyers that the
repairs were complete. The buyers disagreed and brought this suit. The jury
verdict was for the buyers.755 On appeal, the district court ruled that the trial
judge erred by failing to grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.756
The district court did not clearly express its theory, but it is apparent that
the court concluded that seller was not yet in breach of the contract. Time was
not of the essence under the contract, and the buyers had never formally
demanded performance by a date certain. So, even if the repairs were not yet
satisfactory, the seller still had the to time to complete the repairs. It is not
known whether the buyers failed to follow the advice of counsel or simply
lacked competent legal advice, but these buyers lost because they simply did
not play this game by the rules.
XXVI. SIGNATURES
Although the Florida Legislature did not seem to enact significant
legislation this year affecting substantive property law, it did pass the Elec-
752. Conner, 660 So. 2d at 290-91 (Farmer, J., concurring specially).
753. Id. at 290.
754. 668 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996). Judges Levy, Gersten and Green con-
curred in the per curiam opinion.
755. Id. at 234.
756. Id.
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tronic Signature Act of 1996 ("Act"). 757 One of this Act's primary purposes is
to develop authenticity and integrity to electronic signatures and electronic
commerce. 758 As a result, unless prohibited by law, one may now use an
electronic signature to sign a writing and such a signature has an equal effect
as a written signature.759 However, although it is the Secretary of State's
responsibility to issue to public and private entities certificates (computer-
based records) to verify digital signatures, no public or private entity is
required to participate in such a program.76
XXVII. TAXES
Chapparal Partners v. Department of Revenue.76' Chapparal is a general
partnership composed of Congden Properties, Inc. and First Interstate Bank of
California as trustee. First Interstate held defaulted notes and mortgages on
two Jacksonville properties which were worth substantially less than the
amount due on the notes. First Interstate gave the guarantors of the notes a
covenant not to sue in exchange for conveyances of the properties.
7 62
The present dispute centered on the amount of documentary stamps to be
affixed to those deeds. The parties agreed that the several indebtednesses on
the properties were not discharged and remained encumbrances on the land.
The Department of Revenue, relying on a part of section 201.02(1) of the
Florida Statutes "which defines 'consideration' for a conveyance to include
'the amount of any mortgage ... or other encumbrance, whether or not the
underlying indebtedness is assumed,"' felt the stamp taxes should be assessed
based on the amount of debt encumbering the land at the time of convey-
ance.7 63 The appellants argued that the part of the statute which should govern
provides "'[i]f the consideration ... includes property other than money, it is
presumed that the consideration is equal to the fair market value of the real
property. . .,,764 The appellants submitted that the covenant not to sue is
"'property other than money,"' making the more specific part of the section
referenced by the Department inapplicable to the present case.7 65
757. Ch. 96-224, § 3, 1996 Fla. Laws at 837.
758. Id. § 2, 1996 Fla. Laws at 837.
759. Id. § 3, 1996 Fla. Laws at 838.
760. Id. § 6, 1996 Fla. Laws at 838.
761. 662 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
762. Id. at 728.
763. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 201.02(1) (1991)).
764. Id
765. Id
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The First District Court of Appeal held that applying the language offered
by the appellant to the present case would "render the clear legislative intent to
define 'consideration' in terms of the amount of an encumbrance that survives
a conveyance as meaningless," and noted that otherwise, the specific definition
could be regularly evaded by "the giving of any non-money consideration."
766
The court thus concluded that the Department of Revenue had correctly based
the assessment of stamps on the amount of the debt.
767
XXVIII. T1TLE INSURANCE
American Title Insurance Co. v. Carter.768 The trial court found that
American Title had a duty under the title insurance policy to defend the Carters
in a boundary dispute, and American Title appealed.769 The Fifth District
Court of Appeal reversed.770 After purchasing the subject property, the Carters
had a professional survey performed, and in reliance thereon, they erected a
fence on what they believed was their eastern boundary line. Their neighbor to
the East, Eugene Calabrese, had a survey performed, which evidenced that the
Carters' fence encroached 26.5 feet onto Calabrese's property.
Calabrese filed an action alleging encroachment, seeking recovery of
possession of the fenced portion, damages, and attorney's fees, and the Carters
made a formal demand on American Title to defend them. American Title
refused, and the Carters filed a third party complaint against American Title
and their predecessors in interest, alleging that American Title insured them
against loss and damages for circumstances as alleged in Calabrese's com-
plaint and breached the policy by failing to defend them in the suit. American
Title answered, stating two bases for its denial of Calabrese's claim as not
covered under the policy. First, Calabrese's claim did not assert any claim to
any lands described in the Carters' deed.771 Second, the claim was not covered
due to the survey exception in Schedule B of the policy.
772
The Fifth District Court of Appeal agreed that American Title was not
under a duty to defend under the policy under these circumstances. 773 The
issue did not pertain to title, but was merely a boundary dispute not covered by
766. Chapparal Partners, 662 So. 2d at 728.
767. Id. at 729.
768. 670 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
769. Id. at 1115.
770. Id. at 1118.
771. Id. at 1116.
772. Id.
773. American Title, 670 So. 2d at 1116.
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the policy.774  Also, there was an exclusion in the policy excluding from
coverage any "encroachments, easements, measurements, variations in area or
content, party walls or other facts which a correct survey of the premises
would show."775 The court thus noted that, "essentially, the Carters are asking
the court to write them an insurance policy superior to the one they pur-
chased." 7
76
National Title Insurance Co. v. Safeco Title Insurance Co.7" National
appealed the trial court's decision to grant a new trial on the issue of damages
while Safeco cross appealed the trial court's denial of its motion for directed
verdict on the issue of liability for breach of contract.778 The Third District
Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of directed verdict to Safeco, a
decision which the court felt "moot[ed] ... the appeal in chief.' 779
In 1982, National loaned $103,500 to buyers Younts and Bowman. Home
Title, an agent of Safeco, acted as closing agent for Safeco, the underwriter of
the title insurance policy, which provided that Safeco insured "against loss or
damage... sustained or incurred by the insured by reason of... any defect in
or lien or encumbrance on such title.' 780 The policy listed only National's
mortgage and no second mortgage. At closing, Rosen, president of Home
Title, notarized and witnessed documents78' indicating that no second mort-
gage existed. He did this despite the fact that prior to closing, unbeknownst to
National, the buyers had obtained a second mortgage for $3,009.02 from their
developer, Interdevco, which Rosen had also notarized and witnessed.
National sold the mortgage to the Federal National Mortgage Association
("FNMA") in November 1982, while purchasing private mortgage insurance
from Verex, representing that no second mortgage existed.
The second mortgage was satisfied in 1984, but the buyers defaulted on
the first mortgage. Upon discovery of the second mortgage, the Verex policy
was invalidated despite the fact that it had been satisfied four years prior.
National paid to FNMA $75,000, representing the balance unpaid on the first
mortgage, and it obtained a deed to the property in lieu of foreclosure.
774. Id at 1117.
775. Id. at 1116.
776. Id. at 1117.
777. 661 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995), review denied, 670 So. 2d 939 (Fla.
1996).
778. Id. at 1235.
779. Id. at 1236.
780. Id. at 1235.
781. Among these documents was a Federal National Mortgage Association document
certifying that no second mortgage existed. Id
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In July 1989, National sued Safeco, Interdevco, Home Title, and Rosen
for breach of the title insurance policy and negligence seeking recovery of the
$75,000 payment to FNMA.782 Default judgments were entered against
Interdevco and Home Title. 83 The jury found that Rosen had no knowledge of
the second mortgage at closing.784 Safeco argued that any loss to National was
no result of a breach in its obligations under the policy, and after the trial court
denied its motion for directed verdict on the issue of breach, the jury, by
special interrogatory verdict, found Safeco had breached, resulting in $75,000
in damages to National.785 The jury also found that the two defaulting defen-
dants were negligent and allocated liability among them, with Interdevco
responsible for $50,000 and Home Title responsible for $25,000.786 The trial
court ordered a new trial on the issue of breach, believing that Safeco's
damage liability could not be greater than that of its agent, Home Title.787
The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of
Safeco's motion for directed verdict.788 The court felt that even if Safeco had
breached the policy, such breach was not the natural and proximate cause of
National's damages.789 The court then noted that when a title insurer breaches
a mortgagee's policy, the proper measure of damages is "'the difference
between the market value of the mortgage, if the lien thereof were as insured,
and the market value of the mortgage with the title imperfection. ' '' 790 The
court also noted that the second mortgage was not an outstanding encumbrance
when National paid FNMA, and that National's loss was a result of the buyers'
default, not the second mortgage.79 1 The court then affirmed the jury verdict
for Rosen, not reaching the evidentiary issues, but held, as a matter of law, that
Rosen could not be held liable for National's loss because that loss was not
caused by Rosen's failure to disclose the second mortgage, even assuming
Rosen was aware of its existence.
792
782. National Title, 661 So. 2d at 1235.
783. Id.
784. Id. at 1235-36.
785. Id. at 1236.
786. Id.
787. National Title, 661 So. 2d at 1236.
788. Id. at 1237.
789. Id. at 1236.
790. Id. (quoting Goode v. Federal Title & Ins. Corp., 162 So. 2d 269, 271 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1964); Interstate Title Corp. v. Miller, 581 So. 2d 213,214 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1991)).
791. Id.
792. National Title, 661 So. 2d at 1236 (citing Applegate v. Barnett Bank, 377 So. 2d 1150,
1152 (Fla. 1979) (holding that "[e]ven when based on erroneous reasoning, a conclusion or
decision of a trial court will generally be affirmed if the evidence or an alternative theory supports
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XXIX. TRuTH IN LENDING ACT
Beach v. Great Western Bank.793 In this case, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal addressed the following question of first impression in Florida:
[W]hether a consumer has right to rescind a mortgage on a home,
under 15 U.S.C.A. section 1635 of the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA), as a defense by way of recoupment to the lender's foreclo-
sure action, when the defense is asserted beyond the three year pe-
riod set forth in the statute.
79
The court held that a consumer was not entitled to rescission; rather, he is
limited to a damage set off.
7 95
The opinion included a brief overview of the T!LA, noting that the Act
gives consumers the right to rescind, for up to three years, any agreement that
results in the lender taking a security interest in the consumer's principal
dwelling, if the creditor fails to make all material disclosures to the borrower
as required.796 Exercise of the right results in discharge of the consumer's
liability for any finance and other charges paid by the consumer, as well as
it."); Bird Lakes Dev. Corp. v. Raskin, 596 So. 2d 133, 134-35 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that a trial court decision may be upheld for any reason appearing in the record)).
793. 670 So. 2d 986 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 678 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 1996).
794. Id. at 988 (citation omitted).
795. Id. at 990. After criticizing the Colorado Supreme Court decision of Dawe v. Mer-
chants Mortgage & Trust Corp., 683 P.2d 796 (Colo. 1984), the court observed that "[w]hether
one may agree with Dawe or not, the ultimate question is whether as a matter of Florida law, the
defensive assertion of rescission should be allowed." Beach, 670 So. 2d at 991. In asserting the
right of statutory rescission, the appellants relied upon the Supreme Court of Florida decision of
Allie v. Ionata, 503 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 1987). Id. at 991.
The court distinguished Allie as a case which "addressed a claim barred by a statute of
limitations, which bars not the right, but the remedy." Id. In distinguishing Allie, the court also
noted that in Rybovich Boat Works, Inc. v. Atkins, 585 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 1991), the Supreme Court
of Florida later explained that Allie "'rested primarily on consideration of public policy and
fairness as well as an analysis of the purpose of the statute of limitations."' Beach, 670 So. 2d at
991 (quoting Rybovich Boat Works, 585 So. 2d at 270). The court then explained that, in Allie,
the Supreme Court of Florida refused to permit assertion of a claim for specific performance after
the expiration of the statute of limitations due to the adverse consequences on the free alienability
of title. Id, The court was persuaded into similar reasoning by Great Western's argument that the
same reasoning should apply in the present case. Great Western relied on a January 1972 report
submitted to Congress by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in which the
"Board recommended that a limitation on the right to rescind be established because the title to
residential real properties may be clouded by the uncertainty regarding the right of rescission."
Id.
796. Id. at 988.
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discharge of any security interest taken by the creditor in conjunction with the
extension of credit, leaving the creditor with only an unsecured claim on the
principal amount.797 The TILA also allows for money damages for violations
with a one year statute of limitations.798 However, the statute specifically
provides that, as a defense of recoupment or set-off to an action for collection
of the debt by the creditor, the consumer may assert the damages to which the
consumer would be entitled to under the Act for any violations.799
In dissent, Judge Pariente noted that the 1995 amendment to 15 U.S.C. §
1635(i)(3) applied to all consumer credit transactions in existence and pro-
vided "'[n]othing in this subsection affects a consumer's right of rescission in
recoupment under State law,"' 8°° and that the majority's interpretation ran
contrary to Congress' intent.80' Judge Pariente noted that 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f)
was not part of the original statute, "but rather has been described as part of a
series of technical amendments designed to improve the administration of
TILA. In fact, the original version of [15 U.S.C.] § 1635, which created the
statutory remedy of rescission, had no time limitations.'
8 0 2
Finally, the appellate court certified the following question to the Su-
preme Court of Florida as being of great importance:
UNDER FLORIDA LAW, MAY AN ACTION FOR STATU-
TORY RIGHT OF RESCISSION PURSUANT TO THE TRUTH
IN LENDING ACT, 15 U.S.C.A. SECTION 1635 BE REVIVED
AS A DEFENSE IN RECOUPMENT BEYOND THE THREE
YEAR LIMIT ON THE RIGHT OF RESCISSION SET FORTH
IN SECTION 1635(f)?80
3
797. Id. at 999 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(b); Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co.,
898 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1988), aff'd in part, 898 F. 2d 907 (3d Cir. 1990)).
798. Beach, 670 So. 2d at 989 (citation omitted).
799. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(e) (West 1982)). In its reasoning, the court relied on
Bowery v. Babbit, 128 So. 801 (Fla. 1930), for the following general rule of statutory interpreta-
tion:
[Wlhere a statute confers a right and expressly fixes the period within which suit
to enforce the right must be brought, such period is treated as the essence of the
right to maintain the action, and the plaintiff or complainant has the burden of
affirmatively showing that his suit was commenced within the period provided.
Beach, 670 So. 2d at 991.
800. Id. at 994 (Pariente, J., dissenting) (quoting Pub. L. No. 104-29 §§ 5, 8, 109 Stat. 1517
(1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1635(0)).
801. Id
802. Id.
803. Id.
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Home Savings of America, F.S.B. v. Goldstein.804 The trial court granted
summary judgment on the ground that there had been violations of the Federal
Truth in Lending Act ('TfIILA"). 80 5 Five specific grounds were alleged by the
appellees/borrowers, but "the trial court affirmatively refused to specify what
violations it found in the documents.,, 8°r The appellate court stated that its
review was hampered by the trial court's failure in this regard.807 The court
further noted that one of the alleged violations was the exclusion of the Florida
intangible tax finance charge.808 Since the entry of the summary judgment in
this case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal decided, in Pignato v. Great
Western Bank,09 that the charge was excludable under the TWfA. The trial
court appeared to have relied on Rodash v. AIB Mortgage Co.,810 which the
Fourth District Court of Appeal departed from in deciding Pignato.81 1 The
court also found that material issues of fact and law remained on the other
violations.812 Thus, the court reversed and remanded.81 3
XXX. USURY
Donofro v. Dick.14 The first district affirmed the trial court's finding of a
lack of "'corrupt intent to knowingly and willfully charge and receive an
unlawful rate of interest' because the record contained competent and
substantial evidence supporting the finding.815 The court reversed the attor-
neys' fee award of $5,576 because the award exceeded that specified in the
note.816 The note called for an award of ten percent of the principal due under
the note or $750, whichever was greater. Under that provision, $2,200 was
due on the $22,000 outstanding. The court noted that under section 687.06 of
the Florida Statutes,' 7 where the parties have provided for fees in a written
804. 672 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
805. Id. at 883.
806. Id. at 884.
807. Id.
808. Id.
809. 664 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App 1995).
810. 16F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. 1994).
811. Home Savings, 672 So. 2d at 884.
812. Id. (citing Moore v. Morris, 475 So. 2d 666, 668-69 (Fla. 1985)).
813. Id.
814. 21 Fla. L. Weekly D1339 (1st Dist. Ct. App. June 4, 1996).
815. Id. (quoting Sumner v. Investment Mortgage Co. of Fla., 332 So. 2d 103, 105 (Fla. 1st
Dist. CL App. 1976), cert. denied, 344 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 1977)).
816. Id.
817. FLA. STAT. § 687.06 (1993).
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instrument, and the fee does not exceed ten percent of the principal, the fee is
deemed reasonable and, absent a showing that the fee raises equitable ques-
tions, such as unconscionability, the parties have contracted away their
opportunity to have judicial inquiry into whether a greater or lesser fee should
be awarded.818
Jersey Palm-Gross, Inc. v. Paper.819 The Supreme Court of Florida
affirmed the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Jersey Palm-Gross,
Inc. v. Paper,820 in which the fourth district certified conflict with the Fifth
District Court of Appeal's opinion in Forest Creek Development Co. v. Liberty
Savings & Loan Ass'n.8 2 1 The supreme court disapproved of Forest Creek
insofar as it was inconsistent with the opinion in the present case.822 The
Fourth District Court of Appeal posed the following question, which the
Supreme Court of Florida answered in the negative:
[W]hether the existence of a contractual disclaimer of intent to
violate the usury laws commonly known as a 'usury savings clause'
in the loan documents in this case removes the determination of
usurious intent from a factual inquiry and conclusively proves as a
matter of law that the lender could not have 'willfully' or know-
ingly charged or accepted an excessive interest rate.
8 23
Justice Anstead, who authored the court's opinion,824 announced the
court's core holding on the effect of these clauses, stating, "[W]e conclude that
a usury savings clause cannot, by itself, absolutely insulate a lender from a
818. Id. (citing Dean v. Coyne, 455 So. 2d 576, 576 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984); A&E
Int'l Enters., Inc. v. Gold Credit Co., 450 So. 2d 1166, 1166 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, 461 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1984); Sepler v. Emanuel, 388 So. 2d 28, 29 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1980)).
819. 658 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 1995).
820. 639 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review granted, 651 So. 2d 1194 (Fla.),
decision approved, 658 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 1995). See Brown et. al., supra note 423, at 358
(discussing the opinion rendered in this case).
821. 531 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988), review denied, 541 So. 2d 1172 (Fla.
1989).
822. Jersey Palm-Gross, 658 So. 2d at 532.
823. Id. at 533.
824. Concurring in Anstead's opinion were Chief Justice Grimes, and Justices Shaw, Kogan,
Harding, and Wells. Justice Overton also joined Anstead's opinion and wrote a concurrence in
which Justice Wells joined. Justice Overton wrote "to emphasize that a savings clause is still a
valid factor-but not the exclusive factor-in determining the intent of the lender at the time of
making the loan," and ended by noting that the borrower still has the burden of proof on the issue
of usurious intent. Id. at 537.
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finding of usury."8 Rather, such clauses are but one factor properly consid-
ered in the determination of the lender's intent . 26 The court also felt that its
rule struck the proper balance between the legislature's policy and "the need to
preserve otherwise good faith, albeit complex, transactions which may
inadvertently exact an unlawful rate of interest."8 27  Such clauses have a
legitimate purpose and, thus, should be enforced under appropriate circum-
stances, such as where the actual rate charged is close to the legal rate, and
"the transaction is not clearly usurious at the outset but only becomes usurious
upon the happening of a future contingency." 2s This statement raises inter-
esting analytical questions since "it is generally agreed that money, which is
not absolutely payable, is not interest for usury purposes."8 29
Levine v. United Companies Life Insurance Co.8 3° The Supreme Court of
Florida reviewed the Third District Court of Appeal's decision in this case, 831
and it rejected that court's view in so far as it conflicts with the court's opinion
in Jersey Palm-Gross v. Paper,32 holding that a usury savings clause is not
conclusive evidence of lack of usurious intent, but is merely relevant evidence
to be considered on the issue of intent.8 33
XXXI. CONCLUSION
The foregoing survey of cases and legislation presents selected materials
of significance to real estate professionals. Although there seems to be no
consistent pattern to the case law and legislative development, the survey is
useful in maintaining contact with the progression of real property law.
825. Id. at 535.
826. Id.
827. Jersey Palm-Gross, 658 So. 2d at 535.
828. Id. (quoting and approving of Judge Pariente's statement in the fourth district's opinion
in the present case, Jersey Palm-Gross, 639 So. 2d at 671).
829. Brown et. al., supra note 423, at 360.
830. 659 So. 2d 265 (Fa. 1995).
831. Levine v. United Companies Life Ins., Co., 638 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1994), decision approved, 659 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1995).
832. 658 So. 2d 531 (Fa. 1995).
833. Levine, 659 So. 2d at 267.
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